Associated consistency and values for TU games

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Driessen, T.S.H. (2006) Associated consistency and values for TU games. [Report]

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Abstract:In the framework of the solution theory for cooperative transferable utility games, Hamiache axiomatized the well-known Shapley value as the unique one-point solution verifying the inessential game property, continuity, and associated consistency. The purpose of this paper is to extend Hamiache's axiomatization to the class of efficient, symmetric, and linear values, of which the Shapley value is the most important representative. For this enlarged class of values, explicit relationships to the Shapley value are exploited in order to axiomatize such values with reference to a slightly adapted inessential game property, continuity, and a similar associated consistency. The latter axiom requires that the solutions of the initial game and its associated game (with the same player set, but a different characteristic function) coincide.

Item Type:Report
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Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science (EEMCS)
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Link to this item:http://purl.utwente.nl/publications/66576
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