Stochastic games with endogenous transitions

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Joosten, Reinoud and Meijboom, Robin (2010) Stochastic games with endogenous transitions. [Report]

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Abstract:We introduce a stochastic game in which transition probabilities depend on the history of the play, i.e., the players' past action choices. To solve this new type of game under the limiting average reward criterion, we determine the set of jointly-convergent pure-strategy rewards which can be supported by equilibria involving threats. We examine the following setting for motivational and expository purposes. Each period, two agents exploiting a fishery choose between catching with restraint or without. The fish stock is in either of two
states, High or Low, and in the latter each action pair yields lower payoffs. Restraint is harmless to the fish, but it is a dominated strategy in each stage game. Absence of restraint damages the resource, i.e., the less restraint the agents show, the higher the probablities that Low occurs at the next stage of the play. This state may even become 'absorbing', i.e., transitions to High become impossible.
Item Type:Report
Copyright:© 2010 Max Planck Gesellschaft
Faculty:
Management and Governance (SMG)
Research Chair:
Link to this item:http://purl.utwente.nl/publications/76562
Official URL:https://papers.econ.mpg.de/evo/discussionpapers/2010-24.pdf
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