A note on equivalence of consistency and bilateral consistency through converse consistency

Driessen, Theo and Hu, Cheng-Chengt (2009) A note on equivalence of consistency and bilateral consistency through converse consistency. Games and Economic Behavior, 65 (2). pp. 644-648. ISSN 0899-8256

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Abstract:	In the framework of (set-valued or single-valued) solutions for coalitional games with transferable utility, the three notions of consistency, bilateral consistency, and converse consistency are frequently used to provide axiomatic characterizations of a particular solution (like the core, prekernel, prenucleolus, Shapley value). Our main equivalence theorem claims that a solution satisfies consistency (with respect to an arbitrary reduced game) if and only if the solution satisfies both bilateral consistency and converse consistency (with respect to the same reduced game). The equivalence theorem presumes transitivity of the reduced game technique as well as difference independence on payoff vectors for two-person reduced games.
Item Type:	Article
Copyright:	© 2009 Elsevier
Faculty:	Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science (EEMCS)
Research Group:	Discrete Mathematics and Mathematical Programming (DMMP)
Link to this item:	http://purl.utwente.nl/publications/68056
Official URL:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.01.011
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