Decentralization and mechanism design for online machine scheduling


Share/Save/Bookmark

Heydenreich, Birgit and Müller, Rudolf and Uetz, Marc (2006) Decentralization and mechanism design for online machine scheduling. In: 10th Scandinavian Workshop on Algorithm Theory, SWAT 2006, 6-8 July, 2006, Riga, Latvia (pp. pp. 136-147).

[img] PDF
Restricted to UT campus only
: Request a copy
458kB
Abstract:We study the online version of the classical parallel machine scheduling problem to minimize the total weighted completion time from a new perspective: We assume that the data of each job, namely its release date $r_j$, its processing time $p_j$ and its weight $w_j$ is only known to the job itself, but not to the system. Furthermore, we assume a decentralized setting where jobs choose the machine on which they want to be processed themselves. We study this problem from the perspective of algorithmic mechanism design. We introduce the concept of a myopic best response equilibrium, a concept weaker than the dominant strategy equilibrium, but appropriate for online problems. We present a polynomial time, online scheduling mechanism that, assuming rational behavior of jobs, results in an equilibrium schedule that is 3.281-competitive. The mechanism deploys an online payment scheme that induces rational jobs to truthfully report their private data. We also show that the underlying local scheduling policy cannot be extended to a mechanism where truthful reports constitute a dominant strategy equilibrium.
Item Type:Conference or Workshop Item
Copyright:© 2006 Springer
Faculty:
Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science (EEMCS)
Research Group:
Link to this item:http://purl.utwente.nl/publications/62214
Official URL:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11785293_15
Export this item as:BibTeX
EndNote
HTML Citation
Reference Manager

 

Repository Staff Only: item control page