THE GENESIS OF A SYSTEM

COALITION FORMATION IN MOZAMBIAN HIGHER EDUCATION, 1993 - 2003
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COALITION FORMATION IN MOZAMBIAN HIGHER EDUCATION, 1993 - 2003

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Preface

After almost five and a half years this study on Mozambican higher education policy development comes to an end. Of course, on the one hand it is a relief because the task was difficult and is now finally over. On the other hand it is somewhat saddening because the opportunity to do a PhD was a unique chance where I was paid to follow my curiosity, read interesting books, have oceans of time to think about captivating issues and discuss with others about fascinating subjects, have the opportunity to travel to many countries, meet many nice and interesting people and, without the interference of client’s interest, write my own book that only covers those issues of my own choice and interest. Seen from that perspective, it was a special and luxurious period of my life and many people, in one way or another, have contributed along the way. While all have been important, I would like to acknowledge some of them in particular.

First and foremost, I would like to thank my promotors Guy, Jeroen and Leo. They did a formidable job guiding a graduate from a completely different social science tradition through this research journey. Puzzled as I was in the beginning about “CHEPS’ way of social research”, they supported me through the study and helped me to improve and sharpen my thoughts. Announced or unannounced, they always made time available to help me with all my struggles in research. Our numerous encounters were invaluable.

It was wonderful to do a PhD at CHEPS. The image of the lonely PhD researcher struggling alone does not hold here. CHEPS is an enriching and stimulating learning environment, which at the same time provides a vibrant and social atmosphere where people like making time for parties and drinks.

This study could not have been done without the Ministry for Higher Education, Science and Technology in Mozambique (MESCT) where I stayed for more than a year. I had the good fortune to experience working in a unique organisation that was established from scratch. MESCT staff helped me enormously with this study and I could always easily pop by people’s office for a drink or a chat. I particularly would like to thank Lídia who invited me to do this study at MESCT and Arlindo who supervised me throughout the period I was there.

I am very thankful to the many people in the universities, donor agencies, ministries and business sector who took the time to share their experiences and thoughts and showed me around the places they worked at.

For moments of doubts and relaxation I could always count on Henno, Eric Marijck and Anne. We shared ideas, doubts and frustrations about our studies. But above all, our meetings were characterised by humour and by the shared understanding that there are far more important things in live. Thank you for the dinners, drinks and late night talks.

Thanks to this research I met great people in different part of the world who I have regularly visited the last couple of five years, Temble and Nico in South Africa, people from CIPES in Portugal and Jos, Kitty, Roland, Fatima and the Chilundo’s in Mozambique. Thanks for all the hospitality.
In order to be able to do this research I had to learn Portuguese. I had the fortune to learn this beautiful language from three excellent teachers. Braulia, Ana Isabel and Fernanda, *muito obrigada*! I would like to thank Jeroen Rauwers and Marwine who always were willing to provide the literature I needed. Gillian thank you for supporting me with the last practical things to complete this dissertation. I would like to thank the Salernos for editing and Henno and Jon for going through the chapters again in the tropical Ugandan heat.

My family followed the study with great interest and supported me from the side line. I thank them for their care, diversion and confidence in me.

The last words are for Martijn. Though I was often away from home or locked in my study, you were always at my side. You did my life a world of good.

Jasmin Beverwijk
Kampala, April 2005
# Introduction

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1 Introduction

1.1 Higher education policy developments in Sub Saharan Africa

Higher education in Sub Saharan Africa, as in most developing countries, is mainly imported from Europe and relatively young. The majority of the colonial universities have been established around 1950. Since then the number of higher education institutions has grown rapidly. At the end of the 1960s Sub Saharan Africa only had 6 universities; today it is estimated that over 300 institutions are in operation (Teferra and Altbach, 2004).

This expansion is the result of various factors such as demographic growth, an increased number of people completing secondary education, and government incentives aimed at stimulating university studies. In the early 1960s, governments assumed higher education institutions would contribute to the national development effort and the rebuilding of the country by producing high skilled manpower and ‘the African identity’. Therefore, they made substantial allocations to higher education available (Hinchliffe, 1987). As the universities were considered to build up the nation, the government intervened strongly in the sector. The courses taught in the institutions were specifically chosen to support those sectors contributing most to the development of the new independent country. Hence in Sub Saharan Africa, higher education policies since the 1960s and 1970s has been shaped by nationalist ambition and an emphasis on rebuilding the countries (Sawyerr, 2002). The result has been an impressive growth in student numbers (see Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>2,118</td>
<td>4,822</td>
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<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>19,633</td>
<td>23,073</td>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>44,964</td>
<td>150,072</td>
<td>335,824</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>5,474</td>
<td>5,856</td>
<td>17,578</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>8,479</td>
<td>8,339</td>
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Source: Task Force on higher education and society, 2000
During the 1980s, economies in Sub Saharan Africa stagnated. They suffered from the world-wide decline in international trade, debt crises, inflation, protectionist trade barriers raised by some industrialised countries, and from corruption. Other events that negatively affected the African economy included the famines, sudden demographic growth, political upheavals and war. During the 1970s, the average growth rate of Gross National Product (GNP) per capita for Sub Saharan Africa was approximately 2% whereas in the 1980s, it showed no growth at all (Samoff and Carrol, 2002).

In the 1980s and 1990s the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank introduced Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) to reverse these economic crises. SAPs intended to give room to market forces along the lines of neo-liberal ideology by removing the often state-imposed norms on production, pricing, and exchange rates. They also pushed governments to cut the costs for public services. Consequently the capacity for African governments to finance public services, including higher education, sharply decreased. There was another important factor for the reduction of funding for this sector. Since introduction, higher education institutions in Africa were developed with external support from a variety of different sources, including former colonial governments and religious organisations. However, during the 1980s, the ideologies and beliefs of many donors changed. They believed that higher education was for the elites, that priority should be given to primary and secondary education, and acted accordingly (Teferra and Altbach, 2003, 21). In short, the reduction in higher education funding was to a large extent due to the economic crisis during the 1980s and the changing priorities of many donors (Chapman and Austin, 2002).

Nevertheless demand for higher education continued to grow. Enrolments often increased faster than the capacity to plan for or accommodate. The financial constraints had a negative impact on the physical and human resources in higher education with i.e. libraries becoming outdated and buildings deteriorating. Many staff lacked motivation or even left due to poor rewards and working conditions. Altogether the decrease in funding had devastating effects on the conditions for teaching, learning and research (Ajayi et al, 1996).

Although the agenda of Sub Saharan African governments for higher education was to a large extent dominated by nationalist ambitions during the 1960s and 1970s, the pressure of increasing demand and decreasing funding has largely determined policy since then. Many governments reassessed their higher education policy and sought to develop new coherent frameworks to enable universities to fulfil its role and meet the needs of society as a whole.

The problems faced by governments and higher education institutions in Sub Saharan Africa since the 1980s are certainly not unique. To some extent, institutions in the industrialised world face similar problems, albeit less severe. Moreover, the continuing struggle to find appropriate policies and incentives is not restricted to the African continent. In one form or another, they are on the
political agenda in many countries. Yet, in developing countries they all surface at the same moment which makes these countries rich cases to help us understand the dynamics of higher education policy.

1.2 Higher education policy developments in Mozambique

From the series of possible cases, we selected Mozambique. Mozambique is interesting due to its turbulent context causing drastic changes in higher education. Since the 1990s, after almost 30 years of devastating war, a new higher education system has been practically reinstitutionalised. Since the establishment of the first higher education institution in 1962, the sector has been affected by regimes with totally different ideologies.

The first “higher education system” (1962-1974) consisted of one national university based on colonial ideology, which in practice implied that higher education was reserved for the rich Portuguese. After the Portuguese left, the Government of Mozambique (GoM) adopted a Marxist-Leninist ideology. From 1974 to the beginning of the 1990s, Mozambique had three universities which were centrally planned according to clear prescriptions with respect to curriculum, staff, students and the entire infrastructure.

By the end of the 1980s, the government abandoned the strict socialist programme and shifted towards a more liberal constitution which included democracy and free market principles. For the higher education sector this resulted in the adoption of a new law. This law (nr. 1/93) established the autonomy of higher education institutions and allowed private ones to develop. The change in law had major consequences as the introduction of autonomy meant the level of possible government intervention became limited to paying staff, maintaining facilities and equipment and retaining a decision-making role in the establishment and closing of new institutions. Rectors took on an advisory role to the Council of Ministers on higher education policy and were given substantive freedom in terms of institutional management. They negotiated directly with the Minister of Planning and Finance on any financial matters.

As the higher education sector developed, by 1996 it was clear it could not meet the demands of society. Like other Sub Saharan countries Mozambique lacked adequate financial resources and faced an unprecedented demand for access, with ensuing negative impacts on physical and human resources. Moreover, as each higher education institution developed its own policies, the sector as a whole lacked elements or system characteristics such as quality assurance mechanisms or a credit transfer system that allowed for student mobility. The higher education sector that emerged was therefore inefficient. At the same time, it was generally agreed that the sector had to expand and diversify further given there were not enough graduates to fulfil labour market requirements.
To ensure expansion took place without loss of quality, representatives of government and higher education pushed for a national coordination unit within the government that would develop system-wide policies whilst respecting institutional autonomy. The newly elected government (1999) supported this. In January 2000 it established a Ministry for Higher Education, Science and Technology (MESCT). Through MESCT a national coordination system was implemented and Mozambican higher education entered a new phase. The Ministry initiated new policies to tackle existing problems and created a supportive environment for new opportunities.

1.3 Research objectives

This study analyses the Mozambican higher education policy developments between 1993 and 2003. The context in which these developments took place was turbulent as after colonisation the country endured wars, droughts, famine and suppressive regimes that did not allow opposition. In the early 1990s the country shifted to a new ideology that permitted democratic principles, such as, free elections, freedom of speech and an independent legal system. The country is rebuilding itself and developing appropriate organisations to make democracy work. Hence, policy-making is shaped by recently created political and legal institutions which are still in the process of formation.

This thesis has two objectives. The first is to provide a detailed analysis of the Mozambican higher education policy developments between 1993-2003. We describe the developments whereby a higher education system is practically developed afresh in a turbulent context.

The second aim is to provide empirical evidence to further contribute to theory on public policy and policy change. The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1986) is used to explain Mozambican higher education policy. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith argue that people from different institutions act on the basis of their perceptions of policies (policy beliefs) and form advocacy coalitions with others who have similar perceptions. Members of a coalition then develop strategies to influence government decisions in a specific policy area according to their common policy belief. Usually, there is one dominant coalition and one or more minority coalitions, each holding different beliefs and seeking to realise objectives over time. The dominant coalition to a large extent determines the government programme. The ability to influence a policy process depends on the advocacy coalition’s resources, such as political power, finance and information. Political power, for instance, is important for influencing regulation, budgets and government institution personnel.

Following ACF, policy change takes place in two ways: 1) through the interaction of competing advocacy coalitions, in which each seek to translate
their policy beliefs into government programmes through increasing their political resources and policy learning and 2) through changes in the environment such as socio-economic developments, as a result of which the dominant coalition creates a new understanding of reality that affects both its beliefs and therefore policy goals. The same environmental forces can enable a minor coalition to acquire more political resources enabling them to topple the dominant coalition and become dominant itself.

ACF identified the concepts resources and coordination as key elements in policy processes but in its original form paid little attention to it. A number of scholars argued that actors will not just act on the basis of common beliefs, form coalitions and engage in common activities to influence government policy. The interdependency between actors, caused by an actor’s need for resources to realise his goal, is also a factor that influences their decisions to actively join a coalition (Schlager, 1995, Zafonte & Sabatier, 1998, Fenger & Klok 2001). To gain more insight on the role of resources and coordination in policy processes, we focus specifically on these concepts in addition to the concept belief that forms the basic reason for actors to coalesce in a coalition.

Whether this framework, like most other established public policy theories or frameworks developed in a western industrialised context, may be profitably applied to the volatile context in which Mozambican higher education policy evolved, is the basis of this study. On the one hand there is the turbulent environment of Mozambique, a weak democracy. On the other hand, there is the situation where a higher education system faces major reconstruction.

Hence, the main research question underlying this thesis is:

“How did the policy on Mozambican higher education develop over the period 1993-2003? What can explain the process and outcomes?”

From this the following sub-questions arise:

• Why was a change on the policy on higher education initiated and how did it proceed?
• Who initiated this policy? How did the actors as defined by ACF react to new policy on higher education?
• How can the policy processes regarding higher education be conceptualised and explained from ACF perspective?
• To what extent does empirical evidence support or oppose the theoretical explanation provided by ACF?
1.4 Structure of the study

The initial focus of this book is on key elements that affected the development of higher education in Sub Saharan Africa. In order to understand the broader themes that shape higher education in an African country such as Mozambique, Chapter 2 analyses the history of higher education in Africa, particular how it was established and shaped under colonial rule. In addition it elaborates on the main issues and challenges confronting higher education in Sub Saharan Africa, namely the growing demand for higher education, decreasing funding, the debate on quality and relevance and the issue of governance. Chapter 3 describes the context in which Mozambican higher education was established and developed. It briefly discusses the historical, political and economic developments since the country was colonised by Portugal. Chapter 4 introduces the theoretical framework for this study. It defines the concepts and their relations relevant to the analysis. In addition it explores the criticisms of other scholars. The theoretical section concludes by highlighting aspects of the theoretical framework concentrated on and the expectations related to them. Chapter 5 describes in which way the key variables from the expectations are operationalised and which methods are used to collect and analyse the data for this study. The empirical data on higher education policy change between 1993-2003 was collected in a variety of ways and therefore this section is divided over two chapters. Chapter 6 describes the policy developments between 1993-1999 and is based on a historical reconstruction. It also lays out the history of higher education in Mozambique and the characteristics and problems that it confronted until the establishment of the new MESCT in 2000. Chapter 7 describes the policy developments between 2000-2003 that were studied as they unveiled during our stay in Mozambique. On the basis of the theoretical framework and expectations formulated in Chapter 4, Chapter 8 analyses the higher education policy change processes specifically through focussing on the developments of actors' beliefs and resources and how this has affected coalition behaviour. In addition it identifies the type of policy change the coalitions have realised through their actions and how external factors influenced this change. In conclusion, Chapter 9 analyses whether the logic of ACF, as developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith and further specified in the theoretical section, stands up to empirical testing. The chapter ends with a reflection on what the results of this study mean for ACF.
2 Higher Education in Sub Saharan Africa

2.1 Introduction on higher education in Sub Saharan Africa\(^1\)

In order to understand the broader themes that shape higher education in an African country such as Mozambique, this chapter focuses on key elements that affected the development of higher education in Sub Saharan Africa. We acknowledge that countries in Sub Saharan Africa are not homogenous. Every country has its own specific context and all have a wide diversity of ethnicities, cultures, religions and heritage. In addition, Sub Saharan Africa has a complex variety of legacies stemming from colonisation by various European countries, such as Belgium, Britain, France and Portugal. These historical differences have shaped the specific higher education systems and therefore it is difficult to generalise in regards to the 54 countries that constitute Sub Saharan Africa. However, there also are common elements confronting these African countries that have affected higher education. This chapter’s aim is to explore similarities over time in order to understand the present situation and challenges facing these countries\(^2\).

Higher education in Sub Saharan Africa, as in most developing countries, is mainly imported from Europe\(^3\) and relatively young. The majority of the colonial universities established around 1950. Since then the number of higher education institutions has grown rapidly. At the end of 1960 Sub Saharan Africa had only 6 universities, whereas today it is estimated that over 300 are in operation (Teferra & Altbach, 2004). With very few exceptions (mainly some of the smaller Portuguese-speaking countries\(^5\) every Sub Saharan African country has at least one university. Not only have the number of universities increased but also the diversity in types of institutions. Over the last couple of decades new types of institutions have been established such as, private higher education institutions, polytechnics and colleges, at a high speed. In 2001, for example, Nigeria had over 200 higher education institutions, whilst Uganda

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\(^1\) South Africa is excluded from this chapter. Although the country has many characteristics in common with other countries in Sub Saharan Africa, the unique history of apartheid and complex characteristics of polarised social and economic structure of this middle income developing country make it difficult to draw valid comparisons.

\(^2\) As Sawyerr (2001) points out, these features are not necessarily particular to Africa. Many of them are common to most developing countries (Sawyerr, 2002, p. 11)

\(^3\) Except for Ethiopia which has not been colonised.

\(^4\) In these countries preparations are underway to create one or more post secondary institutions (Teferra & Altbach, 2004)
had 22 and Angola a mere six (Jabril 2003, Carvalho et al, 2003, Strategic Plan of Uganda, 2003).

During the last two decades, higher education in Sub Saharan Africa has also seen a rapid growth in student numbers. Enrolments grew by an average of around 20% per year (Banya & Elu, 2001). However, despite this rapid increase, of all the world regions, Sub Saharan Africa still has the most underdeveloped higher education systems. In 1993 the enrolment ratio of the 18-23 age-group was 2.4 % against 18% in Latin America, 13.2% in the Arab States, 8.2 % in South East Asia and 51% in developed countries (Shabani, 1998).

Yet despite the existing diversity between the countries in Sub Saharan Africa, it appears fair to state that within a relatively short period of time most countries have reached impressive achievements both in terms of increase in number of institutions and students. As Neave (2003) points out, especially when compared to the speed of development of universities in Europe, higher education in Africa has developed rapidly.

Usually a single national university was the dominant mode. It was established as a state institution supplying human resources to run expanding bureaucracies and provide the guiding ideas to these newly independent nations (Court, 1992). Although observers disagree in terms of the extent to which curricula have been adapted to local needs and their potential for contributing to national needs development (van de Bor & Schutte 1989, White & van de Bor 1996, Castells 1996, Maassen 2000), it is generally agreed that the university structure has not changed much from the colonial days. Upon gaining independence, most Sub Saharan African states kept the existing colonial model and newly established universities were structured after those instituted by colonial powers (Domatob, 1998). The degree structures, departments-faculties models and institutional hierarchy remained largely unchanged. Therefore to understand current systems we need to understand their colonial origins.

Higher education institutions in Africa were developed from the beginning with external support from a number of different sources. Initially it came from religious organisations such as churches, philanthropic organisations and later from colonial governments. Since independence, the number of organisations or countries supporting higher education in Sub Saharan Africa expanded. Greater support was also gained from national agencies and higher education institutions of countries without colonies such as the United States, the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, China, Canada, Cuba, and the Scandinavian countries. International agencies such as UNESCO and lending agencies like the World Bank also became major actors in higher education policy. Private foundations including Rockefeller, Ford, Mellon, and the Carnegie Corporation

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5 The Soviet Union and the United States were interested in influencing the ideological orientation of African societies. The competition between the United States and the Soviet Union found a new battleground in Africa.
expanded their programs in Sub Saharan Africa. This external support presented itself in varying forms (for example direct support for capital expenditure, staff development, library support, research, student scholarships and technical assistance or indirect support through developing partnerships) and significance, often following global, regional, and national political and socio-economic trends. Moreover several private (both for-profit and non-profit) colleges in Europe and India implemented their own institutions in Sub Saharan Africa (Samoff & Carroll, 2002).

The remainder of this chapter will further elaborate upon these issues. The first section extensively focuses on the history of higher education in Africa, specifying how it was established and shaped under colonial rules. To do this, we point out the different philosophies to higher education of the Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone governments in Africa, which have consequently affected the higher education systems that exist today. Subsequently we will briefly outline discussions that have taken place after independence between various stakeholders on "the role of the university in Africa and how it would best serve the new independent countries". We will elaborate on the main issues and challenges confronting higher education in Sub Saharan Africa, such as the growing demand for it, decreasing funding, the debate on quality and relevance and the issue of governance. For the purpose of this study we will not elaborate on the developments in the areas of research, since this study on Mozambican higher education policy change does not include that component and the issues and challenges mentioned already provide sufficient food for thought.

2.2 History; colonial higher education

This section sketches the history of higher education in Sub Saharan Africa in broad terms⁶. The main focus is on higher education establishment in British and French colonies, given that most of the countries belonged to these two powers. Britain possessed over twenty colonies in Africa, thus being the largest colonial power on the continent (Lulat, 2003). France had eighteen colonies and a much less extensive higher education system for Sub Saharan African⁷. Portugal had 8, yet their higher education system in Sub Saharan Africa was very small. It consisted of only two universities, one in Angola and the other in Mozambique. Since this research focuses on Mozambique, colonised by Portugal, we also focus on Portuguese principles developing higher education in its colonies.

⁶ In the analysis this paragraph leaves out Ethiopia which has not been colonised and Congo which was the only country colonised by Belgium.

⁷ France had many colonies in Northern Africa.
It was until after World War I that colonial governments started to develop an official policy for provision of higher education in Africa, even though a public debate on the need for an African university had emerged as early as 1872. This debate was initiated by the educated elite in Freetown, Sierra Leone, whom had benefited from education provided by Fourah Bay College (FBC), established by the church. The students were critical of the narrow religious education provided by the Church Missionary Society and demanded a broader programme at tertiary level. After many debates the British government agreed and in 1876 Fourah Bay College started offering university degrees (Kandeh et al, 2003). Throughout most of the colonial period the priorities in developing higher education were to assure that (a) it would contribute to the maintenance of law and order in the colonies and (b) that the programmes were not costly to provide. Africans were therefore trained in the fields of economic, administrative, military and political sciences, enabling them to assist in administering the colonies. Consequently natural sciences were rarely offered (Castells, 1996). Portugal kept enrolments to a minimum and offered it primarily to sons and daughters of the Portuguese colonists. This already distinguishes it from the British and French models. Throughout Africa, the higher education system remained on a small scale until independence (Mário et al. 2003).

The next part of this section briefly sketches the history and characteristics of Anglophone-, Francophone- and Lusophone- higher education systems\(^8\) in Sub Sahara Africa.

### 2.2.1 Establishment of higher education in Anglophone Africa

After a number of committees and reports, the British eventually established higher education in some of its African territories. In the early 1940s, it became clear the colonies would soon become independent. The British authorities recognised there was an urgent need to train more Africans prior to this occurring (Ashby, 1961).

The Asquith report (1945), named after Justice Sir Cyril Asquith who headed the commission on higher education in British colonies, was for many years the basis of British policy for higher education in the colonial territories. The Asquith report was based on prior reports and advised on promotion of higher education learning, research and development and how bodies in the United Kingdom could co-operate with higher education institutions in the Colonies (Ashby, 1966).

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\(^8\) Despite the fact that each share a common linguistic identity, each group is not a homogenous entity and higher education systems within the groups differ, sometimes greatly.
At that time both British and African opinion was that the British model was vastly superior to others in the world and any modifications would imply a lowering of standards. Africans themselves were suspicious of any attempt to modify the conventional curriculum; afraid they would get a "second-rate" curriculum. As Ashby stated "the debate was overwhelmingly in favour of preserving the British academic heritage" (Ashby, 1966, p. 236). The Asquith report therefore advised the same British standards, following the same curricula pattern with minor modification to suit local conditions so that Africans could successfully compete in the European Academic World. According to British philosophy the main purpose for colonial universities was to produce the "elite" required to take over political and administrative control of a colony upon ultimately gaining its independence (Ashby, 1961).

The Asquith Report also set out the framework for so-called Special Relations between the University of London and Colonial higher education institutions under the supervision of the Inter-University Council for Higher Education in the Colonies (IUC). The University of London determined standards and awarded degrees. This framework also provided the possibility of adaptation in the curricula. Adaptation in the general degree pattern, however, was not permitted. As argued by Ashby (1965), the result was in fact that British models and standards for higher education were implanted into Africa and academic quality levels were set by the University of London (Ashby, 1965).

Over a short period of time, on the recommendation of the commission’s report, a number of higher education institutions, often referred to as the Asquith Colleges, were established by the British government in cooperation with the IUC established in 1946 (Lulat, 2003). Characteristic of these institutions was that they were high-cost, residential institutions located out of town. They had their own separate infrastructure which included roads, housing, sanitation systems and a large number of staff. Initially students were not required to pay fees in most countries, but were instead offered accommodation and living allowances to encourage and enable them to attend these institutions (Domato b, 1998).

2.2.1.1 American influence

Gradually resistance to the British model grew. In the mid 1950s, some of the heads of the colonial universities suggested there was an urgent need to review the principles of the Asquith Report. Azikiwe, the founder and executive chancellor of the University of Nigeria, for example, objected to the British curriculum. He considered the American land grant model college as a more suitable role-model for his university (Ashby, 1966). The United States, which had begun showing an interest in African education, was able to influence the developments on higher education in Sub Saharan Africa from this period on. Academics from the United States believed the American model for higher education was more relevant to Africa due to emphasis on vocational
education. The United States started offering scholarships for Africans to study at American universities and, in 1960, they sponsored (through Michigan State University) a university based on American principles.

At the same time, a group of British academics, including John Lockwood who was a member of the IUC, were also strongly encouraging flexibility and adaptation in higher education in the colonies. The IUC decided the Americans and British should co-operate on curriculum development. From there on, higher education in Anglophone Africa is strongly influenced by the Anglo-American cooperation with a focus on teaching vocational skills (Lulat, 2003).

2.2.2 Establishment of higher education in Francophone Africa

Contrary to the British model, France never offered such an elaborate colonial higher education programme (Evans, 1970). It is a matter of dispute as to why this was not done and what their objectives were with regards to African higher education. Lulat gives two main reasons why France offered limited higher education to their colonies. He argued the French government did not usually encourage missionaries to establish education facilities as it felt the primary purpose of Western education was to universalise French secular culture. Second, it staffed its civil service in the colonies almost exclusively with French personnel at all levels, therefore reducing demand for African personal (Lulat, 2003). Yet, Gifford and Weiskel have challenged the notion that French colonial education policy was aimed at assimilating Africans into French cultural and political life. They argue that while the rhetoric of assimilation was prevalent in French pre-colonial policy, it did not become government policy during the period of colonial rule. Despite African demands for educational parity with France it was only after World War II that African pressure had an influence on education policy in French colonies (Gifford & Weiskel 1971). Evans (1970) points out the assimilationist interpretation is too narrow and argues that the objective of French educational policy in Africa was not a matter on which there was unanimous agreement. In his study on Government and higher education relations in Francophone Africa, he came across many motivations, for example; the true goal was to safeguard the political domination, economic exploitation and cultural oppression of French imperialism in its African colonies; no attempt was ever made to define the role education was to play in the process of colonisation; France had no clear education policy for its overseas territories; France pursued an essentially elitist education policy mainly aimed at the wealthy, therefore it was difficult for Africans gain access to higher education as they; French policy was “un beau chaos” (Evans 1970, p. 11-12).

* Despite of the fact that they were discouraged, missionaries did provide education in French colonies (Samoff & Carrol, 2002)
Whatever the reasons were behind for France to introduce higher education to Francophone Africa, the French government believed higher education was best provided in France and therefore initially chose to send small numbers of students from its colonies to study in France. The French decided which posts should be filled by Africans and they then offered training to suitable candidates through means of scholarships. Later on, provision was made for all Africans with a lycee degree to obtain scholarships to study at the Universities at Bordeaux, Toulouse or Paris (Evans, 1970).

Gradually the policy changed and France decided to establish higher education institutions in Africa. According to Evans, the reasons behind this are not absolutely clear. He states that one official reason frequently given was the increase in number of qualified university entrants justified the establishment of higher education in Africa. At the same time because the Ecoles de Medicine at Dakar and Tananarive were already established, it would only be a matter of time before African pressure to raise them to metropolitan standards would come. A third official explanation was “proof exists that Africa was capable of participating in the cultural life of the intellectual elite of the modern world” (Evans, 1970).

The African elite, however, discouraged higher education development in French colonies as they were concerned it would be inferior to that provided in France (Adams & Bah-Lalya, 1991). This is the same reasoning as that which resulted in the adoption of the British “golden standard” in Anglophone countries.

France established branches of French universities in African colonies that formed the basis for national universities. Dakar, the capital of Senegal, emerged as the intellectual capital of the region10 (Adams & Bah-Lalya, 1991). Many of the other regional institutions were initially established between 1961 and 196511. In the same way that higher education institutions in English colonies were linked to the University of London who guaranteed the degree standards, universities in the French colonies were linked to Paris and Bordeaux. However, the French government interfered stronger in these colonial universities since they themselves were in charge of day-to-day operations. In fact, when France established higher education institutions in its colonies they were virtually overseas campuses of French universities. As Lulat described this relationship, “when the University of Dakar was established, a decree from the French Ministry of Education named it the eighteenth university in the French higher education system” (Lulat, 2003, p. 21).

Although colonial education diplomas and degrees equalled those in France, they were not legally equivalent and therefore did not carry the same rights and

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10 The antecedents of the University of Dakar (1957) include the Institute des Hautes Etudes (1950) and the School of Medicine founded in 1918 (Adams & Bah-Lalya, 1991).
11 Universities in Benin and Niger are exceptions, they were founded respectively in 1970 and 1971.
privileges. To be legally equivalent one diploma had to be exchanged for the other. This was only done by the Ministry in Paris on an individual base. Thus diplomas equivalent in standard did not confer equal rights and privileges or job opportunities (Evans, 1970). Until 1968, the degrees at colonial universities were awarded by the French Ministry of National Education.

2.2.3 Establishment of higher education in Lusophone Africa

No form of higher education existed in Portuguese colonial Africa until the early 1960’s. According to Samuels (1970), this was due to a relatively resource-poor Portuguese colonial government that had a long history of neglecting the education of its own people in Portugal itself. In the 1960’s Portugal set up two higher education institutions in their colonies, one in Mozambique the University of Lourenço Marques established in 1962 (nowadays the University of Eduardo Mondlane,) and the second established in 1968 as the University of Luanda in Angola (Carvalho et al, 2003; Chilundo, 2003). All other institutions in Lusophone Africa were established after the Portuguese left. During the colonial days Africans had hardly any access to positions of economic and political power nor to the formal education system. The universities were in principle only accessible to the sons and daughters of the Portuguese. The reason for this being that access to the university was largely based on social and economic capital, which did not favour the presence of African children. Only a few Africans from the emerging local bourgeoisie were actually able to attend university. Cross provides another reason for the extremely low number of Africans in higher education. He argues that only Africans who were, according to the Portuguese, considered to be assimilated, succeeded in entering higher education (Cross, 2000).

Thus compared to the Anglophone and Francophone systems the Lusophone system, if one could call it that, was very small. The Portuguese did not invest in the Africans in terms of higher education to facilitate the transition to independence, which as seen in the next chapter has had major consequences for its higher education system.

