Anonymity and Verifiability in Voting: Understanding (Un)Linkability


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Langer, Lucie and Jonker, Hugo and Pieters, Wolter (2010) Anonymity and Verifiability in Voting: Understanding (Un)Linkability. In: Information and Communications Security. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 6476 . Springer Verlag, Berlin, pp. 296-310. ISBN 9783642176494

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Abstract:Anonymity and verifiability are crucial security requirements for voting. Still, they seem to be contradictory, and confusion exists about their precise meanings and compatibility. In this paper, we resolve the confusion by showing that both can be expressed in terms of (un)linkability: while anonymity requires unlinkability of voter and vote, verifiability requires linkability of voters and election result. We first provide a conceptual model which captures anonymity as well as verifiability. Second, we express the semantics of (un)linkability in terms of (in)distinguishability. Third, we provide an adversary model that describes which capabilities the attacker has for establishing links. These components form a comprehensive model for describing and analyzing voting system security. In a case study we use our model to analyze the security of the voting scheme Prêt à Voter. Our work contributes to a deeper understanding of anonymity and verifiability and their correlation in voting.
Item Type:Book Section
Copyright:© 2010 Springer
Faculty:
Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science (EEMCS)
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Link to this item:http://purl.utwente.nl/publications/75062
Official URL:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17650-0_21
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