The compromise value for cooperative games with random payoffs.

Share/Save/Bookmark

Timmer, Judith (2006) The compromise value for cooperative games with random payoffs. Mathematical methods of operations research, 64 (1). pp. 95-106. ISSN 1432-2994

[img] PDF
Restricted to UT campus only
: Request a copy
159kB
Abstract:This paper introduces and studies the compromise value for cooperative games with random payoffs, that is, for cooperative games where the payoff to a coalition of players is a random variable. This value is a compromise between utopia payoffs and minimal rights and its definition is based on the compromise value for NTU games and the τ-value for TU games. It is shown that the nonempty core of a cooperative game with random payoffs is bounded by the utopia payoffs and the minimal rights. Consequently, for such games the compromise value exists. Further, we show that the compromise value of a cooperative game with random payoffs coincides with the τ-value of a related TU game if the players have a certain type of preferences. Finally, the compromise value and the marginal value, which is defined as the average of the marginal vectors, coincide on the class of two-person games. This results in a characterization of the compromise value for two-person games.
Item Type:Article
Copyright:© 2006 Springer
Faculty:
Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science (EEMCS)
Research Group:
Link to this item:http://purl.utwente.nl/publications/63397
Official URL:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00186-006-0072-6
Export this item as:BibTeX
EndNote
HTML Citation
Reference Manager

 

Repository Staff Only: item control page

Metis ID: 238147