An Intruder Model for Verifying Termination in Security Protocols

Cederquist, Jan and Dashti, M.T. (2005) An Intruder Model for Verifying Termination in Security Protocols. [Report]

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Abstract:	We formally describe an intruder that is suitable for checking fairness properties of security protocols. The intruder is proved to be equivalent to the Dolev-Yao intruder that respects the resilient communication channels assumption, in the sense that, if a fairness property holds in one of these models, it also holds in the other.
Item Type:	Report
Copyright:	©2005 CTIT
Research Group:	Distributed and Embedded Systems (DIES)
Link to this item:	http://purl.utwente.nl/publications/54532
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