A principal-agent model of corruption

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Groenendijk, Nico (1997) A principal-agent model of corruption. Crime, law and social change, 27 (3-4). pp. 207-229. ISSN 0925-4994

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Abstract:One of the new avenues in the study of political corruption is that of neo-institutional economics, of which the principal-agent theory is a part. In this article a principal-agent model of corruption is presented, in which there are two principals (one of which is corrupting), and one agent (who is corrupted). The behaviour of these principals and agent is analysed in terms of the costs and benefits associated with different actions. The model is applied to political corruption in representative democracies, showing that, contrary to common belief, the use of principal-agent models is not limited to bureaucratic corruption.
Item Type:Article
Copyright:© Springer
Faculty:
Management and Governance (SMG)
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Link to this item:http://purl.utwente.nl/publications/77654
Official URL:http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008267601329
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