Detecting Key-Dependencies

Dini, Gianluca and Helme, Arne and Stabell-Kulo, Tage (1998) Detecting Key-Dependencies. In: 3rd Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, ACISP 1998, July 13-15, 1998, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia.

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Abstract:	The confidentiality of encrypted data depends on how well the key under which it was encrypted is maintained. If a session key was exchanged encrypted under a long-term key, exposure of the long-term key may reveal the session key and hence the data encrypted with it. The problem of key-dependencies between keys can be mapped onto connectivity of a graph, and the resulting graph can be inspected. This article presents a structured method (an algorithm) with which key-dependencies can be detected and analysed. Several well-known protocols are examined, and it is shown that they are vulnerable to certain attacks exploiting key-dependencies. Protocols which are free from this defect do exist. That is, when a session is terminated it is properly closed.
Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item
Copyright:	© 1998 Springer-Verlag
Faculty:	Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science (EEMCS)
Research Group:	Distributed and Embedded Systems (DIES)
Link to this item:	http://purl.utwente.nl/publications/56226
Official URL:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BFb0053747
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