Extended KCI attack against two-party key establishment protocols


Tang, Qiang and Chen, Liqun (2011) Extended KCI attack against two-party key establishment protocols. Information Processing Letters, 111 (15). pp. 744-747. ISSN 0020-0190

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Abstract:We introduce an extended Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) attack against two-party key establishment protocols, where an adversary has access to both long-term and ephemeral secrets of a victim. Such an attack poses serious threats to both key authentication and key confirmation properties of a key agreement protocol, and it seems practical because the adversary could obtain the victims ephemeral secret in a number of methods; for example, by installing some Trojan horse into the victims computer platform or by exploiting the imperfectness of the pseudo-random number generator in the platform. We demonstrate that the 3-pass HMQV protocol, which is secure against the standard KCI attack, is vulnerable to this new attack. Furthermore, we show a countermeasure to prevent such an attack.

Item Type:Article
Copyright:© 2011 Elsevier
Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science (EEMCS)
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Link to this item:http://purl.utwente.nl/publications/77274
Official URL:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ipl.2011.05.009
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