2.2.4 Governance during the colonial days

Initially the governance model in African countries was generally the same as in the mother country. In Anglophone Africa this meant a form of state supervising model was introduced. The power of national government was limited and the autonomy of the higher education institutions regarding selection of students and appointment of staff was respected. British Universities and the IUC held substantial decision-making power. The Council
was responsible for recruiting staff and the University of London, in cooperation with the IUC, set the curricular and examination standards and awarded degrees (Ashby, 1965). This situation very much reflected the UK authority distribution between the government, the University Grants Committee and universities operating as independent chartered institutions.

In Francophone Africa a state model was introduced in which national government held a powerful position. It was the Ministry of Education that awarded the degrees and decided that every student who had finished secondary school had access to tertiary education. The interference of the French government in the higher education institutions in their African colonies was much stronger than the interference of British government in Angophone African. The French government itself ran these universities on a day-to-day basis (Lulat, 2003).

With respect to Lusophone Africa, the Portuguese government argued that colonies were not colonies but Portuguese provinces. For this reason, in terms of organisation structure, governance and curriculum, the universities in Angola and Mozambique were Portuguese copies. The model of the university was, as in Portugal, a state model and was dependent on the Portuguese Ministry of Education. At that time Portugal was not a democracy and those at the top, including professors in the University Council, agreed on major policies as it was not safe to openly disagree with official policy. The curriculum was centrally approved. Yet, as opposed to French and Francophone universities the universities in Portugal and Lusophone Africa had degree awarding powers.

The involvement of both France and Britain in Africa was larger than their involvement in the universities in their own country. As previously stated it was the government that decided which courses would be offered to African students. After all, one of the major purposes for introducing higher education to Africa was to train Africans so that they could assist in administering the colonies. As there were only a few Africans in Lusophone universities, the Portuguese government felt no need to differ their policies for higher education in their colonies.

2.3 Higher Education after independence; changing views and new challenges

There is enormous variation in the histories and specific features of higher education systems on the continent – colonial institutions to recent establishments; from mega-universities to one-thousand-enrolment institutions; from the Francophone and Lusophone to Angophone systems which all calls for great caution when generalising about African higher education. However,
some general trends can be observed across the continent in higher education after the decolonisation. In relatively short time enrolment in higher education and number of institutions increased drastically. The enrolments, however, were often increasing faster than the capacity to plan for and accommodate this growth. There was a shortage of financial resources available which implied the increasing number of students had not been accompanied by the necessary financial resources. As a result the quality in higher education was decreasing. Moreover, various stakeholders such as donors, governments, employers and many institutions themselves questioned the relevance of programmes offered. Likewise, institutions in Africa and national governments were rethinking and reforming the modes of coordination in the higher education sector. Along the decades a pattern formed in changing perceptions on the role of higher education for Africa.

In the following section, we outline these developments with respect to higher education in Africa after independence further. Roughly spoken, three phases can be distinguished in which the role and functioning of higher education is perceived differently and in which African countries were confronted with new challenges.

### 2.3.1 1960-1980

The 1960s were a period of rapid change on the African continent. Many African countries gained political independence, starting with Ghana in 1957. After independence there was a strong belief in education. Most countries had a high illiteracy rate as relatively few people had had access to colonial schools and fewer still had reached higher education. Along with liberation came the promise for expanded access to education (Ajayi et al, 1996). It was believed that education would develop the skills and understandings needed for development. As Samoff and Carrol state: “Education was to be the vehicle for achieving social and political goals; developing a sense of national unity and common direction, nurturing individual and collective self-confidence and self-reliance, and reducing societal inequalities. Education would not only make the new society but would also shape the new people who would inhabit and manage that society.” (Samoff & Carrol, 2002, 1)

With regard to higher education, authorities argued it should play a key role in building the nation including the setting up of national industries and commercial enterprises. Higher education was supposed to deliver high skilled manpower and contribute to the institutionalisation of the newly adopted ideology. In other words, it was an instrument for government. Consequently the state decided which courses needed to be taught to support the sectors identified and through which higher education would contribute to the development of the new independent country. Not only was higher education considered utilitarian in producing trained manpower, it was also a
nationalistic ambition to have one or more institutions. A national university was a symbol of sovereignty such as the flag, international airport, national anthem, national bank, and national currency (van de Bor & Schutte, 1989).

The university in Africa was thus seen as a public good serving society and therefore received generous state support. The entire cost of establishment – buildings, equipment, and other facilities - was usually covered by state resources. For decades state subsidies constituted over 90% of the university budgets in Sub Saharan Africa (Sawyerr, 2002). In most cases the budget allocation process was based on a negotiated or ad hoc decision-making process (Saint, 1992).

Ashby already noted the purpose of the university in Africa should be perceived differently from those in Europe:

[...] The social purpose of a university in Africa differs from its traditional social purpose in Europe. In Europe, universities have stood for continuity and conservation: in Africa, universities are powerful instruments for change (Ashby, 1964, p. 98)

Initial progress was generally promising. Enrolments expanded rapidly due to rapid population growth and because African governments encouraged students to enrol in. During this period enrolments in higher education grew much faster in Sub Saharan Africa than any other part of the world (Shabani, 1998).

The increase in enrolments, however, did not occur at the same pace in the different regions of Sub Saharan Africa. Between 1960 and 1983, for instance, enrolments multiplied by 40 in Francophone Africa and “only” by 16 in Anglophone Africa. Shabani attributes the rapid increase in student enrolments in Francophone countries to the combined effect of various factors:

- Rapid increase in the number of secondary school leavers
- Lack of selection at the time students enter higher education\textsuperscript{12}
- Low internal efficiency
- Generous student-aid policy, which encourages students to extend their stay at university because of the uncertainty of finding a job upon completion of the course note (Shabani, 1998, p. 59).

This rapid expansion was accompanied by an equally impressive increase in number of higher education institutions. Different types of post-secondary institutions emerged and colleges were created to supply professionals, particularly for education, agriculture, and nursing. Research institutes, professional associations and regional institutions emerged, both public and private. According to Sawyerr, the quality of higher education was high in the first years after independence. Staff worked under reasonably good conditions

\textsuperscript{12} In Francophone Africa, selection only exists for the “Grandes Ecoles”, which are mainly engineering schools (Shabani, 1998).
and development programmes were put in place ensuring that young faculty moved on to higher qualifications, while senior staff could opt for sabbatical leave. The universities continued to closely co-operate with their motherland that watched the “international standards”. Although enrolments increased considerably, during the 1960s universities were relatively small and higher education participation was low, whereas at the same time it received substantial state budgets. It also often continued to receive subsidies from former colonial powers and staff from the mother country often remained in service. At least this was the case in former Anglophone and Francophone countries. In addition the institutions received substantial support from international donor organisations based in, for instance, the United States, the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, China and Cuba, Canada, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries.

As Sawyerr argues, higher education institutions thus had the financial resources to deliver quality work. The graduates from the 1960s, the so-called first generation African Scholars, enjoyed training of the highest international standards in their home country (Sawyerr, 2002, p. 22).

Over time however, the initial optimism and confidence regarding the universities capabilities to contribute to development diminished, as a number of striking developments took place in the higher education sector.

Firstly, as Mwiria argues, the majority of the courses taught such as philosophy, literature, and arts, were increasingly seen as a nuisance by some governments though at the same time it remained a high priority. Some leaders saw increasing campus political activism as evidence of an inappropriate curriculum that was embedded in the social sciences (Mwiria, 2003). Moreover, due to the increasing unemployment of university graduates, both students and government became frustrated about “irrelevance of the courses”.

As appears from discussions during two major conferences in the 1960s and 1970s, many African governments had already acknowledged that the programmes offered were biased, focussing too much on social sciences. During the conference “The development of higher education in Africa” organised by UNESCO and the Economic Commission for Africa in 1962 in Tananarive, Madagascar, and the workshop “Creating the African University” organised by the Association of African of Universities (AAU) in 1972 in Accra, Ghana, specific attention was given to science and technology and it was generally agreed that capacities in science and technology needed particular attention. During the 1962 conference the African nations even concluded their universities should seek to achieve 60/40-enrolment ratio's in favour of science and technology (Saint, 1992). Yet despite these intentions, generally spoken, in practice, the governments in Africa remained prioritising social sciences in order to generate the African identity (Castells 1996, Bruck-Utne, 2002).

Another point of criticism related to the extent of government interference in higher education. Many governments wanted to use their institutions as instruments for national development and therefore wanted to control them.
Although the nature of universities governance throughout Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone countries was different in the sense that Francophone and Lusophone universities were more centrally organised than Anglophone institutions, in all countries higher education institutions were forced to adapt to local needs and circumstances. As Neave and van Vught indicate, the effect of forced adaptation has been the predominance of the state control model, which often resulted in an authoritarian government attitude towards higher education (Neave & van Vught, 1994, p. 13).

In a state control model the system is created and almost completely financed by the state. The state is often the overarching and highly powerful regulator, which is characterised by centralised bureaucratic control exercised by the government through the Ministry responsible. This Ministry regulates nearly all aspects of higher education such as access conditions, curriculum, degree requirements, examination systems, and appointment of academic staff (Maassen & Van Vught, 1994). In an authoritarian model, government goes one step further by imposing its needs and ideologies on the institutions.

The government in Sub Saharan Africa usually had a major say in appointment of senior university administrators and routinely selected key members of the university councils or boards. In Kenya at the University of Nairobi, Makerere University in Uganda and the University of Botswana, for example, more than half of university council members were directly or indirectly appointed by the head of state (Sawyerr, 2002). In some countries, such as Mozambique, the requirement for appointing a university position was that one had to be member of the ruling party.

In many Anglophone African countries the head of state also served as University Chancellor. The official reason behind this was to emphasise the important role universities were expected to play in national development and to seek high-level support for its efforts (Karani, 1998). According to Mwiria this arrangement worked poorly in practice.

During the 1960s the governments forced the higher education institutions to adapt further to political desires and local needs. This resulted in many criticisms and over the years governments and higher education institution representatives had regular conflicts. Academics expected to enjoy academic freedom with the right to teach, research and publish freely, whereas national leaders gradually increased their involvement to ensure universities would comply with their ideas of national development (Alayi et al, 1996). In short after a promising start following independence, over the years the tensions within the systems grew. This was only to increase.
2.3.2 1980-1990

The optimism of the immediate independence period was followed by political and economic turmoil in the late 1970s and 1980s. During the 1980s capacity of African governments to finance public services sharply decreased. Although higher education was initially sheltered from this, governments eventually were also forced to decrease the budget for this sector as well.

The economic decline was the result of various closely interrelated factors, for example the worldwide decline in terms of international trade, debt crisis, inflation, protectionist trade barriers raised by some industrialized countries against some of Africa’s exports, corruption, negative trade balances, rise in import prices (especially oil), fiscal imbalance, falling commodity prices and the low level of foreign exchange reserve.

The 1980s were also characterised by other events that negatively affected the African economy, such as famine, demographic growth and political upheavals. The political upheavals in many cases resulted in destructive wars. Many of the Sub Saharan African countries such as Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Mozambique and Sudan, have or are still suffering from wars that have disrupted the societies. For higher education this implied that many students and academics left for safety reasons, infrastructure and facilities were destroyed and financial provision became extremely difficult (Ajayi et al, 1996).

The changing ideologies of major donor organisations such as the World Bank also affected the sector to a large extent (Atteh, 1996). The first ideological shift was to expand and strengthen basic education at the expense of the higher education budgets (Atteh, 1996). During the 1970s and 1980s the World Bank published a document on education policy in Africa. This document argued that too much public funding was spent on higher education even though this sector had not proven to play a significant role in promoting development. According to the World Bank an increasing number of unemployed graduates provided sufficient evidence for this. The World Bank recommended to shift funds towards basic education arguing that primary and secondary education had the highest private and social rates of return and that subsidising higher education did not benefit the poor (Atteh, 1996). In addition, they changed its strategy for funding higher education in Sub Saharan Africa. The Bank advocated an improvement in quality and efficiency and in order to qualify for a credit, institutions were obliged to meet certain criteria and conditions (Bolag, 2003, p. 5). The new World Bank orientation was widespread and influential. It was influential as many other funding and technical assistance organisations adopted this new vision and accordingly reduced its support for higher education. This took the form first in the withdrawal of subsidies for expatriate staff working at universities in Africa, and secondly, reductions in general support for universities (Coleman, 1994).

The disillusion that higher education had a contributing role to development was accentuated by the media presentation of Africa in “crisis” which drew
attention to famine and population pressure. Consequently, international agencies refocused on issues of basic survival and direct improvement in human welfare rather than the “apparent luxury of higher education” (Coleman, 1994).

For many donor organisations the view that university education was primarily a public good changed into the perception that higher education was a “private good”. Although donor funding did not stop, there was a reduction, but more importantly the composition of external support changed during this decade. It became more narrowly defined and result-oriented in areas which donors deemed important (Saint, 1992). Their arguments were forceful as the rate of return argument was strongly pressed both as policy advice to African governments and as a conditionality for funding.

The second ideological change related to the state and markets’ role in a development country. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank introduced the so-called Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the 1980s and 1990s to reverse economic and social crises. The programmes were intended to give room to free liberal market forces by removing state imposed norms of production, pricing, marketing and exchange rate. They also sought to cut back the states role, downsising it and reducing its reach. According to Saywerr, the ideology saw education as a service and educational expenditure as a “cost” rather than social investment. For the higher education sector this implied a reduction in university funding (Sawyerr, 2002, p. 7).

In summary, due to the economic crisis, upcoming new ideologies and pressure from external agencies to reduce costs, funding for higher education was dramatically reduced. Yet the demand for it continued to grow which further increased the tensions in the higher education systems in Sub Saharan Africa.

2.3.2.1 Expansion in higher education continues

Due to demographic growth and an increase in students finishing secondary school, the demand for higher education continued to grow. Two relatively new groups of clients predominantly were responsible for this. The first were students that came from medium level technical and vocational schools or teacher training colleges and wished to obtain a university degree. The second group consisted of people who already had a job and many years of practical experience but wanted to undertake higher education (Fehnel, 2003). Table 2 depicts the growth in number of tertiary students between 1975 and 1990.

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13 Not all countries in Africa had such extensive growth in the number of tertiary students. For example, the number of tertiary students in Ghana stayed more or less constant at around 9,000 students.

14 As Saywerr notes it is striking that student expansion in higher education continued throughout the political and economic upheavals of the 1980’s and 1990’s, as well as the wars in several countries. The increases in enrolment in the Republic of Congo and Mozambique occurred despite civil wars.
Despite remarkable enrolment expansion, the gross enrolment ratio (GRE) - the proportion of young people that is in higher education aged 19-24 - on average is lower in Africa than anywhere else. Table 3 shows the average GRE for all developing countries in 1980 and 1996.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic region</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1996</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Developing Countries</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among African countries there is a considerable variation. For example, while the ratio for countries like Burundi, Mozambique and Tanzania fell short of 1% in 1995, others at the high end included – Botswana: 5.3%; Gabon: 8% and South Africa: 18.1% (World Bank 2002).

It was impossible to increase enrolment and maintain quality levels at the same time without increases in resources. The higher education institutions in Africa thus suffered from the effects of scarce financial resources. Yet financial stringency was not the only reason for declining quality. Without elaborating too much, we will sum up the main factors causing the decreased quality in higher education in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Many faculty members had little graduate training and therefore were not able to offer the knowledge, skills and quality required for students to obtain an academic degree. Students were often dependent on teachers using passive and outdated approaches (Task Force for higher education, 2000).
administrative cadres were often characterised as inefficient due to poor quality and performance. This was partly the result of under-qualified staff. School principles or department heads frequently lacked the training or resources to be effective supervisors, administrators or managers. Another major problem was moonlighting. Due to low salaries in the public sector many faculty members worked at several institutions or had other jobs alongside their academic positions. As a result, they devoted little attention to research or improving teaching (Atteh, 1996).

Moreover, many students were academically unprepared upon commencing their studies, as they did not have the required knowledge or skills. It of course could be argued that many of these factors in the end boil down to a shortage of financial resources. But this brief expose also highlights that the problems encountered in Sub Saharan higher education go far beyond a simplistic funding-quality dichotomy.

2.3.2.2 Finance mechanisms

Despite decreasing financial resources for higher education, the majority of countries in Sub Saharan Africa spent a considerable percentage of their GNP on higher education. As Table 4 shows, the expenditure per student is much higher in Sub Saharan Africa than other parts of the world.

Table 4: Tertiary Expenditure per student as percentage of GNP per Capita in 1980 and 1995 by region in national income levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World Region</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1995</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low and Middle-income countries</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub Saharan Africa</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and Pacific</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and Central Asia</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher-income countries</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Task Force on higher education and society 2000, p.123
A number of reasons are identified for the high expenditure rate per student in Sub Saharan Africa which we sum up.

2.3.2.3 Support of living allowance

Higher education costs were considerable due to support of living allowance and accommodation, which in 1995 represented 6% of the recurrent budget in Asia and 14% in the OECD countries. In Sub-Saharan Africa, these expenditures absorb 55% of the recurrent budget in Francophone Africa against 15% in Anglophone Africa (Shabani, 1998). Various donor organisations such as the World Bank question this policy. They believe that when faced with financial constraints, governments should not fund non-academic activities. Many African governments in turn argue this is a western view that cannot be applied to Africa as students or their parents cannot afford the living allowance and accommodation.

2.3.2.4 Negligible or non-existent fees

Most public higher education institutions are over 90% financially dependent on the government. Tuition fees charged are often negligible or non-existent and attempts to increase them encountered major resistance. Nonetheless there is a striking difference between Francophone Africa and Anglophone Africa. In Francophone Africa the student fees collected represented in 1995 on average less than 1% of the university recurrent budget whereas the student social services were still subsidised (Shabani, 1998). In Anglophone countries higher education institutions collect more fees from students. In Uganda for example, in the same year the fees paid by students of the Makerere University represented 15% of the recurrent budget of the University.

In Francophone countries almost every student can apply for scholarship, while in Anglophone and Lusophone countries scholarships are granted to a limited number of students on the basis of their academic performance and national priorities in terms of human resource development. The amount of these scholarships in Anglophone and Lusophone Africa are also relatively lower than in Francophone Africa.

In summary it can be concluded that during the 1980s the student enrolments often increased faster than the capacity to plan for or accommodate this growth. The expansion was the result of various factors such as demographic growth, increased number of people finishing secondary education and government incentives to stimulate people to undertake university studies. Yet gradually many African countries were confronted with a deep economic crisis. This meant that many governments, despite the fact the majority acknowledged the important role higher education could play in further development decreased public funding for the sector. In addition, various donor organisations decided
to decrease their support as well. The decrease in funding and continuing expansion in higher education had a deteriorating effect on the higher education system.

2.3.3 Recent developments from 1990 onwards

By the mid 1990s, revitalisation of higher education was a recurrent theme (Samoff & Caroll, 2002). It was acknowledged that the policy of neglecting higher education institutions in Sub Saharan Africa had had dramatic consequences for the sector and other sectors dependent on it. The view of international agencies changed once again and it was generally believed that investments in tertiary education would generate public benefits essential for economic and social improvements (Task Force on higher education in society, 2000). It was assumed a country’s productivity would increase if the percentage of labour force with a higher education degree was greater. A highly skilled labour force, in other words, was seen as one of the motors for economic development. A major influential report was provided by the Task Force on Higher Education in Africa, set up by the World Bank and UNESCO, which came up with an analysis of higher education contribution, not only to economic development but also to general social and cultural development of Africa. It stressed the importance of tertiary education for basic and secondary education (higher education was no longer seen as a separate sector but part of the whole education system), and how higher education contributes to nation building and social cohesion since it involves learning the skills of formulation, synthesis, analysis, and argumentation, to place facts in a broader context and to consider the moral implications of actions and choices.

During the 1990s, higher education continued to grow, both in size and variety of institutions. The growth in number was partly the result of upcoming new providers, such as private higher education institutions, distance education and specialised universities, as well as independent policy and research institutes that entered the sector. Though there are similarities in developments across the Sub Saharan systems, one should be careful of lumping them all together implying a substantive degree of homogeneity. The Sub Saharan higher education systems are in fact quite diverse. As Saints observes, there are:

- Small systems with stable and declining growths rates, such as Malawi, Tanzania, Sierra Leone
- Small but slowly expanding systems: Burundo, Togo and Uganda
- Small but rapidly expanding systems: Benin, Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Niger
- Medium sized systems with some institutional differentiation: Congo, Ghana, Senegal and Zimbabwe
- Large multi- institutional systems in for example Nigeria, Madagascar, Kenya, Cameroon and Zaire (Saint, 1992, 8).
Chapter 2

The governments in Sub-Saharan Africa responded differently to the increasing demand for higher education. Saint discerns two general approaches across the continent. The first, typified by Nigeria, Kenya, and Cameroon, gave priority to increasing access to university. The implicit rationale was supply-driven; increased numbers of university graduates would benefit the country in the long run by upgrading the knowledge base of the workforce. The second approach, illustrated by Malawi and Tanzania, is where the government limited access in an effort to ensure quality control (Saint, 1992, p. 16).

2.3.3.1 Private higher education institutions

During the 1990s the number of higher education institutions expanded drastically. The following section briefly elaborates on its expansion of the private institutions since its evolution has played an important role in realising expansion. A number of factors can be pointed out that led to this trend such as an increasing demand from students for access, declining capacity of public higher education institutions, pressure by external agencies to cut public services, a growing demand for highly skilled labour force and increased interest of private foreign providers.

In 1960 the number of private higher education institutions was estimated at seven and remained below 20 till the mid-1980s. The number of registered private higher education institutions only began to climb rapidly during the 1990s from 27 in 1990 to an estimated 71 within ten years and 84 two years later (Sawyerr, 2002). Table 5 shows some examples of the growth of number of private higher education institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sawyerr, 2002

15 In Francophone Africa the government decided every student finishing secondary school has open access to higher education. In Kenya, representing an extreme case, when in 1988 the Vice Chancellor of the country’s four public universities decided to limit new admissions, the president, Daniel Arap Moi, imposed that they should allow more students.
While the history and specific circumstances of private higher education institutions differ from case to case and country-to-country, a number of common features can be identified. The ones established through private individuals, corporate groups or foundations are generally small in size. Private institutions are far more expensive to enrol in than public ones that in many cases are virtually free. Therefore a relatively small number of people can afford private institutions.

With some exceptions, private institutions generally provide a limited range of programmes and courses compared to public ones. The courses are often low cost and have a strong vocational and directly market-responsive character because the expensive institutions must give students the prospect of immediate employment. Popular courses include accounting, economics and business administration\(^{16}\). Generally, private institutions rarely provide expensive courses such as natural sciences and engineering since these require expensive equipment that is often not available. Some institutions, especially those with church support, include more regular university degree programmes particularly, theology and other arts courses and sometimes up to Masters and PhD levels, though at the moment these are in the minority (Sawyerr, 2002).

Generally governments do not provide financial support to private institutions, though in some cases they do receive direct government funding. In Liberia, for example, the state provides subsidies to private and church-operated post-secondary institutions. In some other countries such as Togo and Mozambique, the government awards some scholarships to students to cover the cost of tuition and textbooks (Teferra & Altbach, 2003). However, the main source of income for private higher education institutions are usually student fees. Some private institutions rely on funding from religious organisations.

Private institutions are both criticised and admired. It is a matter of dispute whether they only seek profit and are less concerned with quality and do not have the appropriate facilities or sufficient equipment to teach students. Some believe quality there is better, others believe it is worse. In reality some of these like the public ones do indeed offer high quality programmes, whereas other private institutions do not have the facilities to offer certain standards (Teferra & Altbach, 2003).

The majority of private higher education institutions rely heavily on part-time staff who often have a full-time contract at a public institution. They use private sector employment to supplement the generally low salary paid by public institutions. Some argue this practice weakens government institutions as staff with more than one job reduces the time they have available for research and supervising students. Private institutions are also criticised for not taking responsibility in broader national objectives such as outreach activities.

\(^{16}\) Yet in various countries, such as Uganda, graduates from private institutions like graduates from public ones have difficulties finding a job.
Yet advocates of private higher education institutions argue they are indispensable to meeting the growing demand for higher education. In addition, they diversify higher education without putting further pressure on public funding.

Interesting to note is that private institutions have in many countries led to an increase in female enrolments. On average the gender balance of private institutions enrolment has improved compared to public institutions. The explanation for this difference is said to lie in the generally lower entry requirements, their concentration on the humanities and the vocational area and the greater flexibility of their programming, which tends to accommodate the special needs of women with families (Sawyerr, 2002). In Mozambique private institutions were based in the provinces far outside the capital, which enabled female students in the provinces to attend. Previously many potential female students were unable to attend university as parents disliked the idea of their daughters studying far from home (Lind & Igboemeka, 2002).

2.3.3.2 Recent developments in governance and funding in higher education in Sub Saharan Africa

In recent years some countries in Sub Saharan Africa have initiated reforms in governance steering and funding arrangements. As a result some universities are beginning to experience less government control. For example, President Fredrick Chiluba of Zambia and former President of Tanzania Ali Hassan Mwinyi gave up their positions as Chancellor of their national universities. In other countries such as Nigeria, government has introduced new legislation that aims to reduce state power over the appointment of senior university administrators and representatives on key university governing bodies (Sawyerr, 2002). Some countries such as Uganda and Mozambique created or improved buffer bodies meant to act as intermediaries between the government and universities. The main function of these intermediaries is the co-ordination of overall university development, which includes accreditation of new institutions and analysis of basic data on national university systems (Mwaria, 2003).

In addition to reforms in governance, some countries introduced or are in the process of introducing new and alternative funding mechanisms and aim to diversify the financial base for their higher education systems. Some governments in Sub Saharan Africa like Nigeria, Tanzania and Mozambique have sought to promote greater efficiency and accountability through guidelines and rationalise the use of university resources, for example through introducing funding formula’s based on expected outcomes and rethinking internal financial mechanisms in the allocation of funds (Saint, 1992). Some countries, like Uganda and Kenya, have introduced student fees as a means of recovering part of the higher education costs. In Anglophone African countries in particular, the introduction of student fees for cost recovery is gaining acceptance, especially when applied to specific services such as registration,
library access, laboratory use and student activities. (Saint, 1992, p. XV). Moreover, some countries like Ghana decided to implement a student loan scheme (Shabani, 1998).

In the previous sections we outlined the main developments and trends in Sub Saharan Africa. Shortly after independence, expectations on higher education institutions to contribute to the countries development were very high. Gradually, one can discern the many problems and challenges with which higher education in Sub Saharan Africa was confronted, such as the stranglehold of increasing demand and decreasing funding and the struggle for finding appropriate means of funding and steering higher education.

In the final part of this chapter we elaborate on key issues that have not been, or were only briefly mentioned previously, but are relevant for the necessary contextualisation of our case study. Short discussions focus on four themes, relevance of the curriculum, equity, brain drain and graduate unemployment.

2.3.3.3 Relevance of curriculum

It is a matter of debate, and thus of perspective, whether curricula of the higher education programmes in Sub Saharan Africa are relevant and if not, what exactly is missing or weak in these programmes. Some argue that over the last couple of decades universities have developed relevant curricula and revised the content to reflect African priorities (Saint, 1992, Court 1992). Others, however, argue the majority of universities in Africa offer curricula that approach science from a western point of view and therefore focus too much on trends and issues in industrialised countries. By doing this, it overlooked local circumstances and did not sufficiently take into account local needs (White & van de Bor, 1996). Others point out that the curricula are biased, focussing too much on social sciences and not paying enough attention to natural sciences and engineering (Castells 1996, Maassen, 2000). Castells argues that political instability in post-colonial Africa led to a continuous emphasis on the ideological and elite forming functions of higher education. This happened at the expense of economic and educational functions. According to Maassen, the result is that today these countries are facing a number of difficulties:

1) Lack of sufficiently trained faculty able to use the most recent technologies
2) Lack of sufficient funding to train students in experimental sciences and at professional schools
3) Vicious circle, in which developing countries have few jobs for highly skilled engineers and scientists because few firms can operate in these countries at a high technological level due to lack of skilled manpower (Maassen, 2000, p. 50)

Castells believes the training function of higher education in Africa is making progress. However, he argues the knowledge production function is
increasingly lagging behind when compared to industrialised countries. According to him, it is this situation in particular that prevents higher education in Africa from performing its development function (Castells, 1996)\(^{17}\).

2.3.3.4 *Equity*

One of the goals of higher education was to contribute to equity. It was believed the enrolment expansion in higher education would lead to a broadening of the social composition of the student body. As pointed out by Sawyerr, in many countries the opposite is happening. The pattern of access to university education is introducing new forms of social exclusion. Research has indicated that to a large extent the enrolment in the majority of the higher education institutions originates from areas relatively close to the capital, which in general have the highest level of the country’s welfare. For example, in 1999/2000 the top eighteen schools (4% of the total) provided around 45% of admissions to the two oldest, largest and most prestigious of Ghana’s universities (University of Ghana, the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST)). Over two thirds of the matriculants were resident in three of the ten regions of the country (Sawyerr, 2002).

When comparing the economic background of students enrolling in public institutions with those enrolling in expensive private institutions, one can observe an ironical contradiction. Generally the more prosperous people enter public higher education whilst poorer people enrol in private higher education. The reason for this is due to high competition for places in public institutions, hence these institutions can choose whom they admit. Students with the highest performance results at secondary school thus enter the public universities. Given that the best and most expensive secondary schools produce better graduates and are often located in wealthier regions of the country, it is the students with higher socio-economic backgrounds that enrol in relatively cheap public higher education institutions. Some countries are now developing scholarship programmes for disadvantaged students to overcome this problem.

2.3.3.5 *Unemployment and brain drain*

In the early 1980s it became clear that many countries suffered from rising graduate unemployment and inadequate job performance. This was partly the result of national economies stagnation in many African countries and partly due to the fact that institutions produced too many graduates in the same field

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\(^{17}\) Gardner (2002) emphasises that knowledge by itself does not transform economies. He argues a country can only benefit from knowledge if it is used within a complex system of institutions and practices, which he calls National Innovation System (Gardner, 2002, p. 24).
of study, notably the arts and humanities\textsuperscript{18} (Court, 1991). Saint points out that an emerging problem of graduate unemployment is that students postpone graduation, which limits the possibilities for new students to enter higher education.

