Provable anonymity


Garcia, F.D. and Hasuo, I. and Pieters, W. and Rossum, P.J.B. van (2005) Provable anonymity. In: Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering, Fairfax, VA, USA (pp. pp. 63-72).

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Abstract:This paper provides a formal framework for the analysis
of information hiding properties of anonymous communication
protocols in terms of epistemic logic. The key ingredient
is our notion of observational equivalence, which is
based on the cryptographic structure of messages and relations
between otherwise random looking messages. Two
runs are considered observationally equivalent if a spy cannot
discover any meaningful distinction between them. We
illustrate our approach by proving sender anonymity and
unlinkability for two anonymizing protocols, Onion Routing
and Crowds. Moreover, we consider a version of Onion
Routing in which we inject a subtle error and show how our
framework is capable of capturing this flaw.
Item Type:Conference or Workshop Item
Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science (EEMCS)
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