Two extensions of the Shapley value for cooperative games

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Driessen, T.S.H. and Paulusma, D. (1999) Two extensions of the Shapley value for cooperative games. [Report]

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Abstract:Two extensions of the Shapley value are given. First we consider a probabilistic framework in which certain consistent allocation rules such as the Shapley value are characterized. The second generalization of the Shapley value is an extension to the structure of posets by means of a recursive form. In the latter setting, the Shapley value for quasi-concave games is shown to be a core-allocation.
Item Type:Report
Additional information:Imported from MEMORANDA
Faculty:
Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science (EEMCS)
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Link to this item:http://purl.utwente.nl/publications/65683
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