Adams \textit{et al} point out a seemingly contradictory situation where higher education in some regions is at the same time “underdeveloped” and “overdeveloped”. “Underdevelopment” appears in situations where the sector does not deliver sufficient graduates for a proper minimum cadre. “Overdevelopment” refers to the economy being unable to fully absorb even those small cadres or further finance training at similar levels. As an example they state that in the early 1990s Mali was a country confronted with both underdevelopment and overdevelopment. On the one hand the number of college-trained personnel in Mali, three per ten thousand, was the lowest in the region. It was questioned whether this small number of graduates and minimum cadre could serve national development. Yet on the other hand the economy was not able to absorb the graduates at higher education level (Adams \textit{et al}, 1991).

Whilst a number of countries are confronted with graduate unemployment, other countries in Sub Saharan Africa are not able to fill vacancies for graduates as a result of brain drain. Due to low salaries, deteriorating work conditions or instability in the country, highly educated people migrate to Australia, Europe, Canada and the United States. The term “brain drain” is frequently used to describe the movement of high-level experts from developing countries to industrialised nations (Teferra \& Altbach, 2003, p. 41). However, the movement of high-level skilled people also happens within a region, as well as within a country. There is a trend whereby high level staff seek employment opportunities outside public universities and go for better-paying government agencies, private higher education institutions and firms. Major public institutions in many countries have lost significant numbers of staff to emerging private higher education institutions and other commercially oriented institutions.

Regional migration, academic migration to regional and neighbouring countries, has also brought about serious shortages of high-level academics in some countries. Many academic departments have lost faculty members to regional universities in other parts of Africa. For example, several senior scholars from Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia, hold faculty positions at the University of Botswana. Brain drain thus manifests itself in a variety of forms.

\textsuperscript{18} For instance, during the mid-80’s unemployment among university graduates was already over 13 percent in Core d’Ivoire, Ghana and Mauritius (Saint, 1992).
2.4 Summary

To place this study on higher education policy developments in Mozambique in context, this chapter described the history and common features of higher education in Sub Saharan Africa. Although the history and specific circumstances per country differ from case to case, a number of common characteristics can be identified.

Universities in Africa, as in the rest of the world, have adopted the western model of academic organisation. The colonies generally regarded the institutions as an extension of the higher education systems back home. After independence the development of higher education was viewed as a national priority as it was believed it would contribute to nation building and the development of the country. Higher education institutions were seen as symbols of prestige and national provision of high level, skilled manpower to replace departing expatriate staff. In support of the emerging nations' priorities, during the 1960s and 1970s national governments and international assistance organisations, such as the World Bank, regional development banks and bilateral assistance agencies, made substantial investments in these sectors.

After initial successes, the 1970s led to increasing criticisms of the sector, which had not proven to contribute sufficiently to the development of the country. In spite of substantial investments, the situation in most countries was deteriorating rapidly. In addition, various major donor organisations, including the World Bank, believed the rates of return from basic education were so much higher than from higher education that they decided to reduce their support. Consequently, many governments in Africa decreased financial resources they had allocated to higher education, which had important implications for Africa. The inadequacy of funding combined with an enrolment explosion resulted in a reduction of the capacity in most African universities. This in turn resulted in a problematic provision of effective research and learning, and a general drop in higher education quality. About ten years later in the 1990s, the same organisations that reduced their higher education funding showed a renewed interest in the sector. They once again considered it indispensable to society since it produces a high skilled labour force. Many governments in Sub Saharan Africa and donor organisations continued investing in the sector. At the same time, many countries initiated system-wide reforms in areas of funding and governance.

When everything is taken into account, one can conclude that higher education in Sub Saharan Africa is on the one hand criticised for not having met the needs of society. This refers to issues such as low quality in education, irrelevant curricula and graduate unemployment. On the other hand it is also believed that although higher education may not have achieved all envisaged goals, in many Sub Saharan countries it has reached impressive achievement in terms of expansion of the number of both higher education institutions and students.
3 Mozambican context

3.1 Mozambique; history and social, economic and political context

If we are to understand higher education policy development in Mozambique, it is essential to have a thorough understanding of how higher education in this country has developed. Therefore this chapter describes the historical background and context of Mozambique. We start by briefly indicating which types of government have ruled Mozambique and the specific ideologies that have affected policy making. Subsequently we elaborate on some of the current factors that characterise Mozambique and have influenced the decision-making on higher education policy. These factors relate to regional imbalance in the country, economic developments including the labour market, donor aid and reforms initiated at a national level such as the strategy against poverty reduction and reforms in governmental organisations.

3.1.1 Portuguese colony

Mozambique was colonised by the Portuguese. Although the Portuguese influence started when Vasco de Gama landed on Mozambique Island in 1498, until the nineteenth century it was limited to a few coastal areas. This changed when the fascist dictator Salazar came to power in Portugal in 1926. For the purpose of this research it is sufficient to point out that this resulted in an ideology that included discriminative rules against the Mozambicans. They were excluded from any public organisation and forbidden to run their own business or engage in private trade. Moreover, the colonial regime imposed a labour system through which Mozambicans were forced to work almost for free, particularly in the mining and agriculture sectors. The colonial government remained in power due to its well-organised secret police (PIDE) and armed police and military forces (Newitt, 1995).

In 1962 several anti-colonial political groups formed the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), which started an armed campaign against the Portuguese in September 1964. The war of liberation was initially lead by the first president of FRELIMO, Eduardo Mondlane. Mondlane was murdered in 1969 and the leadership was taken over by Samora Machel. It would take more than 10 years of fighting before the Portuguese surrendered and the peace agreement was signed in Lusaka (Tanzania) in 1974 (Newitt, 1995).
3.1.1.1 Adoption of a socialistic regime

The Lusaka Accord handed state power to FRELIMO, which had transformed into a political party. Samora Machel became the new Head of State. His government set up a socialist regime according to Marxist-Leninist principles. Therefore the new Mozambique also had a one party system. FRELIMO suppressed all other political activity and arrested everyone who opposed its regime. As a socialist nation, inspired by communist principles, Mozambique established close ties with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries that offered military support and material aid.

After independence 90% of the Portuguese colonists left the country, taking with them almost 80% of the skilled labour force. This had serious implications for the industrial and commercial infrastructure. The economy collapsed and administration became even weaker than previously. In short, FRELIMO inherited a legacy of economic and social underdevelopment and 98% of Mozambicans (over 10 million people) were illiterate.

To tackle the problems of shortage of skilled manpower and the destroyed or abandoned infrastructure, FRELIMO took a radical approach. It nationalised the economic and social sector. Land, healthcare, education, strategic enterprises such as banks and insurance companies, railways and ports were all appropriated by the State. The GoM gave priority to the establishment of training programmes, specifically for public health care and education, including an intense literacy campaign for the entire country. Important aspects emphasised in the education system were raising the awareness of Mozambican nationality and loyalty to the government ideology. In the beginning of its campaign FRELIMO achieved successes with the health and education programmes. Primary school enrolment, for example, doubled in the first six years and the annual secondary-school intake increased from 20,000 to 135,000. (Cross, 2000).

3.1.1.2 Guerrilla

Despite these successes a large proportion of the population was dissatisfied with FRELIMO’s strict socialist measures such as intolerance of religion, local traditions, chiefs, opposition parties and that people were forced to work on communal land. Political re-education camps were established for everyone who did not obey the regime. As a result the GoM soon faced a military opponent, the “Resistência Nacional de Moçambique” (RENAMO). It formed a counter-revolutionary force (EIU, 2001). RENAMO was supported from various sides. First of all it was able to mobilise support from the Northern and Central parts of the country. The majority of people in these parts felt marginalised, excluded and oppressed by the rule of the GoM that was located in the southern part of the country. Second, the resistance against FRELIMO was also organised through outside intervention by the Southern Rhodesian security forces and the South African military in order to punish FRELIMO for its
support for an independent Zimbabwe and South Africa. The primary aim of these two countries was to weaken regional stability and destroy Mozambican infrastructure. Finally, RENAMO promoted itself as an anti-communist liberation movement and thus received support from the USA and several Western European countries engaged in the Cold War (Chabal, 2002). RENAMO and FRELIMO started a war that would last another 10 years. During this period more than 1.5 million people died and approximately 5 million refugees ran for safety in- and outside the country (EIU, 2001).

During the 1980s various events took place that led to the countries bankruptcy. The centralised economic and agricultural planning policies proved ineffective, sabotage by neighbouring countries seriously damaged Mozambique and the extreme droughts brought on a devastating famine.

At the same time international changes took place that directly affected Mozambique. By the end of the 1980s, external support for the war was disappearing. The end of the Cold War also meant the end of Eastern European support for FRELIMO, since these countries were almost bankrupt themselves. Moreover, the FRELIMO government had already opted for liberal market principles. In a reaction to the crisis of the late 1980s the GoM accepted the Economic Rehabilitation Programs supported by the World Bank and other donor organisations. The condition imposed on this support was official abandonment of Marxism-Leninism. With the GoM moving closer to the West, RENAMO found it increasingly difficult to obtain support on the basis of being anti-communist. South African support also decreased with the demise of the apartheid regime. At the end of the 1980s FRELIMO and RENAMO recognised there was no ideology left to fight over and realised that no military victory was possible. At the beginning of the 1990s the first peace talks between RENAMO and FRELIMO started. In 1992 they finally agreed to a cease-fire signed in Rome (Chabal, 2002).

In order to rebuild the country, donors promised close to $400 million in humanitarian aid and electoral assistance. The United Nations (UN) supervised the peace process such as overseeing the dismantling of the previous FRELIMO and RENAMO armies, collecting undeclared weapons, clearing landmines, supervising the formation of a new national army and monitoring the first multi-party elections. In 1994 FRELIMO won these elections and Joaquim Chissano became the first freely elected president of Mozambique.
3.2 **Current developments in Mozambique**

Mozambique is a poor country in which some 70% of the population lives below the poverty line. It is one of the poorest countries in the world according to UNDP’s 2000 Human Development Report. Mozambique’s human development index ranks 168 out of 174 countries and is well below the Sub Saharan Africa and Least Developed Countries averages. Its 18.4 million inhabitants earn on average an annual income of US$ 197. This is less than one-tenth of the average annual income of its neighbour South Africa and less than half of all Sub-Saharan countries. Life expectancy in 2000 was 42 years. (United Nations, 2000) This number is decreasing further due to the AIDS/HIV mortality rate.

### 3.2.1 Regional imbalance

In political and economic terms Mozambique is confronted with regional imbalances, often referred to as the south/centre-north division. This division coincides with the rural/urban divide. In geographical terms the south refers to the provinces of Maputo, Inhambane and Gaza. The centre/north refers to Manica, Sofala, Tete and Zambezia and the north constitutes Nampula, Cabo Delgado and Niassa. With regards to the disparities between urban and rural areas, Mozambique has an urbanisation rate of 29 %, implying that approximately 70% of the population lives in rural areas (Grobbelaar & Lala, 2003).

The south/centre-north division is partly a colonial legacy. The Portuguese economy was linked to its neighbouring countries, therefore the infrastructure was developed along transport corridors from west to east, (i.e. from South Africa via Maputo, from Zimbabwe via Beira and from Zambia/Malawi via Nampula).
From an economic point of view, Mozambique’s most important neighbouring country is South Africa. Thus the southern part of the country, being closest to South Africa, is most developed.

Even today, the southern part of the country has the largest economic growth. It is far more successful in attracting investments, despite attempts by the Mozambican government to ensure investment in the rest of the country. Investors tend to focus on areas with an existing support structure. In and around Maputo-city and Maputo province there is a concentration of government and non-government organisations, embassies, banks, businesses and physical infrastructure such as railways, a harbour and (tar) roads (Grobelaar & Lala, 2003). Industry such as manufacturing, fisheries, mining and electricity is also concentrated in the Maputo province. Of the 344 industrial developments registered between 1985 and April 1999, 248 were in Maputo (UN, 2000).

The GDP figures reflect this unequal distribution. 25% of the Mozambican population is located in the south (of which 6% are in Maputo City) and benefits from 47.6% of the national GDP. 75% of the population profits from the remaining 52.4% (Grobelaar & Lala, 2003). A related problem is the relatively strong economic development in the south that leads to a persistent brain drain from the provinces, causing a further gap in financial and human resources between Maputo and the provincial capitals (Falck, et al, 2003). Subsequently
the disparities between urban and rural areas increase. The geographical divide also coincides with political affiliations. RENAMO still gets most of its support from the rural areas whereas FRELIMO enjoys the majority of its support from the urban areas (Grobelaar & Lala, 2003).

### 3.2.2 Extensive economic growth and reform since 1992

Soon after the first free elections, Mozambique experienced a notable economic recovery. The period was marked by social and economic progress due to policies of market reform, liberalisation of state enterprises, macro-economic stability, the provision of basic social services by the GoM and massive inflow of foreign assistance. Many donors and credit suppliers saw Mozambique as a successful example of national reconciliation and peace building and therefore supported the country on a huge scale (OECD, 2004). We will return to the issue of donor support later in this chapter.

All these measures and policies resulted in remarkable economic growth rate. The average annual GDP growth rate between 1987 and 1996 was 5.5% (World Bank, 2002). Table 6 shows the strongly increased GDP growth in Mozambique between 1999 and 2003.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1999</th>
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<th>2002</th>
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<td>GDP growth</td>
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<td>13%</td>
<td>8%</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IMF 2003

The sudden decrease in 2000 was the result of floods. The enormous growth in 2001 was due to the implementation of the aluminium smelter MOZAL in 2001 (IMF 2002a).

Yet nowadays there are indicators that predict a slowing of the economy. After several years in which the economic indicators showed encouraging growth rates, this slowdown is accompanied by a depreciation of the national currency, rising inflation and increasing unemployment (Mussanhane, 2001).
3.2.3 **Economy**

The domestic economy is relatively small. The GoM seeks to promote structural change through the development of mega projects and transportation infrastructure in the south, centre and northern part of the country. The latter is undertaken to connect Mozambique with Malawi, South Africa and Zimbabwe (Mussanhane, 2001). Both the GoM and private companies have invested in large projects such as the construction of the aluminium smelter MOZAL, the Gas export pipeline to South Africa, the rehabilitation of the Cahora Bassa Dam for hydroelectricity, mineral projects, and development projects in the Zambezi Valley (OECD, 2004).

Characteristic to the Mozambican economy is it is still concentrated on farming or agriculture-based industries. This involves some 80% of the population, still suffering from inadequate infrastructure such as absence of irrigation and a lack of adequate rural financing. But infrastructural deficiencies are not the only problem. The sector is also highly sensitive to natural disasters, such as the floods in 2000 and 2001 and the droughts in 2002 and 2003 (OECD, 2004).

As an essentially agricultural country, the economy is tending to specialise in the provision of services and trade. Fifty-two of the largest private companies operate in the area of trade, banking, insurance and other services. According to Mussanhane (2001) this is also a vulnerable sector since it depends mainly on foreign interests. He argues further that characteristic to businesses in Mozambique is that they operate in a difficult environment. Various sectors are dominated by monopolies and oligopolies with foreigners predominating. In addition the higher operating and transaction costs, due to high fuel price, the costs of loading and unloading ships, the excessive costs of telecommunication, coastal shipping, air transport and energy costs, reduce the competitiveness of small firms and provide disincentives to new investments (Mussanhane, 2001).

3.2.4 **Labour market**

When focussing on the structure of the labour market, it is difficult to provide a precise picture of the percentage of economically active people and indicate in which sector they are participating. The National Institute for Statistics has outdated data on this topic. Nevertheless, to give an indication, data from 1993 and 1997 are used. In 1993 over 85% of the labour force was self-employed with the majority working in the agricultural sector. Some 11% of the labour force was employed in the formal sector (registered by the State). In the urban areas the figures are different; with over one-third of the workers employed in the formal sector. The private sector predominantly consisted of small enterprises employing less than ten people and accounting for only 8% of total employment. 92% of all enterprises employed less than 50 people. On the other
hand, 69 enterprises employed over 500 persons, accounting for over half the total employment (MESCT 2000a).

As indicated these numbers are outdated. It is difficult to estimate whether and how they have changed due to economic developments. Hardly any official data is available and current estimates are contradictory. A UN report for example, argues that although the country has experienced positive economic growth in recent years, this has not been accompanied by similar trends in job creation. Unemployment in particular is a problem for low educated people, whereas the highly educated proportion of the population has few problems finding a job. Given the low level of qualifications of Mozambican workers, competition for foreign staff is high (UN, 2000).

3.2.5 Debt relief and donors

Mozambique receives a great deal of funding from donors and credit suppliers. In 1987 the country started its first structural adjustment programme (SAP). This resulted in the arrival of a mass of Western aid agencies and the establishment of one of the world’s largest international relief programmes (OECD, 2004). The GoM is still heavily dependent on external support, which currently constitutes 17% of GDP. In recent years 50% of government spending and 75% of public investment has been funded through external aid (Falcke et al, 2003). Overall development assistance to Mozambique totals $500 million per year, excluding debt relief. The United States is Mozambique’s largest bilateral donor. Other major donors include amongst others, the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nations, European Union, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Italy, France Norway, Portugal, South Africa and the United Kingdom (UN, 2000).

Due to this considerable external assistance, Mozambique has accumulated a large debt (352.2% of GNP in 1994 in real terms). Since 1987 there have been a series of debt negotiations and rescheduling arrangements with international donors such as the IMF, World Bank and the Paris Club. Given the economic reforms undertaken by the GoM in the early 1990s and the burden of debt, in April 1998 the creditors agreed to include Mozambique in the programme of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). This implied the country had 1.7 billion in cash flow. Moreover, the country received additional debt relief under the enhanced HIPC Initiative launched in 1999 and also received further debt relief from the Paris Club of bilateral creditors (OECD, 2004). This enabled the country to increase public expenditure in public sectors such as education (Brito, 2003).
3.2.6 PARPA

The GoM placed priority on poverty reduction as an overarching objective for the coming years. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PARPA) is the basis for strategies and policies for poverty reduction (UN, 2000). The Ministry of Planning and Finance is responsible for overall co-ordination and monitoring of PARPA’s progress. The document, approved by Parliament in December 1999, functions as the guide for preparing the State’s budget, programmes and policies both annually and for the medium term (Falcke et al, 2003). The GoM seeks to involve various government and non-government institutions (private sector, NGO’s, civil society, academic and research institutions and the Mozambican press) in planning, formulation, monitoring and evaluating (Falcke, 2001). In short, for each component in the PARPA, policies are developed with accompanying action plans that will be implemented by different Ministries in coordination with related stakeholders. In this context, significant institutional reform, policy development and strategic plans have been proposed and developed (United Nations, 2000).

3.2.7 Public sector reform

In 2001 the GoM approved the 2001-2011 Global Strategy for Public Sector Reform. This reform was developed to lay some of the ground work for PARPA (2001-2005). The goal is to develop transparent and effective government bodies and decrease corruption and unnecessary bureaucracy (Rebelo et al, 2002).

The Public Sector Reform Strategy comprises six major components: (1) strengthening of service delivery through decentralization and institutional restructuring; (2) policy formulation and monitoring; (3) professionalisation of the public sector; (4) financial management and accountability; (5) good governance and combating corruption and (6) management of the reform process itself.

The Inter-ministerial Commission on Public Sector Reform (CIRESP) monitors the overall implementation of the reform program and reviews all proposals for reform prior to their submission to the Council of Ministers (CoM). A Technical Unit for the Reform of the Public Sector (UTRESP) has been set up to support the CIRESP (World Bank, 2003).

An important aspect in this strategic plan, is that Central Government is expected to restructure policy- and implementation processes. Instead of being in charge of operational management and responsible for service delivery, the aim is to re-focus its role and limit it to issues such as setting standards, monitoring and evaluation. Operational management and responsibility for service delivery is destined to be handed down to decentralised offices (Government of Mozambique, 2000).
Some ministries have started to develop these types of mechanisms. The Ministry of Planning and Finance, for instance, initiated reforms to decentralise planning and budgeting and the Ministry of Health strengthened its relations with churches and NGO’s and is discussing their role at a decentralised level (Rebelo et al, 2002).

In this chapter we have elaborated on some of the main historical and contextual factors that constitute the frame within which higher education policy processes are set. As will be substantiated in chapters 6 and 7, the changing ideologies at national level were clearly reflected in these higher education policies. In addition other dynamics, such as economic growth and increasing demand for higher education also affected the sector.
4 Theoretical framework

4.1 The study of public policy

There are many different approaches to studying public policies (see e.g. Hoogerwerf, 1989; John, 1998; Parsons, 1995). Parsons (1995, p. XV) argues that despite the variety of approaches, public policy studies are all concerned with how issues as well as problems come to be defined and constructed and how they are placed on the political and policy agenda. The study of public policy focuses specifically on the realisation and outcome of policy decisions. Various actors such as the state, bureaucrats, legislatures, representatives of interest groups, experts, donor organisations, journalists or the general public can influence both the realisation and outcomes of policy-decisions. These can also be affected by specific factors such as socio-economic, cultural, organisational institutional and legislative.

Each theoretical framework, however, focuses on different aspects of the policy process or seeks to answer specific questions. John (1998, p. 15-16) distinguishes between five theoretical frameworks for policy studies, 1) institutional approaches, 2) group and network approaches, 3) socio-economic approaches, 4) rational choice approaches and 5) ideas-based approaches.

- Institutional approach: this approach argues that political organisations, such as parliaments, legal systems and bureaucracies, structure policy decisions and outcomes. The approach examines the (institutional) constraints actors face and takes into account the norms and habits of policy-making in different political and policy systems. It stresses that rule-following within an institutional context is the main factor for explaining policy variation, stability and change.
- Group and network approaches: these approaches maintain that formal and informal relations shape decisions and outcomes. Networks of relationships between actors determine policy outputs and outcomes. The approach analyses alliance building, networking and mobilisation in public decision-making. It focuses on the informal relations that circumvent formal institutions and define the roles of bureaucrats and other policy participants.
- Socio-economic approaches: according to these approaches, socio-economic factors determine public actors’ decisions and affect policy outputs and outcomes. Socio-economic factors affect action and ideology of actors. The approach stresses the primacy of economic and social systems and explores the salience of ideologies that maintain social and economic relationships.
- Rational choice approach: the approach prioritises preferences and bargaining of actors that explain decisions and outcomes. Policy processes
are bargaining games between individuals. Bargaining is analysed as a series of games between the participants where the structure of choices is determined by institutional and socio-economic constraints. This approach investigates preferences and choices of the actors themselves in the situations they face.

- Ideas-based approaches: these approaches state that ideas about solutions to policy problems have a life of their own. Ideas circulate and gain influence independently or prior to interests in the policy process. This approach concentrates on actors’ beliefs and conceptions about policy. Individual motivations, group dynamics and institutional frameworks are a result of the intentions and beliefs of the participants in the policy process.

These approaches are based on different assumptions about human agency, the effect of structures, the meaning of power and the nature of the state. This does not imply however, that the approaches are mutually exclusive; they generally complement each other.

In this study we are interested in policy change in a turbulent environment. We focus on the complexity of policy developments and give particular attention to macro and micro processes, interaction between actors, their preferences, networks around actors and regulation.

In our search for a theoretical framework we therefore look for an approach that captures such elements. We study policy changes through the lens of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). ACF is a theoretical framework that has elements of the various approaches listed above, particularly from the idea-based and network approaches. The key principle in ACF is that actors with the same belief co-align and seek to influence a policy. ACF is an interesting framework for understanding and explaining policy changes in Mozambique because it focuses on the complex interaction between the macro and micro processes around policy developments. With respect to the macro processes, the theory accounts for broader socio-economic developments that are independent from specific policy areas. In that respect the specific nature of the Mozambican context becomes an important factor in the theoretical framework to explain policy processes. Characteristic of this Mozambican context is that Mozambique is a developing country where more than 90% of the population does not pay taxes. Consequently, there are relatively low financial resources for public expenditure in some public policy areas. With respect to the micro processes, the framework analyses and explains the interactions between people, groups and organisations that have come together because of a common belief and subsequently seek to realise a common goal. In the next paragraph we elaborate on the origins of ACF and set out how ACF explains policy processes and changes.
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1986) developed ACF In the mid-1980s as an effort to synthesise top-down and bottom-up approaches. Characteristic of the top-down approach is that it starts with a policy decision by (central) government officials. Subsequently, it focuses on the question of to what extent policy goals are attained and why. Top-down approaches analyse for example the factors affecting policy outputs, impacts on ideas and actions of implementing officials and target groups, or on policy reformulation over time (Sabatier, 1986, p. 22).

Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith have three general criticisms of the top-down approach. First, they criticise it for mainly focusing on the decision-makers and neglecting other actors, such as those at street-level or outside the public sector. Second, they argue that top-down approaches are difficult to apply in situations where there is no dominant policy structure but instead a multitude of governmental directives and actors. Third, the top-down approach partly obscures the difference between policy formulation and policy implementation, since these phases of policy processes influence each other. Policies are generally reformulated during the implementation phase (p. 30).

The bottom-up approach stresses the involvement of lower-level bureaucrats and other actors who carry out public decisions at this level. These actors aim to influence the policy choices of the decision-makers at other levels. In the bottom-up approach, the researcher must identify the network of actors who interact at the operational (local) level on a particular problem or issue. The researcher is interested in their goals and how they seek to influence decision-makers at higher levels, such as regional and national actors involved in the planning, financing and execution of the relevant governmental and non-governmental programmes (p. 32).

Sabatier argues that the bottom-up approach underestimates the influence of institutions and structures on the actor’s possibility to influence decision makers at other levels. “Just as top-downers are in danger of overemphasising the importance of the centre vis-à-vis the periphery, the bottom-uppers are likely to overemphasise the possibility of the periphery to frustrate the centre” (p. 34). Researchers utilising bottom-up theories take the ideas, preferences, instruments and resources of actors as given. In reality, however, formal structures, socio-economic developments and other actors also influence these preferences and amount of resources. Hence, the top-down and the bottom-up approaches concentrate on different aspects of a policy process. Researchers in top-down approach focus on the effectiveness of specific government programmes while those using bottom-up approaches with accurately mapping the strategies of actors concerned with a policy problem (p. 35).

Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith try to combine top-down and bottom-up approaches. From the bottom-up approach they adopt the idea that one needs to start from a policy problem rather than a law or other policy decision and then examine the strategies employed by relevant actors. From the top-down approach, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith take the assumptions that legal and socio-
economic factors structure behavioural options and therefore specific programmes and strategies. Adopting this aspect puts focus on developments at the macro level, such as socio-economic changes. Other essential elements derived from the top-down approach include behaviour of actors trying to manipulate for example legal rules, the way actors interpret a policy problem and factors influencing policy problems. According to Sabatier, by combining these two approaches attention shifts from policy implementation to policy change over ten to twenty years in which numerous policy initiatives are undertaken. At the same time, one systematically focuses on ideas, strategies and actions of all actors related to a policy issue (p. 39).

ACF was also developed as a critique of what they call “textbook approaches” to the policy process. To study a policy process, textbook approaches make a distinction between stages of problem identification, agenda setting, adoption, implementation and policy evaluation. By breaking the policy process into functionally and temporally distinct sub-processes, researchers are able to focus on the phenomena of one of the identified stages in the policy process (deLeon, 1999). According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith this approach provides a useful conceptual disaggregation of the complex and varied policy process into manageable segments. However it is not a realistic representation of the policy process since policy evolution often involves multiple cycles that are initiated by actors at different levels of government and outside the government (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993, p. 2-3). The identified stages do not logically follow each other as indicated by the textbook approach. Instead, they sometimes occur at the same time or in different sequence and affect one another. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith argue that the policy process should be seen as the interaction of various factors and multiple interacting cycles, multiple sources of causation and multiple levels of government.

4.3 The basic concepts of ACF

Several fundamental concepts underpin ACF: (policy) subsystems, advocacy coalitions, belief system, resources and external factors outside the policy subsystem.

A (policy) subsystem refers to the interaction of actors from different institutions that follow and seek to influence governmental decisions in specific policy areas.

Within this subsystem advocacy coalitions consist of actors that share a set of basic beliefs and seek to manipulate the rules, budgets and personnel of government institutions in order to achieve goals over time. The advocacy coalitions in the subsystem can generally be divided into a dominant coalition and minority coalition, holding different policy beliefs that seek to realise objectives over time in accordance with its policy belief.
The set of basic beliefs that actors in an advocacy coalition hold is called a belief system: it consists of perceptions and values. These beliefs determine individual choices and actions. Individuals form advocacy coalitions on the base of similar beliefs and subsequently act on the basis of these beliefs.

According to ACF, policy developments take place in two ways: 1) through interaction of competing advocacy coalitions whereby the coalitions seek to attempt to translate the policy beliefs into governmental programmes through increasing political resources and through policy learning, and 2) changes external to the subsystem that affect the policy core belief of the dominant coalition or enables a minor coalition to acquire more political resources that enables them to push the dominant coalition from its position and become dominant itself. Figure 2 summarises the relationships between the key concepts of ACF.

**Figure 2: Diagram of the Advocacy Coalition Framework**

Source: Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1986
In the following section we elaborate upon the central concepts of ACF (in bold in).

**Policy subsystem**
The unit of analysis in ACF is the policy subsystem. A subsystem refers to the interaction of actors from different institutions that follow and seek to influence governmental decisions in a specific policy area (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993, p. 16). Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith assume that every subsystem contains a large number of actors. It does not only consist of one governmental institution but of actors from a variety of public and private organisations actively concerned with a policy issue or problem, be it air pollution control, mental health or – as in our case – the development of a higher education system.

Policy subsystems are open systems in the sense that there is no clear boundaries that determine who are part of the subsystem. Moreover not all subsystem actors need to be active in influencing the policy at the same time. Some may be more active at an early stage of policy reforms and others may be more active during implementation. Sometimes subsystem actors are just there for certain procedures but not actively trying to influence the policy. As Sabatier argues, activating latent actors is often a strategy for coalitions to affect policy change, for instance the coalition can expand the range of subsystem actors in their explicit effort to use information from these people in order to alter a policy (p. 24).

New subsystems regularly emerge, for instance, because actors have become dissatisfied with the existing subsystem neglecting a particular aspect of policy problem and therefore form their own subsystem (p. 24). This initiation of a new subsystem may be the result of minor coalitions or it may be the result of a dominant coalition becoming large and specialised enough to form its own subsystem. According to Sabatier there will be greater fragmentation of beliefs in recently formed subsystems than in more established ones. Once the subsystem has matured, about two or three advocacy coalitions are left (p. 26).

