Neo-classical economics, institutional economics and improved fisheries management

Burg van der, Tsjalle (2000) Neo-classical economics, institutional economics and improved fisheries management. Marine Policy, 24 (1). pp. 45-51. ISSN 0308-597X

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Abstract:	According to neo-classical economists, taxes and individual transferable quotas (ITQs) are the most efficient measures for dealing with the problem of overfishing. Institutional economists, however, criticise neo-classical economists for neglecting political problems, enforcement problems and transaction costs. In relation to this, they argue that taxes and ITQs have serious weaknesses as well. Taking account of both neo-classical and institutional arguments, a new management system is proposed. The system is as efficient in the neo-classical sense as taxes and ITQs, but it also has certain advantages in view of institutional aspects.
Item Type:	Article
Copyright:	© 2000 Elsevier
Faculty:	Management and Governance (SMG)
Research Group:	Legal and Economic Governance Studies (LeGS)
Link to this item:	http://purl.utwente.nl/publications/74298
Official URL:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0308-597X(99)00008-1
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