Two axiomatizations of the kernel of TU games: bilateral and converse reduced game properties
Driessen, T.S.H. and Hu, C.-C. (2006) Two axiomatizations of the kernel of TU games: bilateral and converse reduced game properties. [Report]
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| Abstract: | We provide two axiomatic characterizations of the kernel of TU games by means of both bilateral consistency and converse consistency with respect to two types of two-person reduced games. According to the first type, the worth of any single player in the two-person reduced game is derived from the difference of player's positive (instead of maximum) surpluses. According to the second type, the worth of any single player in the two-person reduced game either coincides with the two-person max reduced game or refers to the constrained equal loss rule applied to an appropriate two-person bankruptcy problem, the claims of which are given by the player's positve surpluses. |
| Item Type: | Report |
| Faculty: | Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science (EEMCS) |
| Research Group: | |
| Link to this item: | http://purl.utwente.nl/publications/66580 |
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