**Advocacy coalitions**
Advocacy coalitions consist of actors from a variety of public and private institutions at all levels that share a set of basic beliefs and values and seek to manipulate the rules, budgets and personnel of government institutions in order to achieve goals over time. Advocacy coalitions tend to have common perceptions of policy goals (or a government programme), how to reach objectives and of the magnitude of a problem. The values act as information filters since it determines how actors perceive reality.

Individuals form advocacy coalitions on the basis of shared beliefs and subsequently act on the basis of these beliefs. In their attempts to successfully reach their policy goals, members of an advocacy coalition act to an important extent in concert, that is, they coordinate their activities and develop strategies
over time that seek to make governmental institutions behave in accordance with their policy beliefs. Examples of these strategies are:

- Influencing legislatures to alter budgets or legal objects
- Changing the incumbents of various governmental positions within elected bodies or administrative agencies
- Affecting the public opinion
- Altering target group behaviour, via for example, demonstration or boycott
- Altering the perceptions of policy-relevant actors through producing knowledge and information (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p. 142).

In sum, ACF defines an advocacy coalition as “people from a variety of positions who 1) share a particular belief system and 2) show a non-trivial degree of co-ordinated activity over time.”

Subsystems generally, consist of a dominant coalition and one or more minority coalitions where the former is in the position to determine policy processes. Each coalition will seek to realise its policy objectives over time through increasing its political resources and through policy-oriented learning. The minority coalitions can seek to improve their relative position through augmenting their resources, though, their basic chance of gaining power within a subsystem resides in waiting for external events to significantly increase their political resources (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993, p. 35). We will come back to the notion of resources later in this chapter.

**Policy brokers**

Advocacy coalitions adopt strategies to pursue their policy. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith argue that because subsystems consist of more than one advocacy coalition, each with its own policy objective and strategy, policy brokers may mediate the strategies. A policy broker is someone who finds some reasonable compromise for the competing coalitions that will reduce intense conflict (p. 18).

**Policy beliefs and type of policy change**

Some aspects of belief systems (and therefore also public policy) change far more frequently than others. In order to get a conceptual handle on this, ACF distinguishes between three belief systems levels: 1) deep core, 2) policy core and 3) secondary aspects;

- Deep core elements: this level of belief includes basic ontological and normative assumptions about human nature, or the priority of fundamental values such as liberty or equity, or political support to a left or right wing party. It refers to the individual’s underlying personal philosophy. This belief usually applies to all policy fields and provides the foundation for the other more specific beliefs.
• Policy core elements: these beliefs relate to a specific policy field or subsystem. It includes the basic strategies and policy positions for achieving deep core beliefs in the policy area of a subsystem and involves topics such as: whose welfare counts, the relative authority of governments versus the market and the role of various actors in the policy subsystem.

• Secondary aspects: these relate to particular aspects of the policy area and are narrow in scope. A secondary aspect refers for instance to the multitude of instrumental decisions and information searches necessary to implement the policy in a specific policy area (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993, p. 28)

Within the hierarchy of layers (see figure below), the secondary aspects are assumed to change more frequently than the policy core, which in its turn changes more frequently than the policy’s deep core aspects.

Secondary aspects often change due to policy learning. Policy learning refers to relatively enduring alterations of thoughts or behavioural intentions that result from experience and are concerned with the attainment (or revision) of policy objectives (p. 19). Advocacy coalitions learn over time. They create, on the basis of experience and learning, new understandings of reality about insights into the causes of problems, how to solve them or to reach policy goals.

Changes in the core aspects of a policy are usually the result of perturbations in non-cognitive factors external to the subsystem, such as changes in socio-economic conditions or in outputs from other subsystems. ACF assumes that these external factors are relatively stable and rarely, or only after a long time, change. Consequently, core beliefs that are affected by these external factors change slowly, generally after a decade or more. To change the power structure between dominant and minor advocacy coalitions, there is a need for significant perturbations external to the subsystem including shifts in governments or media attention for a policy issue in favour of the minor coalition.

Changes to the deep core seldom happen. As Freudenberg and Gramling (2002), state: “these beliefs can provide an important context for actions, including the actions involved in joining one coalition rather than another, but they tend to have less direct impact within specific domains” (p. 19-20).
According to the AFC, the policy core, is the fundamental source of division and cohesion in political conflict (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993, p. 27). Changes in the secondary aspects are minor changes. Given that they concern relatively minor changes, advocacy coalition tend to give up their secondary sooner than the policy core. It is therefore the policy core that binds subsystem actors in an advocacy coalition.

**External factors to the subsystem**

External factors outside the subsystem include relatively stable parameters, dynamic events and resources.

The dynamic changes external to the subsystem can be divided into three main categories:
- Changes in socio-economic conditions, like migration or economic growth
- Changes in governing coalitions, like newly elected government that decide to alter the coalitions’ resources
- Outputs from other subsystems that provide opportunities or obstacles to the competing coalitions, for instance funding policies affecting higher education policies
The stable parameters are divided in four main categories:

- Basic attributes of the problem area (or good) such as its public or quasi-public nature
- Basic distribution of natural resources. For example, the distribution of natural resources strongly affects a society’s overall wealth, the viability of different economic sectors, many aspects of its culture, and the feasibility of options in many policy areas.
- Fundamental socio-cultural values. Political power, for example is often correlated with income, social class and large organisations.
- Social structures such as, constitutional and other fundamental legal norms can sometimes affect the extent of policy learning. In some governmental systems for example it is easier to evaluate factors that affect a policy than in others (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993, p. 21).

**Resources**

Coalition resources include money and members (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). The distribution of resources among subsystem actors is determined by factors outside the policy subsystem as these can alter the constraints and opportunities facing them. Redistribution of these resources takes place when political power shifts to different actors. New subsystem actors may receive the authority to make policy while others may have to give up their position. (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p. 130).

Whereas the distribution of resources of subsystem actors is affected by forces outside the policy subsystem (external factors), advocacy coalitions always actively try to increase their resources. After all, seeking to move a governmental programme in a certain direction depends largely on resources that coalitions posses. Therefore they actively compete for resources through attracting more members with similar policy beliefs or someone with powerful political positions.

### 4.3.1 Summary of policy change in ACF

In short, ACF focuses on the interaction between actors that hold a different belief within a policy subsystem and attempt to respond to changing socio-economic and political conditions (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993, p. 16). In ACF policy change can basically occur in two ways. The first is through the interaction of competing advocacy coalitions. Here coalitions seek to translate their policy cores and secondary aspects into governmental programmes through increasing political resources and through policy learning. The second is through the effects of system-wide events - changes in socio-economic conditions, outputs from other subsystem, changes in the governing coalition - that can lead to a shift in dominant coalition or change in the policy core of a dominant coalition. The replacement of a dominant coalition can occur when
minor coalitions exploit external events to augment their resources and improve their relative position.

4.4 Criticisms on ACF

In the last decade ACF has come to be seen as a promising theoretical framework for studying public policy processes (e.g. Fenger & Klok, 2001, Parsons, 1995, Eberg, 1997, Schlager & Blomquist, 1996, Grin & Hoppe, 1997). As of 1999 ACF has been used in at least 34 published studies in policy domains like environmental and energy, education, national defence, telecommunications, regulation, drugs, infrastructure, and gender discrimination in wages (Sabatier, 2003, p. 13). These studies point out that ACF appears to be applicable to a variety of policy domains and political systems, particularly for countries in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The studies identified the strengths and the weaknesses of ACF (see e.g. Schlager, 1995; Schlager & Blomquist, 1996; John, 1998; Minstrom & Vergari, 1996; Grin & Hoppe, 1997). Despite criticisms, the core elements have remained intact and are generally considered to be valid. Scholars generally agree that policy processes and outcomes are the result of interactions between actors, holding a common belief, within a policy subsystem and who attempt to respond to changing socio-economic and political conditions (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993, p. 16).

To better understand changes in ACF, in the following table we summarise the criticisms on ACF organised in seven basic themes identified by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999).
Table 7: Criticisms of scholars around seven basic themes as identified by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith

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<th>Theme</th>
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Source: Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999

According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, ACF is a young theoretical framework that is still under development. On the basis of the empirical applications in the published studies and the criticisms of other authors, they adapted ACF. They made changes in the theoretical framework, revised some of the hypotheses, and added several new ones:

- Subsystems: originally a distinction was made between mature and nascent subsystems in order to indicate the extent of stability of coalitions (Sabatier & Brasher, 1993). In addition Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999, p. 136-137) came up with criteria under which new subsystems emerge.
Defining characteristics of the policy core beliefs: as opposed to the ambiguous defining characteristics of the policy core in their first versions, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith underline that scope and topic are the defining characteristics of the policy core beliefs (Jenkins-Smith & St Clair, 1993 and Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier 1994). They provide a revised and extended set of topics that are covered by the policy core. The latest version of this list is from 1999 (see Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p. 133). They assume that on the basis of empirical research this list will be extended.

Coalition actors: the position of administrative actors is now distinguished from other subsystem actors. Jenkins-Smith and St. Clair (1993) argue that within a coalition, administrative agencies will advocate more moderate positions than their interest group allies. Due to their position they are confronted with cross-cutting constraints. In addition they now add a hypothesis that distinguishes between “material actors” and “purposive actors”. Purposive groups are more constrained in their expression of beliefs and policy positions than material groups. The reason for this is that purpose groups primarily attract members on the basis of ideology and thus members maintain a relatively strict loyalty to group beliefs and policy positions in order to decrease the risk of losing members. Leaders of purpose groups are logically selected on the basis of their adherence to those beliefs. Members of material groups, which focus on promoting their self-interest, allow their leaders greater latitude in choosing secondary aspects (determining their strategies how to promote their core objective), as long as they are attentive to their main core purpose (Jenkins-Smith & St. Clair, 1993, p. 151).

Co-ordination: Based on the work of Zafonte and Sabatier (1998) and Fenger and Klok (2001), a distinction is now made between the type of coordination mechanisms amongst actors. The type of coordination activity depends on two variables: 1) the type of interdependency (symbiotic, competitive or independent) and 2) the type of belief (congruent, indifferent, diverge). Differences in interdependencies and beliefs are argued to lead to different types of inter-organisational arrangements. Fenger and Klok provide insights to the role of resources in policy making (Fenger & Klok, 2001, p. 1).

Factors influencing policy change: Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith added and revised several aspects. First, they acknowledge that even when the accumulation of technical information does not change the views of the opposing coalition, it can have an important influence on policy, at least in the short term, by altering the view of policy brokers or other important government officials. Second, they acknowledge that significant perturbations external to the subsystem are a necessary, but not sufficient, cause of change in the policy core attributes of a government programme. Perturbations provide an opportunity that should be exploited by the advocacy coalitions (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993, p. 219). Third, an extra variable is added to the category external system events: changes in public opinion. Public opinion can alter priorities of certain policy issues or
influence the priority of various policy problems (p. 223). Fourth, on the basis of criticisms by several European scholars who pointed out the necessity of including the variable “degree of consensus needed to institute a major policy change” (as it varies by country), this variable is now included in ACF model. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith indicate that the degree of consensus affects the constraints and strategies of subsystem actors and the probability of major policy change. Fifth, hierarchically superior units of government may attempt to change the policy core of a “subordinate level”, like the possible consequences of European legislation for member states or the consequences of WTO agreements. Sixth, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith add that major policy change in super-majoritarian systems (systems where much more than a simple majority vote is required for major change) usually require advocacy coalitions to augment their resources by developing short-term coalitions of convenience with a variety of other groups. Seventh, they now assume that in situations where all major coalitions view continuation of the current situation as unacceptable, they may be willing to enter negotiations with the intention to find a compromise. The authors subsequently come up with some additional conditions for successful consensus (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p. 148).

- Successful forums: a number of supplemental hypotheses concerning the characteristics of successful forums that facilitate learning between coalitions were also added.

On the basis of these changes, the diagram of the revised ACF looks as follows (see Figure 4).
As the revised model shows, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith added two elements: changes in public opinion and the degree of consensus needed for major policy change. The other changes they made are expressed in hypotheses. Some are specified further and some new ones are added. An important observation is that the adaptations made by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith do not affect the basic principles or causal relations between the key variables to explain policy change.

Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) point out that more empirical research is needed that systematically relates the core variables of ACF to actual policy changes. In particular more research needs to be done on the principal dependent variables in the model. This includes the conditions conducive for successful coalition formation, the problems regarding collective action, the development of young subsystems that mature, factors affecting beliefs, and institutions affecting policy changes.
The majority of the studies using ACF apply it to industrialised regions such as states in the US, Canada and countries in Western Europe. A couple are also applied outside the OECD countries, such as Indonesia and Poland (Anderson, 1998; Elliot, 1998). The first conclusions indicate that the applicability of ACF is not limited to OECD countries. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) indicated that more research needs to be done in order to come to a full assessment of ACF in non-industrialised countries.

In the previous section we summarised the major criticisms of ACF. We pointed out the adaptations that are made following insights from empirical research that applied ACF and basic theoretical contributions of various scholars. In this study we observe the policy developments of Mozambican higher education through the lens of ACF. We question whether this theoretical framework holds when applied to a unique context characterised by a turbulent environment in which a higher education sector is practically built from scratch. In the following part of this chapter we explore this issue further and set out the model underlying our research.

4.5 ACF and higher education policy in Mozambique

ACF assumes that the policy subsystem is situated in a context of stable and dynamic factors. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith distinguish between relatively stable and dynamic external factors. Stable factors include the four parameters, basic attributes of the problem area, basic distribution of natural resources, fundamental socio-cultural values and social structure and basic constitutional structure. ACF – developed for application in industrial societies and functional democracies – argues that these factors rarely change and are seldom the subject of a coalition strategy. However, the Mozambican case shows that the higher education subsystem developed in a highly turbulent environment with unstable external factors. In Mozambique the constitutional structure is young, weak and in some aspects still under development. During the last four decades, major changes in the basic constitution were made; after independence (during the Marxist-Leninist period) and after the shift to an environment that allowed free elections and liberal market principles. The turbulent environment is to a large extent the result of shifts in totalitarian regimes. Only since the reforms in the early 1990s when the Government of Mozambique (GoM) shifted to liberal market principles and organised the first free elections, civil society could freely vote and openly dispute governmental policies without being persecuted or punished. A functioning subsystem, as defined by ACF thus emerged in the early 1990s, although this subsystem has its roots in the colonial days and inherited characteristics from before this period of time. For this
reason, the Mozambican higher education subsystem, from ACF point of view, can be characterised as a nascent subsystem.

As Chapter 2 indicated, characteristic of higher education in Sub Saharan Africa are its fast dynamics and the turbulent conditions in which it develops. On the one hand the higher education enrolments increased significantly while on the other hand higher education budget declined drastically due to political and economic turmoil. These developments led to a crisis in higher education in Sub Saharan African (Salmi 1991, Court 1991, Ajayi et al, 1996 Sawyerr 2002, Samoff & Caroll 2002, Teferra & Altbach 2003). Mozambique was not an exception in Sub Saharan Africa.

Given this turbulent environment this study primarily focuses on the policy cores and secondary aspects. We assume it is difficult to define deep cores for countries in such contexts. First, deep core refers to very general beliefs and abstract statements that cut across all subsystems. They are not specifically related to one policy area, but relate to the system level. In contrast to ACF’s assumptions, the system level variables that are related to the deep core have never been stable in the Mozambican case. System variables have changed considerably three times in the last four decades due to shifting state models. Mozambique has had a stable environment for ten years, which is relatively short and the system variables are still in the stage of stabilisation. The constitutional rules are new and need to be further developed. Organisations and functions included in this constitution are still in the process of maturing. For instance, functions like independent law officers, parliament and an independent press are still young and relatively weak.

Second, Mozambique is characterised by extreme poverty. We argue that it is difficult for actors to choose out of a series of options regarding deep core issues. In this stage, where there is hardly any industrial or private sector, people assume government ought to provide education, health care and other public infrastructure. Given the lack of alternatives, the government is considered to be the key player in the development of the country. There are some indications that people in the economic sector prefer the GoM interferes less with this sector since some representatives of private organisations perceive government regulation as impeding sectors development (Mussanhanhe, 2001). However, the general perception is that the social sector practically needs to be (re)established by the government. This type of discussions takes place at subsystem level (which is related to policy core issues) and not at system level (which is related to deep core issues). Issues such as equity, freedom, animal rights and environmental play a less important role in societies where the majority of people have little or no education and where public institutions have to be (re)built. Furthermore, poverty ‘suppresses’ the debate on deep core issues. Therefore we do not include these issues in our research.
The main objective of this study is to analyse and explain Mozambican higher education policy developments from 1993 to 2003. Given the context described in Chapter 2 and 3, studying these policy development through the lens of ACF raises two challenges. First, the question is whether ACF model holds when it is applied outside OECD countries and applied in a context characterised by a turbulent and unstable environment. Second, what are the consequences of policy processes and developments in a nascent subsystem. ACF is generally applied to stable systems that existed for a long time and where actors’ position are clear and stable. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith call such systems “mature systems” and give a set of criteria for their existence:
- participants regard themselves as a semi-autonomous community who share a domain of expertise,
- participants sought to influence public policy within the domain over a fairly long period,
- there exist specialised sub-units within agencies at all relevant levels of government to deal with the topic because without such units at all levels, implementation will be exceedingly problematic
- there exist interest groups or specialised sub-units within interest groups that regard an issue as a major policy topic (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p. 136).

4.6 Research model

4.6.1 The search for reasons for coordination activities in policy processes

Although, from an ACF point of view, resources are seen as important factors that affect policy processes, Grin and Hoppe (1997) and Fenger and Klok (2001) correctly note that this concept is hardly worked out. The notion of resources is in fact a black box in ACF framework (Grin & Hoppe, 1997, p. 15). Fenger and Klok made an important contribution to ACF by giving insight in the role of resources in policy processes. Their starting point was to help clarify what Schlager (1995) called the coordination/collective action of actors in subsystem. ACF defines advocacy coalitions as “people from a variety of positions who: 1) share a particular belief system and 2) show a non-trivial degree of co-ordinated activity over time. By coordination activity Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith refer to the strategies that actors develop to realise common policy goals. As will become clear later in this chapter, coordination is a specific outcome of common action that depends on the nature of beliefs and resources that actors hold. To avoid confusion, in the rest of this study we refer to the terms ‘coalition
behave’ ‘common action’ or ‘interaction’ when referring to strategies actors develop to realise policy goals. Coordination is a specific outcome of coalition behaviour. Schlager criticised ACF for not sufficiently specifying why actors form coalitions or remain in a coalition. She disagrees that beliefs in itself are sufficient to overcome problems that occur when actors engage in joint activities. She argues that subsystem actors involve in activities on the basis of cost-benefit calculations. Common action is costly and should be balanced by benefits. With help of Ostrom theoretical framework (1990), the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD), Schlager developed a framework that explains the emergence, maintenance and dissolution of coalitions.

Zafonte and Sabatier (1998) agree with Schlager that the notion of common action and the problems related to it are not sufficiently worked out in ACF. They acknowledge that these problems do indeed affect the coalitions and cannot be assumed away. Yet, they disagree with the solution she comes up with. They argue IAD and ACF make different assumptions and they therefore find Schlager’s analyses problematic. They also argue that subsystem actors’ beliefs are not only limited to rational cost benefit calculations. These type of calculations are typical for individuals who act solely on the basis of interests. In ACF actors act on the basis of interests and beliefs. The emphasis however is on beliefs and the costs benefit calculation is subordinate to the ideologies. Due to perceptual filters, which are an element of the beliefs, the perceived costs for common action are lower than in the IAD framework and the perceived benefit are larger.

Zafonte and Sabatier continued studying the dynamics around common action by questioning why actors develop common activities. Inspired by the work of Chisholm (1989), they came to the conclusion that the type of interaction between actors depends on, apart from beliefs, the structure of subsystems. Subsystems can be dependent on each other. Chisholm (1989) concentrates on functional interdependencies among organisations as an alternative explanation for coordinated behaviour. He argues that interaction between organisations in multi-organisational systems is linked to overlapping subsystems that are dependent on each other. On the basis of these ideas, Zafonte and Sabatier developed hypotheses on common action over time in overlapping policy subsystems and their interdependency on each other.

Zafonte and Sabatier argue that interdependence refers to the condition by which the actions of one actor interferes with or contributes to the goal achievement of another. The authors specify two forms of interdependency, overlapping geographical subsystems and overlapping functional subsystems. The first type relates to imposed interdependencies due to supra-national, national or regional rules. The second type refers to strongly connected subsystems such as the agriculture and water quality subsystem. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith refer to these as nested subsystems. There are also some subsystems that fall under both types. In such cases Zafonte and Sabatier refer to multiple functions and nested territories (Zafonte & Sabatier, 1998, p. 474).
Zafonte and Sabatier agree that both subsystems’ structure and beliefs are important factors that affect the common action. They question how these two factors relate to each other and come up with the following assertions:

A) When overlapping functions induce interactions between subsystem actors who share similar beliefs, the subsystem actors (organisations) show greater frequency of coordination.

B) When imposed interdependencies cause interactions between subsystem actors with conflicting beliefs, the subsystem actors are more likely to work against each other than to cooperate. In this case, overlapping functions result in conflict causing the subsystem actors to be in opposing coalitions.

C) As the overlap between two organisations’ functions decreases, the extent to which values produce either co-ordination or conflict also decreases because one organisation’s attempts to institutionalise their beliefs does not directly impinge upon the other’s. Without functional overlap, there is both less necessity to co-ordinate and less reason to fight (Zafonte & Sabatier, 1998, 481).

On the basis of Zafonte’s and Sabatier’s arguments, Fenger and Klok developed the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional overlap</th>
<th>Policy core beliefs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Strong co-ordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Weak co-ordination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fenger and Klok 2001

Table 8 shows a distinction between “strong” from “weak” co-ordination. Strong co-ordination requires the development of a common plan of action; the communication of that plan to potential coalition members; the monitoring of member compliance; and the imposition of sanctions for non-compliance. Weak co-ordination does not require any elaborate decision-making or monitoring processes. It requires the potential members of a coalition to monitor each other’s behaviour and alter their own to make it complementary. According to Zafonte and Sabatier these alterations of behaviour should not be too complicated because actors have similar beliefs and trust each other. Weak co-ordination is often sufficient for some degree of policy success without implying high costs for coalition members. This type of co-ordination is important because it provides mechanisms through which a variety of actors can develop complementary strategies without paying the costs of jointly accepting and implementing a unified plan of action. It may apply across the
diverse set of organisational types that are potential members of advocacy coalitions (Zafonte & Sabatier, 1998, p. 480). Zafonte and Sabatier argue that strongly coordinated behaviour can occur and can be successful, both on a long-term and short-term basis. Strongly coordinated behaviour may periodically be necessary for coalition success. As they state: “While some joint agreements that are established through strong coordination may lead to peak associations that are long lived, many others forms of strong coordination focus on short-term policy objectives” (p. 480).

Fenger and Klok (2001) agree with the thoughts of Zafonte and Sabatier, but add an extra dimension to their work. First, as opposed to Zafonte and Sabatier’s focus on coalition behaviour between actors in different subsystems, they concentrate on the coalition behaviour within the same subsystem and overlapping subsystems. Second, they argue that the nature of interdependency and beliefs can be further specified. The nature of interdependency is related to the characteristics of the resources. It is the type of resource (symbiotic, independent or competitive) that determines the nature of dependency between the subsystem actors. The nature of dependency between subsystem actors is subsequently a crucial factor that affects common action of subsystems. With respect to beliefs, Fenger and Klok add an extra category, that beliefs regarding policy issues can also be indifferent. They thus distinguish three types of policy core beliefs: congruent, different or indifferent. Fenger and Klok conclude that the type of policy core belief and the extent of dependency between the subsystem actors determines whether and which type of common action will be undertaken. On the basis of these arguments Fenger and Klok developed the table as is presented below (Table 9)

**Table 9: Coalition behaviour as the result of interdependency and belief congruence (modified hypotheses)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interdependency</th>
<th>Policy core beliefs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Congruent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbiotic</td>
<td>Strong co-ordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Weak co-ordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td>Collective action with severe action problems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fenger and Klok, 2001
This table shows that differences in interdependencies and beliefs lead to different types of inter-organisational arrangements and subsequently the nature of policy change (Fenger & Klok, 2001). In fact, the authors do not solely aim to predict different forms of coalition behaviour. The characteristics and outcome of different forms of coordination can be similar, yet, because they occur under different circumstances, they are labelled differently. Coalitions of convenience show the same type of interaction as coalitions that show weak coordination. Fenger and Klok made a distinction between these coalitions to underline that coalition behaviour occurs under different circumstance (i.e. in coalitions of convenience, actors hold indifferent beliefs and are symbiotic dependent on each other, whereas the activities of coalitions that are classified as weak coordination, actors hold similar beliefs but are independent from each other).

In the upper left cell (congruent beliefs and symbiotic interdependency) actors are expected to be in the same coalition and will not face great difficulties in coordinating their activities since all actors are better off in the end. The middle left cell indicates that if beliefs are congruent and interdependency is competitive then beliefs will bring actors together while competitive interdependency (bottom left cell) will drive them apart. However, in line with ACF’s basic assumption, beliefs are the principal glue of coalitions. It is therefore expected that actors form a coalition along the lines of their beliefs, yet, they will face severe collective action problems due to their competitive interdependency. The coalition is expected to be unstable due to the diverging forces of competitive interdependency. If, like in the upper right cell, beliefs are divergent and interdependency is symbiotic, then the result is more difficult to explain. On the basis of assumptions indicated by the AFC, one would expect that actors are members of conflicting coalitions. However, they are dependent on each other. One would also expect them to face severe collective action problems given that their members are symbiotically interdependent with actors from the opposite coalition. One way of coping with this situation would be a strategy of de-politicisation, where actors stick to their divergent beliefs but develop some sort of general compromise that enables them to work together with the actors from the other coalition. ACF would not expect this to happen “overnight” but the tendency might be expected, certainly with regard to the secondary aspects of the belief system (Fenger & Klok, 2001 p. 8).

In this study we use Fenger’s and Klok’s insights to study the higher education policy processes in Mozambique. On the basis of our interpretation of Fenger and Klok’s expectations about coalition behaviour, we develop a model involving coordination activities between subsystems actors. Figure 5 shows which aspects of ACF we concentrate on when studying higher education policy processes.
To explain policy change we concentrate on four variables; beliefs, resources, common action and external factors. In order to keep this clear focus, other variables in ACF take a different form or are omitted. Beliefs, resources and common action are operationalised based on theory, while external factors include stable and dynamic components are derived from a description of the context of Mozambique and the characteristics of Mozambican higher education.

Section 4.4 summarised other scholars’ criticisms of ACF and gave an overview of the adaptations and revised model. In the following part we summarise how beliefs, resources and common action are defined by ACF and examine how other scholars used or criticised the way ACF defines these variables.
4.6.2 Beliefs

A belief system refers to the set of basic beliefs that actors in an advocacy coalition hold. According to some theorists, a weak point in ACF is the operationalisation of policy beliefs (Grin & Hoppe, 1997). They criticise Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith for often changing their definition of the concept policy change. Coming up with different definitions makes it difficult for a researcher to operationalise this. Moreover, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith argue that the deep core of a belief system of one advocacy coalition can be a secondary aspect for the other coalition. Grin and Hoppe claim it is unclear how a researcher can differentiate between these three hierarchical levels (Grin & Hoppe, 1997).

On the basis of these criticisms, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith now cover the critical aspects that are attributed to each of the three aspects of the belief system (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, 134). They indicate that scope of system and topic should be the defining characteristics of policy core beliefs and that it is this belief that is most strongly related to indicators of co-ordinated behaviour. With respect to scope, deep core beliefs relate to issues at system level, policy core beliefs relate to issues at subsystem level and secondary aspects relate to certain elements of the subsystem. In addition, they developed a list with policy core topics (e.g. the topic “overall seriousness of the problem” or “basic causes of the problem”).

Table 10 gives an overview of the structure of the beliefs systems.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 10: Structure of belief systems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deep core</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defining characteristics</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scope</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Illustrative components</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Human nature:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Inherently evil vs. socially redeemable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Part of nature vs. dominion over nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Narrow egoists vs. contractarians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Relative priority of various ultimate values: Freedom, security, power knowledge, health, beauty etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Basic criteria of distributive justice: Whose welfare counts? Relative weights of self, primary groups, all people, future generations, non human beings etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Sociocultural identity (e.g., ethnicity, religion, gender, profession)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sabatier 1998
According to ACF, it is the policy core beliefs that glue actors together in a coalition. To realise the common policy, common action between actors is developed around policy core beliefs.

### 4.6.3 Resources and nature of interdependency

ACF argues that in order to form coalitions, common beliefs and joint actions are the basic factors. Coalitions seek to realise their objectives over time through increasing their (political) resources. Different coalitions are in contact with various governmental units where they have authority, are able to gather relevant information or have access to resources. ACF assumes that shared goals and beliefs plus the resources that subsystem actors possess increase the probability of success for advocacy coalitions to turn beliefs into government policies.

Coalitions’ resources include money and legitimacy. Legitimacy can be obtained through the support of influential actors. One example might be through co-aligning with officials who are sympathetic to the coalition and are able to affect policies according to their policy beliefs (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993, 228).

Especially in the early stage of ACF, the notion of resources was poorly worked out. When having a broader look on how the concept of resources is used in public policy studies and organisation studies, we can conclude that this concept is generally interpreted and used in the same way as is done in ACF. The notion of resources in organisations is extensively worked out by various scholars (Huisman, 1995, Fenger, 2001). Huisman gives an overview of different descriptions of scholars regarding the concept resources. He starts with a general definition of Yuchtman and Seashore (1967, 900) who say that resources are “The generalised means, or facilities that are potentially controllable by social organisations, and that are potentially usable - however, indirectly- in relationship between the organisations and its environment.” Huisman continues his analysis by referring to Benson (1975), Aldrich (1972, 1979) and Levine and White (1961) each mention different types of resources. Benson argues that there are two important resources encompassing all forms, money and authority. Aldrich refers to four different resources: products, services, operating funds and personnel and information. In a later work he refers to human activity, power, influence reputation, knowledge and money. Levine and White argue that the relevant resources in health organisations are equipment, specialised knowledge, funds and services. Based on the Klok’s work (1993), Fenger (2001) argues that resources should be based on the distinction between labour and capital. He indicates that physical goods (buildings, machines and natural), competent and skilled labour, time, information, money and legal rules are the essential resources.
Resources are only relevant if they can actually be used for purposes. Yuchtman and Seashore (1967) therefore indicated specifically that the resources must be potentially useable.

