A note on scoring rules that respect majority in choice and elimination

Woeginger, Gerhard J. (2003) A note on scoring rules that respect majority in choice and elimination. Mathematical Social Sciences, 46 (3). pp. 347-354. ISSN 0165-4896

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Abstract:	In a recent paper [Mathematical Social Sciences 43 (2002) 151], M.R. Sanver investigates scoring rules for social choice problems with n voters and m alternatives. He proves that unless n ${2, 3, 4, 6, 8}$ a scoring rule cannot simultaneously respect majority in choice and majority in elimination. In this short technical note, we first point out a serious flaw in Sanver’s proof. Then we provide a complete proof for a corrected version of Sanver’s statement: Unless n ${2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12}$ a scoring rule cannot simultaneously respect majority in choice and majority in elimination
Item Type:	Article
Copyright:	© 2003 Elsevier
Faculty:	Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science (EEMCS)
Research Group:	Discrete Mathematics and Mathematical Programming (DMMP)
Link to this item:	http://purl.utwente.nl/publications/58664
Official URL:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00050-7
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