A note on the nucleolus for 2-convex TU games

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Driessen, Theo S.H. and Hou, Dongshuang (2010) A note on the nucleolus for 2-convex TU games. International Journal of Game Theory, 39 (1-2). pp. 185-189. ISSN 0020-7276

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Abstract:For 2-convex n-person cooperative TU games, the nucleolus is determined as some type of constrained equal award rule. Its proof is based on Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley’s geometrical characterization for the intersection of the prekernel with the core. Pairwise bargaining ranges within the core are required to be in equilibrium. This system of non-linear equations is solved and its unique solution agrees with the nucleolus.
Item Type:Article
Additional information:Open Access
Copyright:© 2010 Springer
Faculty:
Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science (EEMCS)
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Link to this item:http://purl.utwente.nl/publications/72458
Official URL:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0216-z
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