Different scholars refer to different resources but all refer to similar types of resources, such as money and rules (authority). We agree with the notion that different resources are important for different organisations and policy areas. Physical goods, for example, may be relevant for industrial organisations but play a less important role for the higher education sector.

The many resources mentioned above can indeed be reduced to the two resources that Benson states as the basic resources authority and finance. We add the resources information since in ACF perspective the development of policies generally happens after consulting subsystem actors and monitoring of activities, which is based on data supplied by actors in the policy subsystem.

Interdependency and resources are two concepts that are closely related because the nature of resources determines the extent and nature of interdependency between actors. Based on the resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), it can be concluded that resources play a role in enabling actor to take actions. Fenger and Klok analyse that when two actors both need the same scarce resource in order to perform their different actions, they are supposed to be interdependent in a competitive way. This implies that when one actor acquires the resources, they are no longer available to the other and therefore this interferes with the latter’s intention to perform the action or achieve his goal. There is another form of interdependency, symbiotic interdependency. In this situation, one actor’s action contributes to another actor’s action or goal achievement. In other words, different actors possess different resources and the exchange of resources enables them to perform the action that makes them achieve their goals (Fenger & Klok, 2001, 6). In short, resources are a factor that influence the interdependency of actors, which in turn lead to different forms of behaviour. We elaborate on this in the following section.

4.6.4 Interaction

Common action between subsystem actors, or coalition behaviour refers to different types of action. ACF refers to these as strategies of advocacy coalitions to make government institutions behave in accordance with their policy cores through. For example:

- Influencing legislatures to alter the budgets and the legal authority of administrative agencies through testimony and campaign contributions.
- Trying to change the incumbents of various positions (i.e. agency political appointees, civil servants, elected legislators etc.).
- Trying to affect the public opinion through mass media.
- Attempt to alter target group behaviour via demonstrations or boycott.
In this study we are interested in the consequences for policy processes in 1) instable and turbulent contexts and in 2) nascent subsystems. To study the policy processes in these specific contexts we concentrate on the role of beliefs, resources and coalition behaviour, whereby the coalitions seek to influence the policy processes.

4.7 Expectations

Having discussed the basic features of ACF, the main elements of our research model and the focus of this study, we formulate the following expectations.

Expectation regarding beliefs in nascent subsystems

Because the Mozambican higher education subsystem only emerged in the 1990s it is considered a nascent subsystem. In their later work, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith made a distinction between mature and nascent subsystems in order to indicate the extent of coalitions stability (Sabatier & Brasher, 1993). Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith came up with criteria under which new subsystems emerge. They argue it is important to distinguish between the conditions under which a subsystem emerges, because it affects the nature of coalitions and coalition formation in the nascent subsystem (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p. 136). If new subsystems are spin-offs of existing ones, for instance when a group of actors becomes dissatisfied with the neglect of particular problems by an existing subsystem, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith expect clearly differentiated coalitions (mirroring pre-existing groups) to emerge. In cases were subsystems emerge out of a new issue or a new conceptualisation of a situation, they expect an amorphous situation where policy beliefs are fragmented and coalitions are unstable (p. 137). Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith state “whatever the origins, subsystems normally contain a large and diverse set of actors” (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993, p. 25).

Sabatier and Brasher’s (1993) study of environmental policy at Lake Tahoe\(^\text{19}\) shows that fragmentation of beliefs can be regarded as a phenomenon whereby 1) policy cores are vaguely formulated, 2) actors espouse different policy cores and 3) actors’ policy core beliefs change rapidly. As a consequence actors change coalition in relatively short periods of time.

\(^{19}\) which Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith point out as a typical case that demonstrates fragmented beliefs in nascent subsystems that emerged out of new issues or a new conceptualisation.
Policy core issues include topics such as whose welfare counts, the relative authority of government and market, and the role of various actors in the policy subsystem (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). In the Lake Tahoe study subsystem actors supported ideals like “the need for urban planning” and “clean air” whereas at the same time the actors were occupied with their own specific policy issues in which they were interested. For example local government officials, business owners, environmentalists and regional planning agencies supported the ideal because they were concerned about the negative consequences of urban growth such as pollution of the lake and mountains that surrounded the lake. Yet in the meantime they were also occupied with their own policy issues. The legal regional planning agency strived for more decision-making power in the region, which relates to the policy core issue “the role of various actors in the policy subsystem”. Environmentalists were mainly worried about pollution due to urbanisation and economic growth, which relates to the policy core issues “environmental protection over economic development”. Business owners in turn were occupied with economic growth and stringent government regulations, which relates to the policy core belief “the relative authority of government and market”. Once the subsystem matured, actors discovered that policy issues in this subsystem were closely related and therefore started to coordinate activities to realise their common goal, which they specified further. Actors gained experience with regional planning and environmental policy and increasingly realised that intergovernmental values not only required dealing with both water quality and urbanisation but that doing so required stringent environmental controls. They searched for common ground and aligned in a so-called “environmental coalition”. People valuing economic development and property rights became increasingly aware of the costs of environmental controls and those values and aligned in the competing “economic growth/property rights coalition” (Sabatier & Brasher, 1993, p.192). Thus once the subsystem matures, actors coalesce in distinct advocacy coalitions that reflect integrated policy core beliefs. The coalitions that existed in the nascent subsystem fell apart at this point and actors have redistributed themselves in two or three stable coalitions with distinct policy core beliefs.

If subsystems emerge out of a new issue or a new conceptualisation of a situation, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith expect an initial situation characterised by fragmented beliefs (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p. 136). For the Tahoe study this meant that actors relating to different sectors and concerned about specific policy issues initially espoused a specific policy core that directly related to the concerns in their own sector. At the same time these actors had a vaguely formulated ideal. At a later stage, once the subsystem matured, these actors integrated their policy belief in a clear overall policy objective that covered different policy sectors and interests. During this process actors shifted from policy core beliefs and coalesced into a different coalition. We apply this expectation to the case of Mozambican higher education:
Expectation 1
In nascent subsystems that emerge out of new issues or a new conceptualisation, policy beliefs are fragmented.

Expectations regarding interaction between subsystem actors
In order to analyse the higher education policy developments in Mozambique we concentrate on coalition behaviour, whereby coalitions seek to influence higher education policies. From the theoretical approach adopted, policy change is affected by the interaction of subsystem actors. Interaction between subsystem actors is affected by resources and common beliefs. On the basis of Fenger and Klok’s (2001) contribution we expect that the type of resources and the type of policy beliefs that the subsystem actors possess will determine whether actors join an advocacy coalition to realise common goals and determines the type of effort to realise common goals. We study whether these expectations, predicted by Fenger and Klok and resulting in nine possible types of coalition behaviour summarised in Table 9, also apply to Mozambican higher education policy.

Expectation 2
The type of interaction between actors is dependent on the interaction between the nature of policy beliefs that actors hold and the nature of interdependency of actors.

Expectation regarding major policy changes
Due to “shocks” from outside the subsystem, policy core beliefs can be reviewed and adapted resulting in major policy changes. In addition, for the redistribution of political power between dominant and minor advocacy coalitions, there is a need for significant perturbations external to the subsystem, such as shifts in governments or attention from the media for a policy issue in favour of the minor coalition. In the latter case, a change in the external environment is necessary, but not sufficient to cause change in the policy core attributes of a government. The perturbations provide an opportunity for major policy change, but that change will not occur unless proponents of change, that is the minority coalition, skilfully exploit that opportunity (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p. 148).

Expectation 3a
Major policy change (referring to change in the policy core aspects of a governmental programme) happens infrequently, that is only after a decade or more.
**Expectation 3b**
If major policy change occurs, this happens due to changes external to the subsystem.

### 4.8 Summary

The unique context in which the Mozambican higher education sector develops challenges ACF’s assumptions and expectations. After all, ACF was designed and applied to relatively stable and industrialised societies. Characteristic for this study is that the Mozambican higher policy subsystem and policies are built almost from scratch and policy changes take place rapidly. In ACF terminology, the higher education field is a nascent subsystem.

The aim of this research is to analyse the policy developments of Mozambican higher education between 1993 and 2003. In our search for an answer to our research question we study how a system of coordination is put in place through the establishment of MESCT to facilitate the reforms in the sector. We focus on three particular aspects of ACF: 1) fragmented beliefs in nascent subsystems, 2) major policy change and 3) the role of beliefs and resources in common action and policy change.
5 Research methodology

5.1 Introduction

This chapter sets out the methodology and type of data collection used for this study. The study seeks to understand and explain how and why policy developments between 1993 and 2003 proceeded in a certain direction. Case studies are a good approach when we want to obtain detailed information on how and why a certain phenomenon takes place (Yin, 1994). One of the basic purposes behind the case study method is comprehensive understanding of the social phenomena under investigation (Becker, 1968, p. 233). Mozambican higher education policy developments are assumed to be the outcome of various interacting variables and relationships. Characteristic to the case study methodology is that different methods are combined for the purpose of illuminating a case from different angles. It can be based on a mix of qualitative as well as quantitative information and research techniques, such as document analysis, interviews, observation or statistical techniques.

The theoretical framework serves as a method of focussing data collection. For this study this implies that for the purpose of the research model, we concentrate on resources that actors possess, beliefs on the higher education policy and on actions undertaken by actors to influence higher education policy. In addition, as the framework is applied to a turbulent environment and nascent subsystem, and in line with our expectations, policy change, nascent subsystem and external factors are key concepts.

5.2 Operationalisation of variables

The key concepts of policy change, nascent subsystem, external factors, beliefs, resources and common action are defined and elaborated on in the previous chapter. The concepts of the theoretical model, beliefs, resources and common action, need to be operationalised further. This is seen in the work of other scholars who struggled with these concepts when analysing policy change (see for instance, Schlager, 1995, Grin & Hoppe, 1997, Zafonte & Sabatier, 1998, Fenger & Klok, 2001).
5.2.1 Policy Beliefs

In ACF, belief system is synonymous with perceptions regarding policy, such as perceptions on policy goals (or government programme), perceptions on how to reach objectives (policy instruments and causal relations) and a set of basic values and perception of the magnitude of the policy problem. To gain a conceptual handle on policy beliefs, ACF distinguishes three levels in the belief system: deep core, policy core and secondary aspects. According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, it is these policy core beliefs that bind subsystem actors in advocacy coalitions. Consequently to press core beliefs in policies, the common action between coalition members concentrate around it.

5.2.2 Resources

Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith argue that coalition resources include money and members (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). In the previous chapter we argued information is also an important resource for coalition actors to influence policy developments. Therefore for the purpose of this research, we identify three types of resources: financial resources, authority and information. We operationalise these variables as follows.

5.2.2.1 Financial resources

With respect to financial resources we are interested in who controls funding and how funding mechanisms for higher education institutions are regulated and changed. To obtain insights we will analyse which actors provide funds to higher education institutions and whether there is a change in the amount and type of funding or requirements to obtain it. This information gives insights on dependency relations between higher education subsystems actors.

We will study financial year reports of higher education institutions that indicate their financial sources.

5.2.2.2 Authority

To operationalise authority we will focus on the decision-making power of subsystem actors. We will study over which areas the subsystem actors have decision-making power and whether and how this changes over the years. We intend to study whether new actors can obtain decision-making power over certain areas or established actors lose it and whether actors must share this power.

This type of information is found in higher education laws that define decision-making power, for example from law nr.1/93 on higher education, nr.14/2000 on the establishment of the new MESCT and nr.5/2003 on higher
education. Moreover, information can also be obtained from donor agreements that define rules regarding reporting mechanisms, accountability and management in order to be eligible for their financial support.

5.2.2.3 Information

In order to operationalise the variable information we focus on information streams between subsystem actors concerning higher education policies. We seek to unravel who provides whom with what type of information, for what purpose and how subsystem actors react it. For example, we analyse whom MESCT consults when developing a policy and what type of information subsystem actors provide the Ministry.

The resource information can be obtained through written documents (minutes of meetings) that indicate who informs who or a law that defines specific reporting mechanisms between MESCT and higher education institutions. In addition, data on information streams can be collected through attending meetings to see how and with what type of information the different subsystem actors inform each other. Finally, interviews provide the opportunity to ask what type of information they get from whom how and on what topics they communicate with other subsystem actors.

Interdependency and resources are two concepts narrowly related. The type of interdependency is the result of operationalisation of the concept resource. In order to see how interdependency between actors develops over time, we look whether and how actors’ possession of the three resources changes in comparison with the previous period. If, for instance actor A possesses more resources in period II than in period I on which actor B is dependent, actor B is becoming competitively dependent on actor A. Or if actor B, over time, loses resources relevant to goal achievement to actor A, actor B is competitive interdependent on actor A as well.

5.2.3 Interaction

In the previous chapter we discussed the expectations concerning coalition behaviour. Fenger and Klok characterised the type of coalition behaviour. As indicated in Table 9 in the previous chapter, they distinguish nine types of possible outcomes of interaction. Given that “weak conflict” is an outcome of coordination that occurs twice under different circumstances and the fact that one outcome refers to the situation where no interaction occurs at all, in practice only seven different types of interaction are distinguished; strong coordination, weak coordination, coordination based on unstable conflict, coalitions with severe collective action problems, coalitions of convenience, weak conflict and strong conflict (Fenger & Klok, 2001).
In this section we operationalise the seven forms of interaction between actors. First, a distinction is made between coordination and conflict. Coordination refers to the spectrum of activity in which one party alters its political strategy to accommodate the activity of others in pursuit of similar goals (Zafonte & Sabatier, 1998). As opposed to coordination, conflict refers to the spectrum of activity in which the political strategies of one party are aimed at preventing other parties from pursuing divergent goals (Fenger & Klok, 2001). Both forms of interaction have a weak and a strong form, which depends on the type of strategies coalitions use. For weak coordination and weak conflict soft strategies are used, such as negotiation, whereas for strong coordination and strong conflict coalitions use more rigorous strategies like going to court.

**strong coordination**
Strong co-ordination requires 1) development of a common plan of action, 2) communication of that plan to potential coalition members, 3) monitoring of member compliance and 4) imposition of sanctions for non-compliance. Strong coordination is likely to last for a long period.

**weak coordination**
Weak co-ordination does not require the rigorous strategies mentioned above. Instead it simply requires the potential members of a coalition to 1) monitor each other’s behaviour and 2) alter their own to make it complementary.

**strong conflict**
Strong conflict points to situations in which coalitions develop more rigorous strategies to prevent other parties from pursuing their goals. Coalitions use strategies that aim to make it as difficult as possible for other coalitions with divergent beliefs. Coalitions seek to bring down and degrade other coalitions through for example going to court.

**weak conflict**
Soft strategies are used for weak conflict to prevent other parties from pursuing their goal. As with coordination, weak conflict occurs when organisational actors monitor each other’s political behaviour and then alter their actions to prevent the pursuit of goals by the other party.

In addition to these four forms of coalition behaviour, Fenger and Klok distinguish three other forms of interaction, coordination based on unstable conflict, coalitions with severe collective action problems and coalitions of convenience. According to Fenger and Klok, these forms of coalition behaviour correspond in principle with one of the four forms of coalition behaviour mentioned above. Yet it is the conditions in which coalition behaviour occurs
that distinguishes one form from the other. In other words, Fenger and Klok
give different labels to similar forms of interactions that occur under different
conditions. For each label they provide a description to specify the different
dynamics and complexity around these forms of interaction, which at first sight
appear to be the same but are a result of different forces and circumstances.

**coordination based on unstable conflict**
Coordination based on unstable conflict occurs when 1) coalitions use soft
strategies and search for a compromise (as with weak conflict) and 2) actors are
symbiotically dependent on each other and divergent beliefs.

This type of coalition behaviour relates closely to weak conflict. Yet because
the actors are symbiotically dependent on each other, Fenger and Klok classify
this type of interaction as coordination based on unstable conflict. One way of
coping with this would be through a strategy of de-politisation, where actors
stick to their divergent beliefs but develop a general compromise that enables
them to work together with actors from the other coalition, for instance through
formulating common goals broadly and vaguely.

**severe collective action problems**
Severe collective action problems occur when 1) coalitions engaged initially in
common action (weak or strong) but fall apart once actors discern its ability to
influence policy does not successfully lead to common policy goals and 2) actors
hold congruent core beliefs but compete for the same resources.

Common beliefs bring actors together, but competitive interdependency
would drive them apart and therefore they will be confronted with severe
collective action problems. They predict coalition behaviour will be unstable.
That is, once they notice the strategies developed to realise a common goal are
not successful, the coalition will fall apart. In fact, this type of coalition
behaviour gets labelled “severe collective action problems” as soon as it indeed
falls apart and occurs under the conditions just mentioned.

**Coordination of convenience**
Coordination of convenience occurs when 1) actors seek to tune their activities
and 2) actors have neither conflicting ideas, nor univocal perceptions and
beliefs but with regards to resources are symbiotically dependent on each other.

This type of coalition behaviour is similar to weak coordination, but due to
the different conditions under which they occur, indifferent beliefs and
symbiotic interdependent, Fenger and Klok classify this type of coalition
behaviour as coordination of convenience. This implies there will be a loose
form of cooperation between coalition actors as there is an absence of driving
force behind the beliefs. This coalition is primarily based on shared interests,
not on shared beliefs. Figure 6 gives an overview of how the variables in our
theoretical model are operationalised
5.3 Research techniques for the Mozambican case study

This research is based on a single case study. The case, or unit of analysis in this study is the Mozambican higher education policy subsystem.

The main bulk of the field research was conducted from August 2000 until July 2003. During this period we were in Mozambique four times, once in 2000 for a short visit as part of the preparation, and three times between 2001 to 2003 to conduct fieldwork and collect data for our analysis. In total we spent more than a year in Mozambique.

The first year was used as orientation and preparation for the fieldwork that lay ahead. During that year we collected written information on Mozambican higher education and conducted interviews with people familiar with the subject. Part of this preparation consisted of a visit in July 2000 to attend the National Seminar on higher education and get acquainted with people in MESCT. The actual fieldwork, periods where we stayed five months on average to collect data on higher education policy developments, started in September 2001. This means that policy developments from 1993 to 1999 were reconstructed afterwards, on the basis of written sources and interviews with people active in the higher education policy subsystem during that period. Policy developments from 2000 to 2003 were closely watched as they proceeded and were analysed through (participant) observation, interviews (including Q-sort methodology) and written documents.
In the following section we elaborate on four basic techniques, (participant) observation, interviews, the study of written information and Q-sort methodology, which were used for collecting data.

5.3.1 Participant observation

With participant observation the researcher places himself in a community and, over a period of time, observes and records day-to-day activities of its members. It is a method of building a holistic picture of the community under observation (Meek, 1984).

During the period of field research, MESCT gave permission to observe all activities in the different departments in the Ministry. Access was given to attend meetings, both internal and meetings with people from outside MESCT such as meetings with donors, people from higher education institutions or with the business sector. In addition we were invited to attend seminars, workshops and national conferences.

A variety of both formal and informal events were observed that was useful for various reasons. First, the discussions provided much information as they revealed relevant policy issues at that time. They exposed what type of policy decisions had to be taken, actors’ concerns, which issues were sensitive and the conflicts and topics on which subsystem actors agreed. Second, it was useful to attend these events as the discussions clarified what and how these actors reacted. The different perceptions were used in the interviews to generate further discussion with these actors at a later stage. Third, it provided the opportunity to get acquainted with people in the Mozambican higher education policy subsystem. But also the other way around, it was a way to be introduced and explain the purpose of the visit to Mozambique. Generally most people showed interest in the research and indicated their willingness to cooperate whenever needed. This made it easier to make appointments for the interviews.

During this period a flexible workspace at MESCT was offered, which implied the office space of MESCT staff could be used if they were out. The advantage of this was that it was possible to get to know ministry staff well. Working regularly in different office spaces shared with other MESCT staff enabled us to develop a trust relation with them and were therefore kept abreast of the latest developments. MESCT staff always kept their “roommates” informed about the latest developments through discussions (subjects, outcomes, their (dis)satisfaction, concerns and surprises) after every meeting, seminar or specific document they read or had to prepare. By following these discussions and asking further specific questions, it was possible to closely follow the higher education policy developments and perceptions of staff, both within the ministry and the sector as a whole. Again, without referring to the specific source of information, these discussions were often used as reference points for
interviews with the target group. The information was used, for example, to
generate further discussions and to uncover the perception of the target group
on certain issues.

Whenever asked, people met during events made time available to answer
questions, provide contact details of those who played a role in higher
education policy subsystems and helped find relevant documents. After a few
months of information gathering a network of key informants was developed.
This network consisted primarily of informants holding key positions within
MESCT, the Ministry of Education (MINED), the Ministry of Planning and
Finance (MPF), higher education institutions, donor organisations and a couple
of private businesses.

During our stay we worked on some small projects in MESCT. For example, in
cooperation with other staff of MESCT, project proposals were written for
donor organisations and we developed an archive system for documents and
papers. Working together with the staff gave another dimension to the
fieldwork. In this way one became part of the “MESCT team”.

5.3.2 Interviews

Structured in-depth interviews were conducted with both Rectors and Vice
Rectors of the higher education institutions, advisors to the Minister, heads of
departments in MESCT, members of Parliament dealing with higher education,
the former Minister of education, the Vice Minister of education and the donor
organisations. As part of the interviews we also conducted the Q-sort
methodology, which enables a researcher to combine in-depth qualitative
interviews and a statistical analyses of beliefs. We will come back to this specific
(interview) technique in paragraph 5.4.

Within this group, people were selected whom we intended to interview three
times over a period of two years, in order to see whether and how perceptions
regarding higher education policy had changed. All conducted interviews were
written on the same day and subsequently labelled and archived. In this way
we could compare actor’s perception over time. The group selected for this
specific type of research technique included heads of departments within
MESCT, the Minister of ESCT, the rectors of higher education institutions, two
members of parliament dealing with higher education and two key senior
people within MINED. By the time we organised the second or third round of
interviews, some Rectors referred us to the Vice-Rectors.

With regards to the interviews with the rectors, in addition to the core aspects
of our interviews which was to find out their beliefs with respect to higher
education policy developments, broader issues specifically related to their
institutions were also discussed. They talked, for example, about the history of their institution, how it was funded, the problems they dealt with and how they sought to solve them. This helped us place the perceptions of the rectors in context.

Many discussions with subsystem actors (informal interviews) took place outside MESCT and higher education institutions, for example during parties, dinners at home and in pubs. Some people tended to speak more freely during such occasions and discuss issues, which they would otherwise not mention during formal interviews.

5.3.3 Written information/documentation

Written information was studied for two purposes. First of all we were interested in which extent verbal information and written information coincided. If the two sources of information differed we tried to find out why there were different perceptions on certain developments and who exactly had different opinions. Second, written information gave insights into past events, developments and history of the institutions, MINED and MESCT. MESCT allowed us to study archive documents such as policy proposals, policy papers, minutes of meetings, letters, newsletters and annual reports. Information was also obtained from higher education institutions, donor organisations and newspapers.

5.4 Q-sort methodology

Q-sort methodology is a method for the scientific study of human subjectivity. It is a technique that enables to operationalise, analyse and measure a person’s communication with respect to his point of view. Steelman and Maguire (1999, p. 361) state that subjectivity refers to self-reference, that is the person’s internal frame of reference that determines how the person perceives and judges the world. Every person perceives the world differently and therefore their judgements are different regarding, for example, problems challenges and issues. Judgements are value laden and involve multi-valued choice. Choices for judgements are derived from the point of reference of the actor, and Q-sort methodology provides a systematical means of examining the opinions and experiences of key actors related to an issue (McKeown & Thomas, 1988, p. 12).

The Q-sort methodology was developed in 1935 by British physicist-psychologist William Stephenson and is most often associated with quantitative
analysis due to its involvement with factor analysis. Statistical procedures aside, what Stephenson was interested in providing was a way of revealing the subjectivity involved in any given situation, e.g. perceptions of organisational role, political attitudes, appraisals of health care, experience of bereavement, perspectives of live (Brown, 1996, p. 561). Q-sort methodology has been used in a range of fields, most relevantly for studies in psychology, sociology, social psychology, political psychology and political science (Durning & Osuna, 1994). The most relevant aspect of the Q-sort methodology is to not know how many people “think like this or like that on a certain issue”, but why and which context their perceptions differ or correspond with each other. Q-sort methodology is thus concerned with patterns of subjective perspectives across individuals.

The Q-sort methodology is in line with the ideas of Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith were able to reconstruct beliefs and ideas through developing a three-layer belief system and subsequently show how they affect policy changes. They provide the structure for the belief system and point out the particular choices underlying a policy in order to give an insight in an actor’s rationale behind it. The Q-sort methodology gives researchers a systematic quantitative means of examining these beliefs by providing statistical tools that highlight differences in perspectives and identify areas of overlap.

5.4.1 Operational procedures of the Q-sort methodology

First, the researcher needs to collect information on the subject in order to develop statements of opinions. The selection of statements can be determined by theoretical consideration (deductive design) or by pragmatic consideration (inductive design) (MacKeown & Thomas, 1988, p. 37). In the latter case, statements may be derived from previously held interviews and archive material or may emerge from patterns observed.

Subsequently, the respondents (person sample) are asked to rank the collection of statements (Q-sample) to reflect their personal view on how various issues relate to their beliefs. The rank ordering of statements (Q-sort) is done according to specific conditions of instructions, for instance from “most agree” (+3) to “most disagree” (-3). In addition, the respondent must put the Q-sample into a normal distribution. This implies the respondent is only allowed to place a limited number of statements in the extremes, while more statements will be placed in the category “indifferent”. This forces the respondents to think systematically about how he would like to rank the statements vis-à-vis the others (Steelman & Maguire, 1999). While placing the statement along the continuum of valence (the form board), the respondents are asked to motivate their choice and overall perspectives. The researcher can always ask them to
specify their choice further. In this way the researcher can investigate the sources of the beliefs and judgements.

The person sample can also be constructed using either theoretical or pragmatic considerations. Theoretical considerations mean people are chosen because of their special relevance to study goals. Pragmatic considerations dictate that those who are most readily available will participate (McKeown & Thomas, 1988, p. 15).

After the Q-samples are placed along the form board by the respondents, the rankings (Q-sort) must be correlated and then factor analysed to show the groupings of opinions as expressed among the respondents, which is done with help of database and the Q-sort methodology software (McKeown & Thomas, 1988). The factor analysis indicates how many different groups exist that hold a specific view on the issue in question. More specifically, it calculates the correlation coefficient of peoples with different views and calculates how the views of actors correspond to the views of other actors in the person sample (whether their point of view is similar or even the opposite) (Focht et al, 1999). It thus gives an in-depth portrait of the typologies of perspectives that prevail in a given situation (Steelman & Maguire, 1999, p. 363).

5.4.2 Administering the Q-sort methodology

The Q-sample
The Q-sample consisted of 38 statements (see appendix 3) which related to five different topics:

A. The role and authority of MESCT
B. The role and authority of public and private higher education institutions
C. The character of and the relation between private and public higher education institutions
D. The place of higher education on Government’s agenda and its relation to other (education) sectors
E. The role of the business sector and donors.

As has been explained in chapter 4 (section 4.5), we focus on policy cores and the secondary aspects since we assume the deep core is not stable (yet). The statements for the Q-sort were therefore formulated around policy core and secondary aspects.
Person Sample
Initially it was planned to conduct the Q-sort methodology with representatives from MESCT, MINED and MPF, the rectors or vice rectors of the higher education institutions, and of the major employers in Mozambique. Due to lack of time it was not possible to do the Q-sort methodology with representatives of the employers and MPF. Of the twenty interviews conducted with the Q-sort methodology, seventeen were suitable. Unfortunately three interviews could not be used as either the respondent did not follow up the criteria for placing cards on the scale or they were not a representative of the actors identified for this research.

Scores
The respondents were asked to place the statements on a scoreboard that had values from −4 to +4. The cards with statements had to be placed according to the following criteria: 2 cards at value −4, 3 cards at value−3, 4 cards at value −2, 6 cards at value −1, 8 cards at value 0, 6 cards at value 1, 4 cards at value 2, 3 cards at value 3 and 2 cards at value 4. We chose this type of distribution because we wanted to develop a steep normal distribution instead of a flat normal distribution. The steep normal distribution has many statements at the 0 score and only a few at the extremes. This type of distribution forces the respondent to prioritise among the statements. The extreme scores (−4, −3, +3 and +4) refer to the most salient topics to the respondent. Part of this research was to identify which topics are most salient for actors in higher education.

5.4.3 Reflection on methodology
We noticed during the fieldwork that participant observation had some disadvantages. At the beginning we were sometimes regarded with a slight degree of suspicion by some members of higher education institutions. Some people assumed we were representing MESCT and were therefore less willing to do an interview. Once a representative of a higher education institution was visited who argued that she had put already so much effort into answering questions of MESCT every week that she was fed up with it. But aside from some initial problems we never felt that our position in MESCT limited access to information.

A second disadvantage was that since the workspace was at MESCT and given that we worked on some of its projects, some bias may have been developed against other subsystem actors. Spending most of the time in MESCT meant that most of the observations and discussions were in spaces with MESCT representatives, in comparison to people from higher education institutions, donor organisations and the business sector. We tried to overcome this problem through arranging informal visits or meetings with people from higher education institutions, donor organisations and business sector to get a
picture of their work and how they related to the higher education policy issues.

Along with time spent in MESCT, we were also mainly in Maputo. This may have resulted in obtaining a better insight to higher education in the South than in the rest of the country. However, the country is 3000 kilometre long, it was therefore impossible to spend an equal amount of time in each region. Higher education institutions in the Northern and Central part of the country were only visited once, whereas institutions in the South were visited regularly. Through literature and interviews with people who worked in the Northern and Central part of the country we tried to overcome this bias.

The Q-sort methodology was applied in 2003. To study developments of beliefs, ideally we would have done a Q-sort methodology three times to identify groups in the higher education system in the three identified periods, 1993-1999, 2000-2002 and 2003. However, this was not possible since the Q-sort methodology requires a lot of knowledge on policy processes and beliefs. At the time we started this study, little information on higher education policy developments was available. Only after we obtained insights in policy processes from our fieldwork in 2001 and 2002, we could select the key policy issues and transfer these into statements for the Q-sort methodology. Despite the fact that it would have been more ideal to use the same methodology, we believe we did obtain a correct picture on actors’ beliefs between 1993-2003 because of our long stay in the higher education sector where we were exposed, on a daily basis, to discussions from which we could derive beliefs. The Q-sort methodology, in this respect, was used as an extra tool to systematically identify and analyse coalitions and their beliefs.

5.5 Summary

In order to study the developments on Mozambican higher education policy from 1993 to 2003 the case study was employed. This is a suitable strategy when a research deals with how and why questions on a contemporary phenomenon. The case study includes a collection of different type of data and research techniques. For this study the following techniques were used; participant observation, interviews, analysis of written information/documents and Q-sort methodology. The first three research techniques were qualitative techniques and provided insights in the context of the case study, perceptions of the different actors in the higher education policy subsystem, the type of activities they undertook to influence a policy and the resources they possessed. With the Q-sort methodology we aimed to indicate, on a quantitative base, around which issues actors held common beliefs.
6 Higher education in Mozambique: history, characteristics and developments until 1999

6.1 Introduction

Chapter 2 traced the development of higher education in Africa through various phases and illustrated how higher education was initiated by colonial governments and how its role changed after independence. African governments believed universities were to play an important role in the development of the country by forging a sense of national unity and supplying civil servants to run the country. The university was thus seen as a utilitarian institution, to contribute to the development of the country according to thoughts and plans of national governments. At the same time, the higher education sector was confronted with problems such as rapid expansion, insufficient resources to accommodate mass influxes of students and maintain quality, extensive influence of donor-organisations and new governance regulations.

Mozambique was but one African country confronted with these developments. The specific context of the country and the developments of the different governments was described in Chapter 3. The Mozambican higher education system has undergone many and radical policy changes since its establishment in 1962. Besides the many reforms that characterise Mozambican higher education, the sector faced challenges in the form of growing demand for higher education while being confronted with financial problems, regional imbalance between the south and the rest of the country in the higher education sector, and problems regarding quality. In the following sections we briefly describe the history of higher education in Mozambique. Subsequently, we elaborate on the characteristics of Mozambican higher education system and the challenges it is confronted with. We conclude this chapter by exploring the processes that led to the establishment of the new MESCT.

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20 What is a subsystem for Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith is in the domain of higher education studies a system. We therefore will use the term higher education system when referring to the set of actors who seek to influence higher education policy.
6.1.1 Colonial period

In 1962, soon after the majority of African countries gained independence, the Portuguese government founded the first higher education institution in Mozambique. The General University Studies of Mozambique (EGUM), as it was called, functioned as a branch of the Portuguese universities (Chilundo 2003). In 1968 the institution’s name changed to the University of Lourenço Marques (ULM).

The ULM was in principle only accessible to the sons and daughters of the Portuguese because access to the university was strongly based on social and economic capital, which did not favour the presence of children from African families. Cross (2000) mentions another reason for the extreme low number of Africans in higher education. He argues that only Africans who were considered to be assimilated by the Portuguese could enter higher education.

ULM started with only a few courses and gradually expanded over the years. By the end of 1974 ULM offered a broad range of programmes (17) in both the social sciences and technical sciences. At the end of the colonial period only 40 Mozambican students, less than 2% of the total student body, had entered ULM (Fry & Utui, 1999).

6.1.2 Independence and socialism

The political transformation that took place after independence in 1974 changed ULM significantly, which in May 1976 was renamed after the Mozambican hero as the University Eduardo Mondlane (UEM). The number of staff and students had seriously declined due to the exodus of Portuguese colonists. Student numbers fell from 2,433 in 1975 to 740 by 1978 while the Mozambican teaching staff was reduced to as low as 10 (Mário et al, 2003).

The new government of Mozambique adopted a Marxist-Leninist approach characterised by central planning. Until the early 1990s, the higher education sector was framed in a context in which emphasis was placed on: a) the development of a national identity and b) social and economic restructuring to rebuild the country along communist principles (Mário et al, 2003). To justify the existence of the university, the government adopted a utilitarian approach. Students were trained in what the government considered to be the pressing needs and crucial areas of the new socialist economy. The Ministry of Education (MINED) determined which courses would be offered for what purpose and assigned students to what it considered appropriate study courses. In other words, individual careers and interests were completely subordinated to the national interest (Mário et al, 2003). MINED commissioned the establishment of the Faculty of Marxism-Leninism to provide teaching to all university students. According to Dias (1998), the majority of the curricula included courses about indigenous Mozambican society to ensure that students would acquire basic
knowledge in this area. During the same period, the Faculty for Combatants and Vanguard Workers was inaugurated to enable party cadres to acquire higher education (Mário et al, 2003). Courses that were considered to be of lesser priority or which had very few students were closed such as biology, chemistry, physics, geology, mathematics, geography, modern languages and educational sciences.

The university operated under extremely difficult conditions in that there was a lack of practically everything, including infrastructure, books, teaching materials, furniture and buildings. There were very few qualified Mozambicans available to teach at university level during the first years after independence and therefore, the majority of teaching staff were recruited from abroad and particularly from Soviet controlled countries (Lind & Igboemeka, 2002). Because the university was considered to be an important tool of the government to contribute to national development, it received, in relative terms, compared to the other education sectors, much public financial support. The GoM actively encouraged the rapid expansion of enrolments so that the university could produce the cadres that would generate and implement the national development plans. The government requested UEM to develop a system that would quickly prepare students at pre-university level and as a result, propaedeutic courses were introduced. In 1980 UEM also established a Faculty of Education to train teachers for secondary education.

In the early 1980s two new public higher education institutions were established, the Pedagogic Higher Institute (ISP) and the Higher Institute for International Relations (ISRI). In 1985 the ISP replaced the faculty of education at UEM and was upgraded to a Pedagogic University (UP). ISRI trained students for international relations and diplomacy.

Despite the devastating civil war, famine and economic crises in the 1980s, enrolments in higher education continued to increase. Very few potential candidates were denied access during the socialist years because the number of high school graduates was very small and the government was set on increasing enrolments. Until 1990 there were no university entrance examinations; everyone with a high school or equivalent diploma was guaranteed access to the university (Mário et al, 2003).

In sum, after independence in 1974 higher education in Mozambique was extensively supported by the government. It was used explicitly as a tool to contribute to the development of the country, to rapidly train cadres to implement the socialist programme and to propagate the Marxist- Leninist ideology.
6.1.3 Peace, democracy and a market economy

With the collapse of the Soviet Union beginning in the late 1980s, the communist countries could no longer support Mozambique. As a result, Mozambique’s dependence shifted to Western Europe and the United States (Mário et al, 2003). In order to accept credit and loans from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, Mozambique was required to accept and adopt free market principles. For higher education this had several implications. First, the obligatory political courses on Leninism-Marxism were abolished and students were allowed to choose which courses they would like to study. Moreover, in 1994 the President for the first time appointed a rector who was not affiliated with the governing political party. Based on the principles of the new ideology, a new law for higher education was adopted in 1993. This law defined the autonomy of existing higher education institutions and substantially increased rectors’ roles in the higher education sector because of their participation in the National Council for Higher Education (CNES), which advised the Council of Ministers on higher education. In response to the growing demand for higher education and insufficient capacity in the public institutions, Law nr.1/93 also allowed for the creation of private institutions (Boletim da República, Law nr.1/93, 1993). Because demand continually exceeded supply the three public universities had introduced competitive entrance examinations in 1991 as a tool to select students (Dias, 1992).

6.1.3.1 Expansion of student numbers

Over the past decade, university student numbers have increased from less than 4,000 in 1990 to almost 12,000 by 1999 and 19,500 in 2002. The rapid increase from 1996 onwards is due partly to the opening of non-governmental institutions whose intake rose from 262 students in 1996 to 2,598 by 1999 (Mário et al, 2003).

Even in spite of this growth, demand for higher education greatly exceeded supply. Although the pre-university schools produced few graduates, the number of candidates for university places increased as those with diplomas from medium-level technical and vocational schools or teacher-training colleges as well as a new group of applicants consisting of individuals with many years of practical experience now sought access to higher education. This latter group also helps explain the rapid increase in part-time students. At some institutions the majority was part-time students. The candidate/place ratio varied between public and private institutions and between specific university programmes. At the public institutions demand exceeded supply whereas the majority of the private institutions had difficulty filling their places. In terms of popularity of programmes, at UEM law, economics and management and computer science attracted over five times the number of candidates for each place, while geology, chemistry, chemical engineering, physics and meteorology attracted less than one candidate per place (Mário et al, 2003).
Despite the growth the number of students remained very small when compared to neighbouring countries. In Mozambique only 0.16% of the 20-25 year age cohort enrolled, or some 40 out of every 100,000 inhabitants. In comparison, Zimbabwe and Botswana educated 638 and 597 university students for every 100,000 inhabitants respectively ( Brito, 2003).

It was striking that unlike many other countries in Sub Saharan Africa, such as Nigeria and Uganda, the labour market for graduates was not yet saturated. As a result of economic growth in the 1990s there was an increasing demand for personnel with higher levels of education, training and professional and technical skills. However, as pointed out in Chapter 3, the market for higher education graduates was small and there were signs that economic growth was slowing down. It is a matter of debate whether the market for graduates will continue to grow and will be able to absorb the increasing number of graduates.

6.1.3.2 Expansion of the higher education institutions

Since the adoption of Law nr.1/93, which authorised the establishment of private higher education institutions, six private higher education institutions have been established. Coupled with the three established public universities and a public police academy established in 1999, by 2000 Mozambique had ten higher education institutions.

As in many other countries in Sub Saharan Africa, the typical characteristics and images of both public and private higher education institutions were also present in Mozambique. The reputation of private institutions varied from profit seekers paying little attention to quality to exactly the opposite, having better equipment and more dedicated teachers that enhanced quality. We will come back to the private higher education institutions in section 6.1.3.3.

It was difficult for public institutions to recruit and keep qualified staff in higher education institutions given an upcoming private sector. During the late 1980s and 1990s public institutions had invested much in Mozambican staff as a way of reducing their dependency on foreign lecturers and to professionalise and improve the quality of Mozambican teaching and administrative staff. At UEM, for example, the proportion of foreign teaching staff dropped between 1975 and 2000 from 98% to 14% (MESCT, 2000a). Mozambicans were trained and given the opportunity to study abroad to upgrade their degrees21. The problem however was that many staff with their newly obtained degrees left the university for better paid positions in the private sector.

Coming back to the issue of expansion, the expansion of students and institutions was concentrated in the southern part of Mozambique. Historically

21 Although the number of Mozambican staff with doctoral and Master’s degrees is growing the majority still has a Licenciatura degree. In 1999, there was a total of 97 Mozambicans with a PhD and 253 with a Master degree (MESCT, 2000a)
Mozambique’s southern provinces have been more developed than the central and northern ones. The backlog of the northern and central part of the country was also reflected in higher education. The proportion of university students from the northern and central provinces was much lower than that from the south. 60% of university students came from the three southern provinces, 25% from the central provinces and 15% from the remaining three northern provinces. These proportions were in fact further out of balance than they seemed at first sight, when one takes into account that the populations of the north, centre and south represented 32.9%, 41.2% and 25.9% of the total population of Mozambique, respectively (MESCT 2000a).

6.1.3.3 Private higher education institutions

Six new private higher education institutions were established after Law nr. 1/93. All institutions, both public and private, were to be approved by the Council of Ministers on the advice of the CNES. Of these six institutions two were founded by non-profit religious organisations: the Catholic University of Mozambique (UCM) founded in 1996 by the Catholic Church, and the University of Musa Bin Bique (UMBB) founded in 2000 by the Center for Islamic Formation22. The other four private institutions were the Higher Polytechnic and University Institute (ISPU) established in 1995, the Higher Institute of Sciences and Technology of Mozambique (ISCTEM) established in 1997, the Institute of Transport and Communication (ISUTC) established in 1999 and UDM (the Technical University of Mozambique) established in 2003. These institutions were for-profit organisations founded by companies or foundations. The number of students in private institutions varied extensively. In general, the older the university the more programmes it had and the more students it enrolled. In 1999, UCM, ISPU and ISCTEM each had over 1,000 students, whereas UMBB and ISUTC had between 200 and 400 (MESCT, 2000a). The majority of the students in the private institutions were employed and followed a part-time programme, mostly during the evenings.

Many private higher education institutions in Mozambique differed from private institutions in other Sub Saharan countries. They were either established or had a faculty in the central or northern part of Mozambique. In other Sub Saharan African countries, the majority of the private institutions were located in or around the capital of the country. As opposed to what private institutions generally offered, “usual low-budget programmes” such as economics, management and accounting, UCM and ISCTEM also offered expensive courses such as medicine and dentistry. The ISUTC offered courses such as civil and transport engineering and telecommunication engineering that were unique in Mozambique.

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22 For both the UMBB and the UCM, students need not have a religious background. UCM does not offer theology. UMBB does offer Islamic religion, but this course is not compulsory.
The number of women in higher education had increased considerably with the development of private higher education institutions. As Lind and Igboemeka (2002) point out, on average the gender balance of enrolments in private institutions was much better than in public institutions. The main reason for this was that the private institutions were largely situated in the provinces which enabled female students in the provinces to participate, since parents did not like the idea of their daughters studying far from home in Maputo.

Private institutions obtained their funding mainly through tuition fees. These fees were generally between $150 and $250 per month in the early 2000s. Some private institutions received additional (indirect) resources from the private sector for operational costs. As a rule though, industry (both Mozambican and foreign) did not directly fund private institutions. Rather, they supported them by offering equipment, paying student fees for their employees, and sometimes offering loans to be paid back later by the institution. The reason was that these institutions offered programmes that were unique in the country and important for the survival of these businesses (and for the development of the country). Still, there was also evidence that some private higher education institutions had serious financial problems and were struggling with debts (Lind & Igboemeka, 2002).

The GoM did not provide direct financial support to private institutions, but there were some indirect forms of support. The Mozambican government paid some scholarships for students to cover tuition fees and textbooks costs. Private higher education institutions were also exempted from tax when buying equipment.

6.1.3.4 Quality and relevance

As discussed in Chapter 2, the quality and relevance of higher education in many Sub Saharan African countries was questioned and criticised. The Mozambican system portrayed similar problems. Many courses and programmes were outdated and of limited relevance (i.e. they did not meet the demands of a fast growing economy nor specific needs of individual provinces or emerging sectors). Furthermore, the style of learning was often rote learning, despite the fact that employers demanded problem solving and innovative skills. In general, research facilities, library and educational materials were limited and outdated, staff were under-qualified and drop out rates were high.

Neither the GoM nor the majority of the institutions could benchmark the quality of the institutional staff, the educational provision or the research output. People indulged in subjective analyses of the system by comparing it with some ideals from abroad or from the past (Lind & Igboemeka, 2002). Over the years, institutions developed their own rudimentary quality assurance systems, on an ad-hoc basis. Some private institutions had their programmes evaluated by foreign “sister” universities and some of these institutions also awarded the degrees for specific programmes (mainly master degrees).
6.1.3.5 High drop-out rate

Although there was no formal quality assurance system, some data is available on drop-out rates per institution. However, given that each university had its own calculation system it is impossible to compare the data or produce reliable system-wide figures. The rates were difficult to calculate due to the mixture of full-time and part-time students, temporary drop-outs and temporary “drop-ins” and different minimum course lengths. The average completion rates between 1995 and 1998 were up to 6.7% at UEM and 13.1% at UP. As Lind and Igboemeka (2002) argue, whatever possible indicators were used, they suggested grave problems of internal efficiency and should be seen as a sign of serious quality problems related to the teaching-learning and evaluation process, the motivation and quality of the teachers, and financial problems of students caused by poverty. Mário et al (2003) argue that one of the reasons for the high drop-out rate was the fact that many students worked, studied and supported a family at the same time.

One of the bottlenecks for graduation was the thesis requirement for the Licenciatura degree. On average, it took students eight years to finish the Licenciatura, which was officially a five-year programme. Many students completed the course but were not able to write the thesis in the required time, largely due to lack of supervision and lack of previous training in analysing and researching. It was also not unusual for students to find employment before graduation. This was then considered as dropping out (which would not be so if there was recognition of completed courses at the Bachelor’s level).

As in many other countries in Sub Saharan Africa, students were poorly prepared for higher education. They had inadequate skills and knowledge from pre-university education. The bridging courses offered at universities did not address these gaps sufficiently (Lind & Igboemeka, 2002).

In addition to high drop-out rates, the system was inefficient because of the high level of student repetition. This was partly explained by the fact that degree programmes were not structured around credit units but instead around a set of five successive year-long segments with single entrance and exit points. Students who failed to pass one or more subjects were required to repeat the year-long segment rather than the single subject(s) (World Bank, 2002). Graduation rates varied significantly by faculty and degree programme. Students at UEM in the architecture and geography faculties had higher graduation rates than those in the engineering, economics and information faculties. As a result the unit cost per graduate was relatively high. For example, in 2000 the unit cost per graduate was US $31,000. Putting the unit costs per student in perspective with other institutions in Africa, the cost of a student at UEM was 63 times higher than that in Anglophone African countries, 37 times that in Francophone countries and 11 times that in low income Asian countries (World Bank, 2001).

Universities generally recognised the problems of quality and low efficiency. They identified the problems and each university developed its own
programmes and policies to overcome them. Various steps were taken: reforming admission criteria to improve assessment of pre-higher education learning, curriculum review and change, introducing bridging courses to overcome knowledge and skills gaps, improving working conditions for academic staff and in-service training such as pedagogical training of university teachers, development of students’ study techniques and language skills, introducing shorter more flexible courses, introducing evaluation and monitoring systems and teaching guides and improving the functioning and equipment of libraries and computer labs, including ICT networks.

Many of the identified problems that were directly related to problems of efficiency and low quality were caused to some extent by a shortage of financial resources.

6.1.4 Resourcing the higher education system

When looking at the development of public expenditure on (higher) education, the following trends can be discerned. Since 1990 the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Total Public Expenditure in Education (TEEP) increased simultaneously. However, expenditures on education declined from 5% in 1990 to 4% in 1999. Within the education sector, public expenditure on higher education increased from 0.5% of GDP in 1992 to 0.9% in 1999. Total public expenditure in higher education as a percentage of TEEP increased substantially from almost 8% in 1992 to 22% in 1999. The level of expenditure for higher education was relatively high, given that only one percent of the age-group was enrolled. Countries that shared Mozambique’s level of GDP and proportion of age-group enrolled in higher education on average spend less of their public resources on higher education, anywhere from 9 to 18% (World Bank, 2001). As pointed out in the previous section, the Mozambican public higher education system was relatively expensive as was indicated by the high unit costs per student.

In 1999 the education sectors’ share of the total government budget was estimated at 14%. The higher education sub-sector accounted for about one quarter of the education sector budget, which was approximately 4% of the Government’s total budget. The lion share of this budget went to UEM.

Institutional funding was not based on performance but was defined by the actual level of expenditures by category (e.g. staff costs or equipment maintenance) in the preceding budget period. It covered staff costs, educational inputs and many non-educational expenditures (such as staff housing, student bursaries, food.) (World Bank, 2002).
6.1.4.1 Institutional finance

The four main sources of income for the public institutions were government funding, donor support, student fees and income generating activities. The government’s budget was the largest source of revenue. From 1997 to 1999 UEM’s income from government sources ranged between 51.7% and 38.7%, and external (donor) funding ranged between 44.7% and 59.5%; less than 1% came from tuition fees and 3.1% from self-generating activities. During the same period ISRI received 88.5% of its revenue from the government, 11% from donors and 0.2% from tuition fees. The UP depended totally on government funding (MESCT, 2000a). As discussed above in section 6.1.3.3, private institutions depended on student fees, external support and venture capital.

6.1.4.2 Student support and tuition fees

Fees in public institutions were relatively low (from $50 to $100 per year) yet students still faced considerable costs in the form of living expenses, expenditure on books, and other essentials. Student fees in private higher education institutions varied between $150 and $250 per month (Mário et al, 2003).

Mozambique did not have a national system of student loans and the number of scholarships or bursaries was limited. In 1999 less than 1,000 scholarships were awarded - there were 11,619 students in all public institutions. Thus only about 10% of the students in the public sector received a full or partial scholarship, and/or lived in subsidised accommodation (MESCT, 2000a). Scholarships were mainly awarded on academic merit rather than on financial need. There has been very little financial assistance for students from low-income families.

6.1.4.3 Donor funding

Both public and private higher education institutions largely depended on donors, both for funding and expertise. As Lind and Igboemeka (2002) point out, donor funding tended to be ad hoc, with each donor organisation searching for its own niche, field of interest and expertise. Their assistance consisted mainly of many small projects that lacked integration and collaboration between donors. Sometimes donors themselves did not have an overall view of the support provided by their own organisation because of the numerous independent protocols between institutions in Mozambique and universities or institutes abroad. Higher education institutions also lacked information on all of the donors’ financial contribution.

Based on interviews with ten donor organisations the following picture on donor funding for Mozambican higher education emerged. Donor funding and support was given in different forms, including scholarships and training opportunities, providing technical assistance, research support to various faculties and capacity building at the institutional level. The procedures and
type of aid differed per country. Bilateral relations took many different forms. In some cases it was between the donor country’s government and the GoM (either through MINED, MESCT or the Ministry of Foreign Cooperation and Negotiation (MINEC) in others it occurred between the donor-country’s government and the institutions directly. It also took place between faculties whereby a faculty abroad started a project with a faculty in Mozambique. In other cases, financial resources were provided to the central institutional management that co-ordinated and distributed the money further, such as for scholarships. Every donor organisation had its own criteria on how and on what projects funding could be used. Donor organisations such as the World Bank also trained institutional staff in accounting, bookkeeping and donor reporting practices.

6.1.5 Governance

With the adoption of Law nr.1/93 on higher education, higher education governance changed radically. The Ministry’s interference in higher education substantially decreased. It did not prescribe any longer the content of the courses or which courses had to be taught. Moreover, the rectors role in higher education policy increased as they were appointed to the National Council for Higher Education (CNES) which advised the Council of Ministers on higher education issues. The CNES was for instance charged with evaluating applications for the establishment of higher education institutions and advised the Council of Ministers on higher education policy matters. The Council of Ministers ultimately remained responsible for approving the establishment of new institutions and for all policy decisions (Boletim da República, Law nr.1/93, 1993). The GoM’s key areas of authority were final decision making power on approval of new higher education institutions and the actual funding of the public institutions. All other aspects of higher education were the responsibility of the individual universities.

6.1.5.1 Autonomy of public higher education institutions

Universities had full academic autonomy. In the Mozambican context this implied that they could decide what courses to offer, define their own criteria for quality, entry requirements and institutional governance structure (Boletim da República, Law nr.1/93, 1993). Public higher education institutions negotiated their funding directly with the MPF. If an institution wanted to open a new course, it had to negotiate with the MPF over how to fund the course. In theory, universities could open new courses even if the MPF would not agree to fund them. If a university could obtain funding from donor organisations there was nothing that hindered them from opening new courses. In practice
however, universities did not do that due to the fear that donors could stop funding at a certain time.

For UEM, financial autonomy was strengthened in 1999 with the signing of a contract between the government and the university. Under this contract UEM received funding quarterly in advance, rather than monthly, as was the case in other public higher education institutions and received greater freedom internally to allocate these funds (MESCT 2000a). The GoM demanded an annual report from the public institutions that included data on their income (both government funding and donor funding) and the areas on which the money was spent. The annual report was prepared at the central level of the university.

6.1.5.2 Autonomy of private higher education institutions

Private higher education institutions did not depend financially on the national government and nor were they accountable to the government. Once the institution was approved by the GoM and established, it could offer the programmes it liked. Private providers determined their own programmes and courses, salaries for staff, the level of student fees, and their assessment and evaluation systems (Boletim da República, Law nr.1/93, 1993).

6.1.5.3 Special forms of regulation between the higher education institutions and related Ministries

Three of the four public higher education institutions had special relationships with the government. The UP, ISRI and Police Academy (ACIPOL) were established in conjunction with a related Ministry. MINED commissioned the establishment of UP to supply teachers. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MINEC) commissioned the establishment of ISRI with the aim to offer people in this Ministry a higher education degree to become diplomat. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MiNT) affairs gave instructions to establish a higher education institution that would supply the country with specialists in police science to manage and steer the police corps. Although the three universities were autonomous they developed their curriculum in close cooperation with the Ministry to which they related. These ministries were regarded as their clients.

6.1.5.4 Institutional governance

Given that the focus of this research is on governance and steering at the national level, we will only elaborate briefly on the nature of the institutional governance structures. These structures affected the outcomes or side effects of policy developments, which meant they had to be taken into account. The governance structures were strongly centralised and bureaucratic, with power

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23 This paragraph is based on interviews held in 2001
over resources and decision-making concentrated at the central level of the Rectorate.

Mário et al. (2003) point out that at UEM, 70% of the state budget allocated for operating costs was managed at the central level, with less than 30% allocated to the faculties. Due to the fact that power was centralised at the Rectorate, the decision-making power of deans and faculty heads was limited. For the GoM this implied that if the Ministry initiated a reform, the support of the rector was essential, given that the Rectorate ran the university.

In the previous part we described the development of Mozambican higher education since its establishment. For the first thirty years Mozambican higher education was largely directed by authoritarian regimes. Policies were determined and imposed by a centralised government. First, the Portuguese Government decided that the University of Lourenço Marques (ULM), would adopt the ideology of the colonial government.

After independence, the new Mozambican government decided that higher education should adopt and reflect a Marxist-Leninist ideology, which implied central planning at national level. Government and administrative actions were subordinated to the Party’s political system. At the end of the 1980s Mozambique adopted a more Western orientation. The main consequence for higher education was the adoption of Law nr.1/93 on higher education which gave higher education institutions autonomy and rectors a prominent role in advising the Council of Ministers on higher education. The GoM drastically decreased its interference in higher education in the sense that compulsory courses were abolished and students were free to choose which courses to study. In addition, private higher education institutions could also be established (Boletim da República, Law nr1/93, 1993).

In the second half of the 1990s rectors called for stronger support and interference of the GoM in the higher education sector. Since Law nr.1/93 on higher education was adopted, in a short period, five new private higher education institutions had been established. Due to the rapid growth of the sector, there was a growing social demand for equitable access to higher education and a growing need from the labour market for highly qualified staff. For these reasons a government body was established to co-ordinate higher education at the national level. In the following section we elaborate on the processes that led to the establishment of the new Ministry for Higher Education, Science and Technology.
6.2 Towards new modes of coordination; the establishment of MESCT

As the Minister for Higher Education, Science and Technology indicated in a speech at a conference on “Improving Tertiary Education in Sub Saharan Africa” in Accra in 2003;

As the higher education sector developed, it became clear by 1996 that the growth registered in the sector was insufficient to meet the expectations of society, staff, lectures and students. The lecturers felt overwhelmed by the amount of paper work and bureaucratic procedures, the curricula offered were outdated, the funds available were scarce, and the costs of operation were too high. On the students’ side existed the frustration of repeated unsuccessful attempts to gain access to any higher education institution. Many took five admission exams to get admitted, thereby implying a 5-year delay in the continuation of their studies. In the job-market, employers faced the frustration of receiving graduates without the required necessary skills and knowledge. For the society as a whole remained the feeling of imbalances in the system that privileged the southern region at the expense of the central and northern region (Brito, 2003).

This part of her speech summarised the Higher Education Strategic Plan (2000-2010). This plan was supported by practically all key persons in the higher education sector. But before this document was produced, many debates took place and much analytic research was undertaken, initiated or commissioned by various rector and the Ministry of Education.

At the requests of the rectors in 1996, the GoM decided to engage in a national consultation to clearly identify the strong and weak aspects of the higher education sector. A national meeting took place in Manica (Province of Mozambique, in the Mid-West of the country) in 1997, producing recommendations for reform under the leadership of a new Ministry for Higher Education. This recommendation was also supported by the recommendations of the World Conference on Higher Education, organised by UNESCO in 1998.

In 1999 the Minister of Education nominated a task force, the Committee for the Strategic Plan of Higher Education (CPEES), to propose a national vision for the development of higher education in the country on the basis of a thorough study of the sector. The CPEES concluded that sudden growth had resulted in a higher education sector that consisted of a collection of inefficient institutions that were not able to meet the demands and needs of society. In line with the outcome of the debates in 1997, the Committee recommended the creation of a central Government body other than the Ministry of Education, to be responsible for higher education (MESCT 2000a).
The GoM appointed a working group to study what type of national co-
ordination mechanism was desirable and needed to regulate higher education. 
The working group, consisting of rectors and people from MINED, came up 
with two options; 
1. The establishment of a completely new ministry: MESCT 
2. A separate unit within MINED

Opponents of the first option argued that higher education should remain part 
of the whole education sector. They feared that higher education would “run” 
on its own and that in the end there would be two separate sectors, impeding 
continuity and articulation throughout the whole sector. Instead, they favoured 
option two, a unit within MINED, whereby CNES would be responsible for the 
preparation of higher education policies.
 Opponents of option two were afraid that they would get stuck in all the 
problems that the education department was involved in. They argued that 
there was too much bureaucracy and that because there was hardly enough 
money for the primary and secondary sector, the higher education sector would 
never get enough attention or money.

The newly elected government in 1999 favoured the option of the establishment 
of a new Ministry on Higher Education, which was subsequently established in 
January 2000. The new GoM acknowledged the important role of higher 
education for the development of the country and its contribution to the 
reduction of poverty. This acknowledgement is evident in “The Action Plan for 
the Reduction of Extreme Poverty (2001-2005)” (PARPA), which the 
government launched. In PARPA the GoM defined the following main 
objectives for higher education:

  Expand access to higher education; raise the standard of courses given; 
  extend higher education opportunities to citizens from regions outside 
  Maputo; contribute to the viability of expanding the number and size of 
  higher education institutions and the resultant increase in the number of 
  places available. (GoM, 2000)

Moreover, PARPA indicated that science and technology should be given a 
prominent place on the government agenda because it was considered to be the 
game for innovation and development that would play a key role in the 
reduction of poverty. The GoM argued that science and technology had been 
neglected over the past decades. In order to promote and strengthen the science 
and technology sector the new Ministry was given the task to integrate this 
sector with higher education and to develop a science and technology policy in 
close relationship with the institutions.
7 Recent developments in Mozambican higher education

7.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses, on the basis of our empirical findings, Mozambican higher education policy developments between 2000-2003. Chapter 1 described the policy developments between 1993 and 1999. During this time period a number of forces gave rise to MESCT. We described in Chapter 1 why actors believed there was a need for a new Ministry that would develop a national higher education system. Moreover, we showed how actors coordinated their activities to actively strive for a national coordination unit, apart from MINED, to deal with higher education policy. The empirical data on policy developments in 1993-1999 was obtained through secondary sources, such as written documents and interviews with people who played a key role in the higher education system during that time.

In this chapter we describe the developments between 2000 and 2003. This description is more extensive than that for the 1993-1999 period for various reasons. First, different types of methodologies have been used. We spent considerable time during 2000-2003 in Mozambique and therefore were able to follow the policy developments almost on a daily basis. Through this type of fieldwork we describe the initiatives, activities, struggles, debates and actors’ thoughts. Second, once MESCT was established, the Ministry initiated many new activities and policies to establish and shape Mozambican higher education. In addition, the number of actors in the higher education system expanded during the period and therefore, in comparison with the period 1993-1999, we could interview more actors. This produced more empirical data. Finally, there was more interaction between actors, which we were able to observe and elaborate on in this chapter.

This chapter starts with a summary of the policy developments from 1993-1999. It then describes how MESCT, in cooperation with other actors engaged in higher education, sought to develop system-wide higher education policy.
7.2 Towards the establishment of MESCT: the call for a Mozambican higher education system (1993-1999)

The in 1987 political decision to accept free market principles introduced new elements in the social, economic and cultural domain. The GoM allowed a private sector to be established and freedom of opinion was respected. As a result, both the public and the private sector would now play a role in the country. For higher education this culminated in the 1991 law that allowed students to freely choose their own study programmes and abolished compulsory courses on communism. In 1993 another law was enacted that established the autonomy of higher education institutions and the National Council on Higher Education (CNES) and allowed private institutions to be established (Boletim da República, Law nr.1/93, 1993). With the enactment of Law nr.1/93 the GoM changed its perception on steering higher education and the role of the market. The rectors of both public and private higher education institutions were given a prominent role in advising the Council of Ministers on higher education. MINED’s interference in the affairs of institutions decreased drastically as it no longer prescribed what should happen in the institutions. Moreover, the fact that the GoM also allowed the establishment of private higher education institutions was a sure sign that higher education was considered to be important for the country.

In the second half of the 1990s, rectors and representatives of the GoM began addressing the problems in the higher education sector. They were concerned that the sector could not meet the demands of society. Following national consultations by the GoM in 1997 and the resulting report of the Committee for the Strategic Plan of Higher Education (CPEES), it was found that despite rapid growth in higher education, the sector was not able to meet the demands of society. To sum up the main points mentioned in the reports: employers were not content with the knowledge and skills of graduates, in quantitative terms higher education was not producing a sufficient number of graduates to fulfil labour market requirements, in the Central and Northern region student enrolments were low (60% of student enrolment was from the Southern region, 25% from the Central provinces and 15% from the Northern provinces) and graduation rates remained low due to high drop out rates, facilities such as libraries, laboratories and classrooms deteriorating, low research output, outdated curriculum and teaching instruction and a shortage of qualified lecturers. Moreover, the general opinion was that the sector lacked essential elements or system characteristics such as quality assurance mechanisms, scholarships or a credit transfer system that allowed the student mobility in the sector (Brito, 2003). In 2001 a person in MINED indicated that as a response to these documents, the GoM appointed a workgroup to study what type of national coordination mechanism was desirable and necessary to regulate the higher education sector. Two options were considered, 1) the establishment of a completely new ministry or, 2) a separate unit within MINED.
The newly elected government favoured the establishment of a new Ministry for higher education. One of the important reasons for establishing MESCT was not only to support and guide the expansion and diversification of higher education but also to put science and technology on the government’s agenda. The GoM had identified science and technology as a key factor for the country’s development and a key tool for poverty reduction.

In January 2000 the new MESCT was established. Law nr.14/2000 defined in broad terms the responsibilities of the new Ministry:

- Development of general policy on higher education, including identification of priorities and criteria for state funding of higher education institutions;
- Development of policy on science and technology, including scientific research;
- Legislation covering all higher education institutions;
- Establishment of advisory or executive bodies (e.g. with responsibility for particular functions such as accreditation of new higher education institutions or new programs within existing higher education institutions);
- Definition of criteria for the creation, recognition and regulation of higher education institutions;
- Definition, implementation and monitoring of policies and mechanisms to ensure quality control;
- Development (and if necessary implementation) of financing systems for both public and private higher education institutions, as well as policies on scholarships and other financial schemes aimed at supporting students;
- Coordination of the higher education system as a whole, including both public and private higher education institutions (Boletim da República, Law nr.14/2000, 2000).

7.3 The establishment of MESCT: shaping the Mozambican higher education system (2000-2003)

Though MESCT immediately began developing new policies for the higher education sector, another important task it had was to clarify to people in and outside the higher education sector how the Ministry perceived its role in achieving the GoM’s goals. It was striking that MESCT emphasised repeatedly that it was not an implementation-oriented ministry like MINED, but a coordinating body. As several individuals in MESCT that were interviewed explained, MINED is an implementing ministry because it determines issues like curricula for schools and the number of teachers to be appointed. MESCT, on the contrary, leaves these types of decisions to the higher education institutions. It sees itself as a co-ordinating Ministry that creates the conditions necessary for expanding and articulating the higher education sector. As one person in MESCT specifies:
In order to regulate the sector the task of MESCT is three-fold and includes, 1) co-ordination 2) facilitation and 3) promotion. Coordination implies that MESCT is introducing regulations to harmonise the higher education institutions and make sure that they are articulated to enable mobilisation of students between the higher education institutions and from other education sectors. Harmonisation can be reached through setting rules, criteria, and standard procedures, for instance for quality and for credit accumulation and transfer which enables mobilisation in the sector. Facilitation means that throughout the whole process of policy-making MESCT provides various types of means and mobilises resources to realise objectives. For instance, MESCT provides and develops infrastructure and a network (telephone network and technical apparatus) for distance-learning. It provides information to donor organisations that show interest to support the higher education sector or supply scholarships for students. If MESCT approves certain requests of higher education institutions for which no public funding is available, it negotiates with donors and banks for grants or loans with a low interest rate. Finally MESCT promotes the higher education sector through organising workshops and meetings to raise awareness on certain higher education policy issues and to generate discussions.

These principles or "the philosophy of MESCT", a term used regularly by people in MESCT, is reflected in its organisational structure and can also be seen in the way MESCT develops higher education policies and approaches actors. MESCT sought to include all relevant actors in the discussions and development of higher education policy. For MESCT higher education actors are not only people from higher education institutions but also people from different sectors of society including business, industry, NGO’s, and other Ministries. As a person in MESCT indicates:

Higher education serves the whole society since it generates knowledge for all sectors. For this reason we should not only include people from higher education institutions when we develop higher education policies, but we should widen the debate on higher education and include as many key representatives of society in the process of the development of higher education policy.

MESCT was a new organisation and therefore had to be built from scratch, which implied that staff had to be recruited to conduct work in the Ministry. The new ministry, which began with only four people, consciously chose to build a new type of government organisation that was different from the existing ones in Mozambique. In its search for an organisational structure and work approach, MESCT chose a strategy of open dialogue and cooperation with

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24 Individual quotations in the rest of this chapter are derived from interviews that took place in 2001 and 2002
the higher education institutions and other relevant stakeholders. Its objective was to stay small, approximately twenty staff members (excluding support staff). To carry out its work, MESCT appointed people to what it called “temporary commissions” (usually for six months depending on the policy issue) to develop particular policies. MESCT believed this type of organisational structure had advantages. In the first place MESCT wanted to be informed by people working “on the front-line”: those knowledgeable (and having the latest knowledge) in specific policy fields. Second MESCT assumed that working through these commissions assures the policymaking process is done in a participative way. Third MESCT’s aim was to remain small so that the Ministry will not run the risk of becoming an inefficient organisation. In short, MESCT assumed that through appointing temporary commissions, it could make use of existing structures and generate policies in close cooperation with various sectors outside MESCT. The commissions fell under MESCT who retained final decision making authority over proposed policies.

Between 2000 and 2003, MESCT established temporary commissions with the following remits:

- Develop the strategic plan for science and technology (November 2001-July 2003)
- Re-formulate Law n.1/93 on higher education (May 2001-May 2002)
- Operationalise the Strategic Plan on Higher Education (PEES) (September 2000-June 2001)
- Develop a policy on distance education (created in 2001 and still operational)
- Develop a policy for a system of credit transfer and accumulation (October 2003-June 2004)
- Develop a policy for a system to guarantee quality, accreditation and evaluation (October 2003-June 2004)\(^\text{25}\)

See appendix 1 for overview of actors in commissions.

A person in MESCT indicated that all commissions were equally important and had their own specific task and objectives. Generally speaking the tasks of the commissions are to build networks of people relevant for the specific policy issue in order to identify and discuss solutions and new directions for higher education policies. The commissions also generate, in cooperation with people from the network, databases consisting of information and knowledge on the policy issue. In cooperation with the networks the commissions consult and identify the needs and problems. MESCT hires experts and consultants that support the commissions’ ability to conduct their work. These consultants design workshops or train the commissions (and sometimes all the people in

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\(^{25}\) By the time the fieldwork for this research ended the credit accumulation and transfer (CAT) and quality assurance (QA) commission were established. The developments of the CAT and QA policy are for that reason not included in this research.
the network) in order to improve their skills and increase their understanding of certain policy issues. Experts provided new concepts, new methodologies and new knowledge from different parts of the world.

During the first years, the commissions’ members were not paid for the work they did. Only since 2003 have commission members received small fees. From the interviews with various members it is evident that they were interested in participating in the commissions because they believed they could make a contribution to policy areas, which they found very important. As a member of the higher education distance commission indicated:

We worked on a voluntary basis and did not receive any salary. We were motivated to work with MESCT because we felt it was urgent to develop a higher education distance learning system as it can be used as a tool to reduce inequity since it offers students from disadvantaged regions far outside Maputo the opportunity to participate in higher education.

A person from the commission for the establishment of a system to guarantee quality, accreditation and evaluation indicated:

The policy issues that MESCT is dealing with now should have been dealt with earlier by MINED and the higher education institutions. Since independence, I have made a lot of efforts to push the reforms in the higher education sector, but to my opinion without success [...]. I am disappointed with what the higher education institutions have realised up to now. Through working for the commission I hope I can eventually make a change in the sector.

Thus, despite the fact that the commission members were not paid, they were motivated to work for MESCT.

Some people within MESCT criticised the reliance on commissions. They argued that one of the disadvantages of working with many commissions was a lack of continuity in MESCT. Because individuals only work for a short period of time it is difficult to return to the issue since the people no longer work for MESCT. Another problem is the perceived weak links between the commissions. Commission members are generally not familiar with the activities of other commissions and this may lead to duplication of activities or infrastructure. For example, those in the Distance Learning Commission mentioned that they were not aware of what other commissions were doing. They heard via other people outside MESCT that the Science and Technology Commission was organising workshops on similar issues in the provinces. Since the Distance Learning Commission was planning to do that as well, they were interested to see how far they could make use of each other’s network and infrastructure. It must be emphasised, however, that despite criticisms of this organisational model those interviewed did favour it above the models used in
other ministries in Mozambique. They argued that the model had advantages as MESCT could operate more efficiently and policies could be developed in a participatory way.

Other people in MESCT acknowledged the disadvantages of the model, but argued that these problems most probably only occurred in the beginning because MESCT was understaffed. Once MESCT is fully established and staffed, the continuity and links between commissions can be safeguarded by MESCT staff.

Despite the enthusiasm to co-operate with MESCT in the development higher education policies, there were also critical sounds, particularly from rectors from the higher education institutions. Some believed that MESCT was not professional or capable of guiding higher education. In the first year that MESCT existed, one rector explained:

MESCT is too small and its staff is too under-qualified to be able to develop and meet the needs of the higher education institutions [...]. It was difficult to contact MESCT. People are not in the office and whenever I have a question, staff are not able to answer it.

People within MESCT acknowledged that there were many problems in the beginning, particularly because it was difficult to obtain legitimacy and support. As one staff member explained:

Previously no government institution looked after the interests of the higher education sector. Therefore, many people in the higher education institutions had high expectations from MESCT. However, in the beginning the new MESCT did not have the manpower to tackle all priority areas as indicated in the Strategic Plan [...]. It was difficult to recruit staff that fitted MESCT philosophy. Besides many staff members had to be trained, because our organisational approach and policy areas are new. [...] This was one of the reasons why people in the higher education sector blamed us for not being professional. [...] In addition to the fact that MESCT was understaffed during the first years, the Ministry does not have legal tools to develop policies yet, as the revision of the law on higher education still needs to be approved by Parliament. [...] We do not have the mandate yet to develop certain policies, for instance the policy of quality assurance, as we are dealing with the previous law on higher education. Consequently, people can deny us. [...] MESCT is operating in an environment where old rules exist that are not supportive or in line with the thoughts of the Ministry.

In short, for reasons of efficiency MESCT believed they should stay small. Instead of recruiting a large number of staff, like other Ministries in Mozambique it appointed temporary commission members that were largely from outside MESCT. Another reason to work through this specific structure
was because MESCT intended to give key people outside the Ministry a prominent role in the development of policies because it believed that experts and representatives of different sectors or organisations in society should play an active role in the development of higher education policies.

The next section describes how MESCT started to develop and work out higher education policies in cooperation with other higher education actors.

7.3.1 Developing new higher education policies and regulations

Based on the draft proposal of the Committee for the Strategic Plan of Higher Education (CPEES), MESCT’s vision, in terms of national higher education planning, was to create an integrated and articulated higher education system that could simultaneously respond to three challenges:

- Increasing the proportion of the population that had access to higher education,
- Ensuring the provision of a range of quality programmes appropriate to the requirements of Mozambican development
- Ensuring access in terms of both regional equity and socio-economic equity, including gender (MESCT 2000b).

In order transfer these plans into strategies and policies, in May 2000, MESCT organised provincial debates to discuss the draft proposal of the CPEES and MESCT’s plans. The participants in the debate included staff from the education sector, students, parliamentarians, business representatives, and the public sector. The debates were led by staff from the former CPEES, MESCT and MINED. After these consultations, MESCT developed a national higher education plan and transferred the ideas into a proposal for a ten year Strategic Plan for Higher Education in Mozambique (PEES 2000-201026) (MESCT 2000b). This plan was presented in July 2000 at a national seminar, “Expansion with equity, guarantee of quality”. Participants included major actors from all higher education institutions, officials from each province, members of parliament, Ministers from other policy sectors and the President of the Republic of Mozambique. According to Mário et al (2003), the President’s participation was seen as a clear sign of support for the new ministry and its mission. At the end of the seminar it was agreed that there was broad consensus about the national higher education plans. The PEES was subsequently approved in August of the same year by the Council of Ministers (Brito, 2003).

The PEES 2000-2010 outlined six strategic objectives and associated activities: these were, 1) increasing access and equity, 2) meeting labour market demands and national needs through flexibility and responsiveness, 3) using available

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resources more efficiently and diversifying institutions’ financing sources 4) diversify institutions, training opportunities and forms of delivery, 5) enhancing and ensuring quality and 6) redefining the role of government. Table 11 summarises the associated activities for each goal.
Table 11: Objectives of the PEES 2000-2010 and associated activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Meeting labour market demands and national needs: flexibility and responsiveness</th>
<th>Using available resources more efficiently and diversifying financing sources of the institutions</th>
<th>Diversify institutions, training opportunities and forms of delivery</th>
<th>Enhancing and ensuring quality</th>
<th>Redefining the role of government</th>
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<tr>
<td>Increasing access and equity</td>
<td>Expansion of higher education, physically and geographically</td>
<td>Improve the utilisation of academic and non-academic staff and financial and material resources in the higher education institutions</td>
<td>Develop and diversify system of public and private higher education</td>
<td>Improve teaching and learning conditions</td>
<td>Promote the development of higher education in Mozambique</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Implement a policy of access to higher education</td>
<td>Increase efficiency of management and administration of higher education</td>
<td>Develop and implement criteria and mechanisms of accreditation and evaluation of quality at both national and institutional level</td>
<td>Develop and implement criteria and mechanisms of accreditation and evaluation of quality at both national and institutional level</td>
<td>Ensure that the national priorities are taken into account for the development of higher education</td>
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<td>Define a policy of financial assistance to higher education students</td>
<td></td>
<td>Promote and disseminate research and the application of new knowledge and technologies</td>
<td>Develop and implement criteria and mechanisms of accreditation and evaluation of quality at both national and institutional level</td>
<td>Develop legal and regulatory mechanisms to ensure effective implementation of national policies for higher education and research</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Training higher education staff geared towards the national agenda</td>
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<td>Promote and facilitate regional integration and multilateral and international cooperation within the sphere of higher education</td>
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<td>Provide high level administrative, managerial and technical personnel</td>
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<td>Offer student information</td>
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Source: MESCT 2000b
The ten year strategic plan was divided into three phases: PEES I (2001-2004), PEES II (2005-2007) and PEES III (2008-2010). The first phase sought to reform the higher education system through revising the law, enacting new ones, improving higher education institutions’ internal and external efficiency and diversifying higher education. It also included moderate expansion. From both a financial and planning point of view, there was only room for some minor expansion of the public institutions. Priority was given to consolidating (i.e. monitoring and evaluating) and strengthening the institutions that already existed. No restrictions were placed on the establishment of new private higher education institutions, as long as they met the conditions and criteria set by the law. PEES II, was expected to focus on consolidating reforms introduced during the first phase and expanding the sector. PEES III was to focus on consolidating Phase II’s activities and further planning (MESCT, 2000b). Given that the research here focuses on policy changes between 2000 and 2003, we only focus on PEES I.

During 2000-2003, the strategies identified in PEES I were operationalised into policies and activities. For the concrete operationalisation of PEES I, MESCT set up a commission consisting of various stakeholders (see Appendix I for the full composition of the commission). The commission organised meetings with all higher education institutions and government bodies to discuss their possible role and responsibility in realising the objectives as indicated in the PEES. Below we illustrate this by evaluating the negotiations between MESCT and the three public higher education institutions.

The commission prepared an operational plan for PEES I with the higher education institutions. In 2000 MESCT organised various debates with actors from the higher education institutions, in order to foster commitment to PEES. The three public institutions, University Eduardo Mondlane (UEM), Pedagogic University (UP) and the Higher Education Institution for International Relations (ISRI), were each asked to develop their own strategic plans, priorities and alternative scenarios that needed major financial support from government, so that the government could choose which strategies they would support (Brito, 2003). In assessing and approving the strategic plans of these three higher education institutions, MESCT also examined the extent to which the plans aligned with the PEES. It became clear from interviews and document analysis that this was a complicated and difficult process.

One rector argued that MESCT was interfering too much with the higher education institutions. He believed MESCT should only represent the interests of higher education institutions, thereby guaranteeing financial support. He argued that higher education institutions had autonomy but that he felt controlled and managed by MESCT. He was not allowed to spend money on areas which the institutions believed to be important and MESCT did not approve various elements of the scenarios that they developed.
A rector of another the public institution argued that in order to be eligible for funding, MESCT requested reports and bookkeeping that took too much time to prepare due to complicated guidelines. He claimed it was difficult to plan in advance and he was not allowed to adapt the plans during the period. MESCT in its turn argued that the higher education institutions criticised the planning and monitoring issue because they were not used to it. As one person in MESCT pointed out:

Previously, planning in the higher education institutions was based on ad hoc decisions. Often there was no vision behind it. It is totally new for the higher education institutions to develop a detailed strategic plan […] and it is logical that we ask the higher education institutions to report to us if they use public money for which we are responsible. The higher education institutions must be accountable to us and society as a whole on how they use public money. […] Autonomy implies more accountability and responsibility to society. As a matter of fact, the higher education institutions will think differently about this as soon as they experience the advantages of planning in advance. They will notice that clarity will ease these processes.

In sum, the operationalisation of PEES I was a complicated process for the public higher education institutions. MESCT did not always agree on the specific scenarios proposed by the higher education institutions and sometimes asked institutions to adapt them. Moreover, according to the rectors, MESCT did not always choose scenarios that the higher education institutions preferred. For this reason some rectors believed that MESCT was not respecting the institutions’ autonomy and that the Ministry was imposing its ideas on them. These were the first signs of resistance from the rectors to MESCT. Some expected more freedom and decision-making power over the final scenario. The resistance of rectors towards MESCT was also clearly evident during the development and formation of the revision of Law nr.5/03 on higher education.

7.3.2 The development of Law nr.5/03 on higher education

One of MESCT’s priorities was to draw up a new law that would clearly define aspects of decision-making power, the relation between MESCT and the rectors of the higher education institutions, concepts such as autonomy and accountability and the various types of degrees and higher education institutions.

In May 2001, the Minister of ESCT established a commission to draft a proposal. It subsequently started a comprehensive process of consultations and it soon became clear that actors in the higher education system entertained different perceptions of autonomy and how degree structures should be organised. It took various plenary sessions in Parliament, informal and formal
negotiations and lobbying from both the rectors and MESCT to convince Parliament of their respective ideas. According to a person in MESCT, rectors tried to lobby against their reduced power and MESCT’s growing authority. According to the rectors however, the proposals were neither or well worked out and therefore they voiced objections and tried to convince Parliament of the shortcomings of the proposals. After several rounds of negotiations, MESCT agreed to certain adaptations in its proposal. The following section elaborates the policy issues that the rectors and MESCT disagreed on.

7.3.2.1 Introducing systems for quality assurance and accreditation (QA) and credit accumulation and transfer (CAT).

In the draft revision of Law nr.1/93 on higher education, MESCT indicated that it would establish national QA and CAT systems. A member of Parliament indicated, during Parliamentary consultations, members invited the rectors to give their opinion on the proposal. Rectors commented that the Minister did not indicate how it was planned to operationalise and implement such a system. Some rectors also argued that MESCT should first inform them about issues such as how the QA and CAT system should look like, who would be in charge of this, how credit loads would be determined and what implications this would have for students in terms of mobility. Some rectors feared that MESCT did not have the capabilities to develop these systems. They indicated that it was important to develop a system for accreditation and for credit transfer, but they were sceptical about the way MESCT was dealing with this issue and feared that decisions were taken too fast and without clear criteria (Parliamentary Proceedings, 2002).

MESCT’s answer to these criticisms was that it takes time to plan and develop such systems and to create the necessary infrastructure. MESCT would therefore conduct studies, hire experts and consult the rectors as soon as they started with the actual development of the system for QA and CAT. Foremost MESCT wanted to first define the revision of the law that would make it responsible for establishing these systems.

A person from MESCT believed that the resistance from the rectors was because of other reasons. He argued it was specifically the rectors from private institutions that objected to the plans because they were afraid of accreditation. It would imply that MESCT had the legal mandate to close courses:

Some private higher education institutions offer physics when they do not even have laboratory facilities to do experiments or research. Once the law is approved, and accreditation and evaluations take place, they will have to discontinue this subject if the university still has no laboratory
7.3.2.2 Degree structure

The majority of rectors agreed with MESCT that the Mozambican degree structure was confusing. Bachelors and Masters degrees in Mozambique could not be compared with those in neighbouring countries. In Mozambique, a student could not continue with a Master programme after obtaining a Bachelor degree because the degree structure included the Licenciatura degree, which was generally regarded as the first university degree. A person from one of the higher education institutions argued that it is confusing for students wishing to do a Masters programme in a neighbouring country since those countries do allow individuals to enrol in Masters programmes after obtaining a Bachelors degree without the Licenciatura.

This was one reason why MESCT proposed to clearly define the criteria (the duration of the programmes, and the conditions required to enter the programme) of the Bachelors, Licenciatura, Masters and PhD degrees. The Licenciatura caused particular problems. MESCT initially proposed that the Licenciatura should take five years to complete. Yet some rectors pleaded for abolishing the degree as it was a remnant of the Portuguese days. Moreover, it did not make any sense for Mozambique because neighbouring countries did not offer this degree either. Others suggested that the degree should remain but be shortened to four years. They argued that quality and standards still remain due to curriculum reform and new instructions, even if the degree took four years. Finally, there was a group that wanted to keep this degree as it always had been (Parliamentary Proceedings, 2002).

7.3.2.3 Coordinating or managing

According to MESCT, Law n. 1/93 was not clear about the concept of autonomy. The Ministry needed to further define its responsibilities and decision-making power. According to some rectors the proposals on these issues were vague. It was unclear how authority would be divided between MESCT and higher education institutions. Some argued that the proposals refered to concepts such as supervision and coordination (superintender e coordinar) without indicating what these concepts exactly meant (Parliamentary Proceedings, 2002). As one rector mentioned;

What exactly is supervising, where does co-ordination start and where does it end?

According to MESCT, the Ministry coordinates the higher education sector but the higher education institutions remain autonomous.

With the new proposal of the law, some rectors felt that they did not have enough room to influence the decisions due to the growing power of MESCT. They argued that MESCT was not solely coordinating, but also interfering and trying to manage the higher education institutions.
7.3.2.4 Disagreement on the status of the head of higher education institution

In the past the President of Mozambique appointed the heads of higher education institutions and assigned them the title of rector, which entailed various privileges. In addition, it was common to give all newly established higher education institutions the title “university”. MESCT proposed to revise this. It believed there should be clear definitions and criteria for the different types of higher education providers. In addition, it suggested that the title of rector should only be awarded to the head of a university and not to other types of institutions. All other types of higher education institutions are managed by directors (Parliamentary Proceedings, 2002). As it would be impossible to withdraw the titles of current institutional leaders, MESCT proposed that the rule be applicable to all higher education institutions established in the future. According to those working at MESCT, this stirred much opposition from the rectors because they were afraid that they would lose their status and certain privileges.

7.3.2.5 Number of rectors in the National Council on Higher Education, Science and Technology

The initial proposal for Law nr.5/03 on higher education intended to establish a new National Consultation body on Higher Education, Science and Technology (CNESCT) that would advise the Council of Ministers on policy issues (the role of CNESCT is elaborated in the following section). CNESCT included representatives of the higher education institutions, people from the business community, members of scientific institutions, representatives of civil society and representatives of the government. Initially MESCT proposed to include three rectors in the CNESCT (MESCT, 2001). Rectors strongly objected to this and pleaded for more rectors in the consultation body. In Law nr.1/93 the National Consultative Body on Higher Education (CNES) consisted only of the rectors of all the higher education institutions. The rectors felt they were losing power in the consultation process. Initially MESCT did not want to comply with the rectors’ request. CNESCT was designed to represent broader social and economic interests and this required a balance of representatives from various organisations (Parliamentary Proceedings, 2002). The Ministry was afraid that rectors would dominate the consultation body. After much lobbying, MESCT eventually compromised and agreed that the CNESCT could include of five rectors.

7.3.3 Approval of Law nr. 5/03 on higher education

A Member of Parliament explained that when a Minister proposes a law revision or initiates a new law, it is Parliament’s task to ask key representatives of society about their opinion on the proposal. For the proposal on Law nr.5/03
on higher education, Parliament asked students, rectors and MESCT. The Member of Parliament She also mentioned that she later regretted that Parliament had forgotten to invite academic staff from the universities. The students hardly had any comments. According to the Member of Parliament it was probably because they did not know enough about the topic. Rectors on the other hand made many comments. They indicated that the proposed changes were not appropriate. The Member of Parliament explained how important it was that rectors largely supported MESCT’s proposal because they were the ones who would implement the new rules. For this reason, Parliament asked the rectors and MESCT to discuss the proposal further and consider adaptations in order to increase commitment.

After several rounds of negotiations between rectors and MESCT, the Ministry agreed to adapt part of its proposal. MESCT changed the duration of the Licenciatura from five to four years and increased the number of rectors in the CNESCT from three to five. Yet, rectors still disputed key concepts such as the status and the mandate of the rectors and the proposals related to quality assurance. Parliament however was convinced by the arguments given by MESCT and approved the adapted proposal in November 2002.

Law n.5/03 on higher education was signed by the President in January 2003. With respect to the disputed issues, the law defined that MESCT shall periodically inspect and assess the institutions, programmes and courses. To do so, an accreditation and quality assurance system was to be implemented. With respect to the number of years of the Licenciatura, this degree consisted of four years of study and could be compared with the honours Bachelor. As to the status of higher education institutions’ managers, the law stated that universities are managed by rectors while all other higher education institutions are managed by directors (existing higher education institutions continued to be headed by a rector) (Boletim da República, Law nr 5/03, 2003).

The new law included major changes. First, the law n.1/93 referred to the Minister of Education as being responsible for the education sector as a whole, including the higher education system. Law nr.5/03 on higher education defined that the Minister of ESC had to be in charge of supervising the higher education sector. Moreover, the new law introduced new concepts such as accreditation, quality assurance and transfer of credits. It redefined the concept of institutional autonomy and opened the space for and defined a new type of higher education institution (polytechnics). The law also included the requirements for establishing higher education institutions, clear definitions about the various types of degrees and types of institutions and definitions with respect to staffing (Boletim da República, Law nr 5/03, 2003).

Law nr.05/03 on higher education defined two new bodies that replaced the previous National Council for Higher Education (CNES). These were the Council of Higher Education (CES) and the National Council of Higher Education, Science and Technology (CNESCT). CES included of the Minister of ESCT and the rectors or equivalent leadership of public and private higher
education institutions. This Council was a representative body of the institutions established to advise the Minister. CES did not fall under MESCT: it was an autonomous body. Specific advisory responsibilities included the periodic assessment of opportunities and constraints affecting the development of the higher education system, recommending the basis for a system of academic credits, proposing guidelines for access policies and advising on the mobility of staff and students. CNESCT was a consultative body for the Council of Ministers, but fell within the responsibility of MESCT. The CNESCT consisted of five rectors, four lecturers of higher education institutions, five members of scientific institutions, three employers, three representatives of civil society and five representatives of the government. The Prime Minister appointed the members, after consultation with the respective sectors and on the recommendation of the Minister of ESCT. CNESCT advised on policy pertaining to tertiary education, science, technology, research and information technologies; public funding of tertiary education, science and technology; quality and “standardization” across tertiary education, science and technology; and the establishment and termination of tertiary institutions (Boletim da República, Law nr 5/03, 2003).

7.3.4 Cooperation procedures between MESCT and higher education actors

MESCT tried to develop mechanisms to reduce resistance and to gain support from higher education actors. It created commissions consisting of actors representing broader social and economic interests in order to gain support from key organisations outside the Ministry. The following sections describe how MESCT developed a variety of new cooperation mechanisms with higher education actors to create commitment and reduce resistance.

During the consultation processes MESCT identified people in higher education who had similar beliefs to MESCT. It called them “champions”. As the Minister stated;

The champions generate the dialogue and debate with the institutions and MESCT. Champions need to be identified and encouraged at all levels. Champions are people who are interested in the process, who can bring knowledge to it, and who are able to mobilise others around the vision. They are always ready to contribute and to give the necessary time and ideas to the process. They are trusted by others and they interact in a constructive way. The involvement of these champions needs to be constant and their suggestions need to be taken into consideration […]. (Brito, 2003)
MESCT identified champions in key organisations to open the dialogue inside the institutions by involving them in the public debates. Lecturers, students associations, the business community, and representatives of civil society were invited to informal discussions on issues like sector priorities and the mobilisation of resources.

7.3.4.1 Cooperation procedures between MESCT and higher education institutions

A person in MESCT indicated that MESCT developed higher education policies in cooperation with temporary commissions. It also sought to develop policies and regulations in close cooperation with higher education institutions. MESCT invited representatives of these institutions to meetings to discuss policy proposals. Another person at MESCT indicated that in order to establish a constructive mechanism through which institutions and MESCT could develop specific higher education policies, rectors were asked to appoint institutional representatives to collaborate with MESCT. For example, with the policy on access requirements to higher education, MESCT prepared the documents and proposals and asked the representatives to supply information on how their institutions regulated this and to comment on proposals.

Some obstacles could be discerned with this type of cooperation mechanism. Representatives frequently did not attend meetings and often could not provide the information that MESCT asked them to prepare for the meeting. Representatives argued that they did not have time or were not in a position to collect the specific information. Some people from higher education institutions claimed that MESCT asked too much time from them for free when they already had busy jobs. They believed MESCT should recruit sufficient staff to enable the Ministry to perform these tasks. As one rector said:

All of a sudden we received a lot of letters from MESCT with the request to come to the Ministry and discuss policy issues with them at a certain point of time. It is not constructive to organise meetings in such a way [...] It happens too often, we spend too much time at MESCT whereas we need time to run our own institutions.

MESCT’s response to this criticism was that they made an agreement with the rectors to appoint people with knowledge and experience of the subject in question and who should be given time to co-operate with MESCT on the issue. It was therefore the responsibility of the rector to appoint a suitable person who was knowledgeable and able to make time available. Moreover, MESCT argued that they were a new organisation and thus dependent on the cooperation of higher education institutions, which could supply expertise and information on various issues. For this reason it invited people from higher education institutions to discuss certain policy issues and to inform it on what was going on concerning specific areas. MESCT claimed that it was difficult to develop
policies without their cooperation. An individual working in the Ministry indicated early in 2001 that:

Some people from the higher education institutions hesitate to co-operate with MESCT because they do not know the consequences. [...] Our philosophy of developing a policy through consultation is new for Mozambique. [...] We are not an implementing Ministry, but a co-ordinating Ministry, our role is to coordinate the various actors in the higher education sector and stimulate them to co-operate with us in order to realise policy goals to improve this sector [...] Right now it is unclear to them how they could benefit from co-operating with the Ministry. [...] We were a new organisation and it takes years to establish a relationship.

A person in MESCT indicated that there was another reason why higher education institutions did not want to co-operate with MESCT on developing access requirements policies. He believed that they were afraid that MESCT would have the final decision making power over the regulations on access to their university, which implied they would lose decision making power. However, a person from one of the universities indicated that there was a dispute between MESCT and one of the universities on entrance requirements. The university was searching for ways to increase enrolment from students in the North. They claimed that one of the objectives in the PEES was to increase access to higher education for people in disadvantaged regions. The university therefore suggested to set different criteria for students from the North than for students from the South. The person argued that MESCT strongly disagreed on this because it believed all students should be assessed according to the same criteria.

By the end of 2003, the development of the policy on access requirements for higher education stalled. According to a person in MESCT, this was partly due to the resistance of people from higher education institutions to co-operate with MESCT and partly due to other priorities with which MESCT was preoccupied.

7.3.4.2 Cooperation between MESCT and donor organisations

Donor aid has always been significant for the Mozambican higher education sector. Characteristic of donor aid was that it tended to be uncoordinated and ad hoc, whereby each organisation supported an area of its own interest. MESCT sought to promote and facilitate multilateral international cooperation in order to mobilise financial resources for the higher education sector. Its purpose was to bring together donors and higher education institutions in order to integrate and coordinate resources to realise the goals of the PEES and the strategic plans of the institutions (Lind and Igboemeka, 2002). MESCT would organise meetings and seminars with representatives from the higher education institutions and donors to identify needs and discuss how donors
could contribute toward realising their plans. In addition, MESCT aimed to create a database that would provide information on donor funding and identify areas that were not supported by donor organisations. A person in MESCT stressed that they had no intention of dictating to donors where to spend their money:

If donors want to consult or inform MESCT how they would like to support the higher education sector they are welcome, but we do not aim to manage the donor funding. It is not our job to redistribute donor funding. […] Higher education institutions are autonomous and therefore have their own responsibility and have their own role in the PEES. Donors can contribute directly to the higher education institutions without having to ask us.[…] MESCT and the higher education institutions should mobilise their own resources.

In early 2002 extensive interviews were conducted with major donor organisations supporting higher education in Mozambique. In general key donors indicated that they had developed good relations with MESCT. To illustrate this they referred to the general donor meetings and their own private meetings with MESCT where they reflected upon the PEES and discussed how they sought to support the plans it contained.

The donor organisations mentioned that they were impressed by the PEES. They argued it was a comprehensive plan with a clear vision, objectives and operational plan. Moreover, it identified new priority areas such as the establishment of higher education institutions in provinces without them and the development of a quality assurance system.

At the time of the interviews, donors were in the process of identifying areas in the PEES they would like to support. The areas they supported were influenced by the policy defined by the country or organisation they represented. If the organisations’ policy changed then they would change their projects as well. For this reason it can be concluded that the role of MESCT was limited when it came to influencing the donor organisations over how to spend their money. Donor organisations developed projects and relationships with the organisations they wanted to support; this could be MESCT or the higher education institutions.

Under the name Higher Education Project (HEP 1), MESCT in cooperation with the World Bank developed a long term and extensive programme to finance part of the PEES. MESCT played a key role in this project since it managed and distributed the credit to the higher education institutions. For that project MESCT was able to influence the World Bank’s support to the higher education institutions. HEP 1 is a large project of $ 70 million that supports the entire higher education sector. HEP I had three objectives:
1. Enhance internal efficiency and expand the output of graduates
2. Improve equitable access (gender, location and socio-economic)
3. Improve the quality of the teaching-learning process and the relevance of the curriculum (World Bank, 2002).
The HEP I project was in fact a continuation of World Bank support to the higher education sector in Mozambique and the development of a national strategy for higher education initiated in 1999. Together with UEM, the World Bank developed the “Capacity Building Project” (1994-2001) that focused on capacity building and university management. Upon completion, the World Bank decided to continue with a follow-up project, HEP I, that focused on the broader national higher education system. The main difference between the two was that in the previous project, the UEM managed the credit, was accountable to the World Bank and was in charge of all the negotiations with World Bank in cooperation with Ministry of Planning and Finance (MPF). In the HEP I project, it was MESCT, on behalf of the GoM, who managed the World Bank credit and prescribed the guidelines to be eligible for the credit. The HEP I project therefore changed the relations between MESCT and the higher education institutions. In the HEP I project, the higher education institutions and the Ministry had to come to an agreement on how the World Bank credit would be spent. MESCT had the final decision making power in the agreements. It could reject proposals if they did not fit, in its view, within the PEES. HEP I was a strong financial instrument for MESCT since it was in charge of distributing the budget of $ 70 million to the higher education institutions who could only spend it according to set agreements.

Private higher education institutions also benefited from HEP I. It provided funding for Quality and Innovation Fund (QIF), which both public and private higher education institutions could tender for. This fund intended to create opportunities for institutions and researchers to obtain resources for institutional capacity building, innovation, and research. For private higher education institutions this was a loan, but the interest rate was very low (0.5%) and the loan had to be repaid in ten years. For public higher education institutions this was a grant (World Bank, 2002).

The implementation of the HEP I project started in mid-2002. The activities concentrated on the development of a pilot project for a scholarship fund for students from disadvantaged regions, curriculum reform in the public institutions, human resource development in public institutions, the development of a higher education distance learning system and the establishment of new types of higher education institutions: the polytechnics.

7.3.4.3 Cooperation procedures between MINED and MESCT

Law n.6/92 on education pointed out that higher education is part of the overall education sector. The national education system consists of general education, teacher education, technical education, vocational education and higher education (Boletim de República, Law n.6/92, 1992). In order to assure that the higher education sector and the pre-university sector would articulate, various (overlapping) issues needed to be coordinated between MESCT and MINED. However, Law n.14/2000, which established the new MESCT did not indicate how MINED and MESCT should share authority for overlapping policy areas.
The two Ministries entered a completely new situation where both the formal and informal links needed to be developed and negotiated. Below we summarise some of the areas where MINED and MESCT co-operated to realise certain policy goals. The summary is based on interviews with people both MESCT and MINED.

**Analysing submitted proposals**
The higher education institutions were required to submit proposals for the opening of new programmes to MESCT and MINED. MINED was included in this process to assure that the proposed courses were related to the knowledge acquired at secondary school.

**Science and technology**
MESCT co-ordinated the activities in science and technology with MINED in an effort to make science and technology part of the curriculum at secondary education. MESCT assumed that if pupils were not exposed to things like small experiments during chemistry or physics at secondary school then it would be harder for them to develop a feeling for science and technology. MESCT and MINED co-operated to develop plans to expose pupils from secondary school to science and technology so that they would become familiar with these areas before entering higher education.

**Distance learning**
On the request of the Government of Mozambique, MESCT and MINED were asked to jointly develop the distance education network. This implied that the commission that develops the policy for higher education distance learning included staff from MINED and MESCT. Although a policy was being developed for education distance learning, the Commission focused on both higher education and secondary education so that the two sectors could make use of the same network and expertise.

**Linking the pre-university sector with the university sector**
MESCT and MINED co-operated to develop a system that linked pre-tertiary education with tertiary education in order to assure that students coming from pre-tertiary education would be able to continue their courses at tertiary education level. Various initiatives were taken. MINED developed its national qualification framework for education in cooperation with MESCT in order to facilitate the mobility of students from pre-tertiary education level to tertiary education level. Its aim was to develop a system that assessed, recognised and accredited previous competence and prior learning experience. In addition, the two ministries jointly developed a strategic plan for the vocational education.
Thus before the existence of MESCT MINED was responsible for assuring that the different education sectors related to each other. With a new actor responsible for the higher education sector, MINED and MESCT needed to divide responsibilities and authority. They negotiated informally on the division of tasks. The harmonisation of the different education sectors was shaped through discussions between MINED, MESCT and the different education institutions.

7.3.4.4 Cooperation with the labour market

A person in MESCT claimed that in order to identify the needs of the employers and assure they were content with the programmes offered in higher education institutions and their graduates, MESCT developed several mechanisms to involve employers in higher education policy development. It appointed three people representing business organisations to be members of the National Council on Higher Education, Science and Technology (CNESCT). One of the responsibilities of CNESCT was to advise the Council of Ministers on issues regarding the quality and relevance of higher education.

A person from the Mozambican Aluminium Smelter (MOZAL) indicated that a representative of this aluminium plant was asked to participate in the CNESCT. He was pleased that MESCT allowed the company and the business community in general to advise the Council of Ministers on quality assurance and evaluation policies. He also believed it was essential to include employers because he was convinced that in general big companies were unsatisfied with the quality of programmes and graduates.

7.3.4.5 Cooperation with the provinces

In contrast with other ministries in Mozambique, MESCT decided not to establish provincial units. Instead, the Ministry consulted existing provincial and local government structures to develop, implement and promote higher education policy.

7.3.5 New coordination mechanisms in the higher education system

Because of the implementation of Law nr.5/03 and the organisational structure of MESCT, new coordination mechanisms were introduced in the Mozambican higher education system. The system grew rapidly. Before the establishment of MESCT, the main actors in the Mozambican higher education system were:
• The rectors of the institutions, who besides managing their institutions also advised the Council of Ministers
• The Council of Ministers, which approved proposals, strategic plans and policies
• The Ministry of Education, that steered the higher education sector
• The Parliament, which approved laws
• The donors, who provided financial and technical support
• The Ministry of Planning and Finance, which (directly) provided the public funding to the higher education institutions.

MESCT invited many new actors into the higher education system to play a role in the development of higher education policies including the new institutions, the CNESCT (that included people from the business sector), and commissions consisting of representatives of key organisations. Some actors who already were part of this system obtained another role or different responsibilities. For example, after the establishment of MESCT, the World Bank negotiated directly with MESCT instead of with the separate institutions (and their rectors). This implied that MESCT managed the World Bank loan and redistributed it to the higher education institutions. Figure 7 outlines the changes in the coordination mechanisms in the higher education system that have taken place since the establishment of MESCT.
Figure 7: Changes in coordination mechanisms in higher education

Position and responsibilities of higher education system actors before MESCT

Parliament: enacts laws on HE

Council of Ministers: Advises the Parliament and has decision making power on HE regulations

CNES, consisting of rectors headed by Minister of Education: advises the CoM on e.g. establishment of new HEIs

MINED: supervises the HEIs

HEIs: Develop own policies for, e.g. QA, CAT and admission

MPF: Public finance

World Bank

Position and responsibilities of higher education system actors after the establishment of MESCT

Parliament: enacts laws on HE

Council of Ministers: Advises the Parliament and has decision making power on HE regulations

CES, consists of heads of higher education institutions and advises the MESCT

MESCT: supervises the HEIs. Includes the CNESCT, consisting of rectors, teachers of HEIs, members of scientific institutions, employers, representatives of the government, advises the CoM on HE policies

Commissions that develop HE policy in specific areas

HEIs: Develop own policies within framework of law nr5/03 on HE that set criteria for e.g. QA, CAT

MPF and MESCT: public finance

World Bank
**7.4 Summary**

The adoption of Law nr.1/93 formally gave higher education institutions autonomy and allowed private higher education institutions. At that time rectors developed policy for their university without much interference from the GoM.

In the second half of the 1990s, higher education received considerable attention from the GoM. Rectors and representatives from the GoM pointed out that an inefficient higher education sector had emerged that could not meet the needs of society. They believed there was a need for system-wide policy development in order to overcome the identified problems, (i.e. dissatisfaction of employers, the low graduation rates, shortage of higher education provision in the Northern part of Mozambique, under-qualified lecturers and a shortage of them, inadequate financial resources and the lack of quality assurance mechanisms). Basically, all higher education actors agreed that the GoM should play an active role to ensure that higher education contributed to the development of the country and the reduction of poverty. In 2000 the newly elected GoM established MESCT with the aim of further guiding expansion and diversification in higher education by developing system-wide higher education policies. Law nr.14/2000 formalised the establishment of the new MESCT and broadly described its role.

MESCT began to give meaning to Law nr.14/2000, by working out the broad portfolio it had received. Until the establishment of MESCT no bureaucratic apparatus, organisation or commissions existed that could develop, operationalise and implement the objectives set by the new GoM. For that reason MESCT had to work from scratch on organisational infrastructure and had to develop the capacity to design and implement higher education policies. Gradually, different type of institutions, commissions and advisory bodies were established, each with its own role and authority.

Once MESCT proposed changes in the new coordination mechanisms it encountered considerable resistance from the rectors. The rectors agreed on the principle ideas of the new national coordination unit that would support the interests of higher education. Yet they assumed that they would play a key role in this process and had expected that the original division of authority would practically remain intact. Thus, they initially objected to the proposals for Law nr.5/03 that (re)-defined the division of authority between the actors in the higher education system.

MESCT sought to decrease the resistance and to create commitment for its policy initiatives. Through meetings, seminars and debates with key people engaged in or related to higher education (the rectors, MINED, employers, donor organisations, the provinces) the Ministry sought to develop policies jointly and to obtain support. Moreover, MESCT fostered support because it mobilised resources for institutions to realise their plans.
After three years, a number of policy changes have taken place. MESCT has reformed existing regulations and procedures by defining new coordination mechanisms that included new decision-making powers and responsibilities for both MESCT and the rectors. In addition, MESCT initiated policies and regulations for new areas, such as the establishment of a higher education distance learning system, the introduction of scholarship funds, curriculum reform, and proposals for the establishment of new types of higher education institutions.
8 Analysis: higher education policy developments from 1993-2003

8.1 Introduction

On the basis of the empirical findings this chapter analyses Mozambican higher education policy developments through ACF lens. In line with the formulated expectations, we start with an analysis of the Mozambican higher education system origins and explore whether actors' policy core beliefs are fragmented. Subsequently we look at the interaction between actors who seek to influence higher education policy and finally the nature, cause and frequency of policy changes. At the end of the chapter we summarise higher education policy changes between 1993-2003.

8.2 Origins of the nascent system

In Mozambique the higher education system emerged during turbulent times. It is therefore of no use to analyse the system in general before the early 1990s as up to this point all policies, including that of higher education, solely reflected the government’s desires, and the perceptions and beliefs of other actors were neglected. An open dispute about policy beliefs is a key element in ACF, which was not possible until the early 1990s.

During the early 1990s the higher education system emerged. During these years higher education was a domain which rectors and the Government of Mozambique (GoM) were concerned about and believed needed more attention. Their concern can be derived from the enactment of Law nr.1/93 on higher education. The law defined the autonomy of existing higher education institutions, and the establishment of the National Council for Higher Education (CNES), consisting of rectors of all institutions, to advise the Cabinet on higher education. In reaction to the growing demand for higher education and insufficient capacity in the public institutions, Law n.1/93 authorised the creation of private higher education institutions. The new ideology influenced ideas on steering higher education and the role of markets in higher education.

With the establishment of the CNES the GoM, in cooperation with rectors, established a new national regulating body to guide higher education. The government decreased its influence and gave rectors, through the CNES, more power to shape higher education policy. The government allowing private
institutions was a sign that higher education was considered important for the country and that the market could play a role in this sector.

The system evolved due to the adoption of a new political ideology at the national level. The GoM had shifted from Marxist-Leninist principles to democratic principles, which also allowed the introduction of market elements. For the higher education sector this implied that issues were re-conceptualised and that steering mechanisms and the role of the market in the sector were perceived differently. As a consequence the GoM did not interfere much in the sector, in contrast to the period where they decided what would happen in the institutions. The role of rectors in influencing policy increased as they were part of the CNES.

During the first three years, from 1993-1996, little happened in the higher education system. There are no indications in formal documents of activities or discussions around higher education policy. From interviews with actors it can also be concluded that little occurred with respect to higher education policy processes. From 1996 onwards, actors in the higher education system became more active in addressing perceived problems. The actors engaged in common action to influence the government’s policy. By undertaking studies and organising seminars to exchange information, they sought to gain more attention from the GoM.

When the nascent higher education system emerged in 1993, the number of actors was very small. Gradually, especially after the establishment of MESCT in 2000, the number increased. Besides the fact that new actors entered the higher education policy system, some actors who were already involved took on another role or different responsibilities. Figure 8 pictures how the nascent higher education system changes after the establishment of MESCT.
8.3 Interaction between actors

In the following section we analyse, the interaction processes between actors who try to influence the policy using our theoretical model. For this analysis we divided the period 1993-2003 in three different phases, namely 1993-1999, 2000-2002 and 2003. For each period of major change in higher education policy, we analysed the reasons and consequences of these changes. The period 1993-1999 was reconstructed afterwards. In 2001, 2002 and 2003 we were for the largest part of the year in Mozambique to do interviews and observe the policy developments. In our analysis we focused on the role of actors’ beliefs, resources and common action in policy developments.
8.3.1 Development of policy beliefs in the nascent Mozambican higher education system (1993-2003)

Actors form coalitions around policy core beliefs. To realise a common policy goal, the actors in the advocacy coalition tend to give up the secondary aspects of their belief system sooner than the policy core. Policy core beliefs relate to a specific policy field and entails topics such as whose welfare counts, the relative authority of government and market and the role of various actors in the policy system. Secondary aspects relate to aspects of the policy area and are concerned with the attainment (or revision) of policy objectives. Policy core aspects generally change due to perturbations in non-cognitive factors external to the system and secondary aspects change due to policy learning (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). In Fenger and Klok’s model it is the policy core beliefs that are relevant as it are these aspects of the belief system that hold a coalition together. For a more in-depth study, however, we also describe actors policy beliefs that relate to the secondary aspects.

8.3.1.1 Policy beliefs from 1993-1999

During this period the policy system was small. It consisted entirely of rectors and government representatives from MINED, the Ministry of Planning and Finance (MPF) and provincial governors. To enable higher education to fulfil its potential role, it was believed the rectors’ role should increase. Through the CNES, rectors were given an advisory role to the Council of Ministers on higher education matters.

Later, from 1996 onwards, the system actors became active and lobbied for a national coordinating unit to lead higher education institutions. It was generally believed the increasing demand for higher education and sudden expansion of institutions required active guidance and support from government since the sudden growth in this area resulted in a sector that consisted of a collection of inefficient institutions not able to meet the demands and needs of society. The secondary aspects of the policy related to the question “in what form should this new co-ordination unit be established”. Some actors advocated a separate unit within the existing MINED under the guidance of a Secretary. The newly elected government in 1999 favoured a separate Ministry outside MINED. The actors who advocated a unit within MINED did not actively oppose the decision.

During this period one policy core belief can be identified which was supported by all actors, namely the need for system-wide higher education policy, so that higher education could overcome the identified problems and meet the needs of society. It was the rectors who mobilised support for this policy core. With regard to secondary aspects of the policy core there was some disagreement on the status of this co-ordination unit.
Figure 9: policy beliefs between 1993-1999

**Figure 9:** policy beliefs between 1993-1999

**Figure 9:**

**Higher Education System**

**Policy core belief of representatives of GoM and rectors:**
- System-wide oriented higher education policy under the guidance of a national coordination unit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secondary aspects of representatives of GoM and rectors:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coordination unit in MINED</td>
<td>Coordination unit in a separate Ministry</td>
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8.3.1.2 **Policy beliefs from 2000 to 2002**

During this period actors sought to give meaning to the system-wide higher education policy. MESCT played a key role in this process as it initiated policies. On the basis of its perception of what a Mozambican higher education system should entail, the new Ministry developed and proposed various new policies and regulations. One of MESCT initiatives was the proposal for a new law on higher education, science and technology. This proposal referred to the development of new policies such as a finance policy for higher education, a new advisory body to the Council of Ministers on higher education, science and technology, the establishment of a system for quality assurance and credit transfer, the establishment of new institutions that offered different degrees and the development of new degree structures.

It turned out that the majority of rectors disagreed on various proposals for the new law and therefore opposed the initiatives of MESCT. They disagreed on:
- The proposal for the introduction of a quality assurance system and credit accumulation and transfer system
- The proposal for the degree structure
- The proposal for the mandate of rectors
• The meaning of institutional autonomy
• The proposal for the number of rectors in the National Council on Higher Education, Science and Technology (CNESCT)

Although these are different policy issues, they boil down to one general policy core, namely the division of decision-making power and authority between MESCT and the rectors. MESCT and the rectors did not define the policy core belief in these words. We were able to derive this from our in-depth interviews with people from MESCT and rectors in which we dealt with issues such as disputes and opinions about the policy directions. In addition, we used the written minutes of the plenary sessions in Parliament that described the discussions between actors and Parliament.

The development of the Mozambican higher education system required new regulations for coordination mechanisms. Note the term coordination mechanisms in this context refers to a system-wide policy change that defined the division of power and responsibilities and does not relate to the variables in our theoretical framework. Rectors feared MESCT gained too much power at the cost of the institutions’ autonomy. They believed they would lose their own decision-making powers and MESCT would take over. MESCT in turn believed it should have a decisive role in system-wide policy development and planning. In addition, it wanted to balance consultative power between rectors and other actors representing key organisations in society relevant to the higher education system. It had no intention of imposing rules or taking over the management of the institutions. According to MESCT the crux was that rectors misunderstood the notion of autonomy. The Ministry believed they had to “teach” rectors the true meaning of the word and stressed that autonomy also implied being accountable to society and responsible for decisions. It believed rectors tended not to take the required responsibility for the public money they spent.

During the period 2000-2002 key policy developments took place in the Mozambican higher education system as Parliament approved Law nr.5/03 in November 2002. The law included new coordination mechanisms and gave MESCT the mandate to develop new policies. MESCT and the rectors had different perceptions on these new mechanisms. The policy goal “new coordination mechanisms” is difficult to classify. On the one hand it can be classified as a secondary aspect as it refers to implementation of the overall policy goal adopted in 2000. On the other hand it can also be classified as a policy core issue because the policy coincides with the policy core topic “distribution of authority amongst actors”. We argue this was a salient policy affecting the whole higher education system and therefore classify it as a policy core issue. We conclude there were two policy core beliefs on the topic “distribution of authority among actors”. In broad terms, MESCT advocated system-wide decision making and planning whereas rectors advocated more institutional autonomy. The rectors had a tendency to advocate less system-wide policy and more freedom and power for themselves.
During this period, MESCT began the implementation of various components of the PEES. Some rectors of public institutions disagreed with MESCT on how to realise certain components defined in the HEP I project, such as curriculum reform and human resource development for further staff training. Generally spoken they expected to have more freedom and decision-making power in realising these objectives. This dispute between MESCT and rectors concerned the attainment of policy objectives and related to specific aspects of the higher education policy. In ACF terms this dispute would therefore be indicated as disagreement around the secondary aspects of policy beliefs. Figure 10 shows the actors’ policy beliefs between 2000-2002.

Figure 10: policy beliefs between 2000-2002

8.3.1.3 Policy beliefs in 2003

In 2003 we studied actors’ policy beliefs with help of the Q-sort methodology. A different method was applied to provide further insights into policy beliefs. The Q-sort methodology can indicate more specific and precise beliefs for different actors. On the basis of insights in actors’ policy beliefs from 2000-2002, we could
formalise the policy issues and transfer them into statements that were used for the Q-sort methodology. With help of the methodology we could study how actors’ beliefs further developed in 2003. We conducted the Q-sort with all the rectors, key people in MESCT and a key person from MINED. The following four groups emerged from applying the Q-sort methodology.

GROUP 1
Group 1 was dominated by people from private higher education institutions. One person of MESCT was also part of this group. This group believed it was extremely important that the GoM gave more financial incentives to private higher education institutions. The majority believed the role private institutions played in the development of the country was underestimated in comparison with public institutions. A second issue they found relevant concerned the role of MESCT in higher education and how it should relate to private and public institutions.

Support to the private higher education institutions.
A salient issue for group 1 was the support provided to private higher education institutions. However, within this group an extra sub-division could be made, whereby the first sub-group believed the private institutions should indeed be supported by MESCT. They argued MESCT acknowledged that the private institutions were highly important since they contributed to the government’s goal of expanding higher education. For this reason the Ministry had supported them in various ways since the beginning.

The second sub-group believed MESCT’s support was not sufficient. This sub-group felt private institutions were discriminated against in comparison to the public institution. They believed that MESCT did not acknowledge their role in helping the government expand and diversify the higher education sector. They argued private institutions played a key role as they enabled more students to enter higher education, especially in the Northern part of the country, which was mainly dominated by private higher education institutions. They believed that MESCT should support them far more than it was doing. A rector from a private higher education institution in this second sub-group stated:

The private higher education institutions are discriminated because the public finance goes to the public institutions that are mainly based in the Southern part of the country. [...] Due to the fact that most of the public higher education institutions are in the Southern part of Mozambique, students in this region are benefiting, because the public higher education institutions are almost for free. The institutions that are based in the Northern part of the country are basically private. This implies that the students in these regions have to pay for higher education, despite of
the fact that these students are, in most cases, poorer than students in the South. [...] The GoM should have different targets, that is, students should be the beneficiaries of the government support in stead of the higher education institutions.

One member of the second sub-group even argued that public funding was currently being wasted on inefficient public institutions that received funding on the basis of actual expenditure. This person believed it would be more efficient to spend public funding on the basis of performance. In this way more money would be left for the private sector.

A rector from a private institution in group 1 gave another reason why the private higher education sector was so important to the Ministry.

We as private higher education institutions are connected to big non-governmental associations that have links in all districts and provinces. We know the problems in the provinces and we take those problems into consideration when developing and designing our courses. The problems in the rural areas, districts and villages, with respect to for instance aids and family programmes are reflected in our curricula. We are anticipating these problems. For this reason we should get the opportunity to contribute to the identification of the national priorities for the higher education sector.

Yet another rector in the group believed MESCT should have a leading role in identifying the priorities in higher education. He argued that:

MESCT should have a leading role because the GoM has a broader spectrum on what the government needs. If you would leave this decision to the private sector, then they may not invest in courses that are not lucrative.

**Private versus public higher education institutions**

Group 1 stressed public institutions should be bound to different decision-making procedures and regulations than private ones. MESCT should have a leading role over these public institutions. The institutions should follow the guidelines of the national Strategic Plan on Higher Education (PEES) as they were financed through public funding. Public institutions should only be able to spend their funds according to set agreements with MESCT. Public funding should be based on institutional performance instead of being defined by the actual level of expenditure per category.

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27 All citations in the following section are derived from the Q-sort methodology conducted in 2003.
Relation between higher education institutions and MESCT

The second policy issue salient for group 1 related to the discussion on the role of MESCT and the areas on which MESCT and higher education institutions should have decision-making power. In summary, the group believed that whilst MESCT should have a coordinating and supervising role, the autonomy of institutions should be respected. Coordination implied amongst others assuring that:

- there is a form of dialogue and consensus between stakeholders to avoid disparity
- standards are safeguarded by MESCT through a system of quality assurance
- the various higher education institutions are linked through establishing a system for credit transfer that enables the mobility of students between them
- policies are developed that stimulate the expansion of the higher education sector
- a fiscal framework is created that stimulates the private higher education institutions

Generally, both the people of the higher education institutions and MESCT agreed MESCT was indeed coordinating the sector and not managing the separate institutions. They believed that MESCT involved the higher education institutions sufficiently in policy-making processes. As an individual within MESCT in group 1 said:

MESCT is not managing the higher education institutions, we often do not even know what is happening in the higher education institutions.

GROUP 2

Group 2 was represented by people from MESCT. This group emphasised what the exact role of MESCT should be in higher education and what they expected from the institutions. The group argued MESCT operated on the basis of PEES which again was based on the government’s election programme in 1999. Group 2 marked what they called “the unique structure and organisation of MESCT”. They realised the notion of autonomy was interpreted in different ways and explained what they meant with concepts such as autonomy and coordination.

The role and task of MESCT

Group 2 defended the strategy and decisions which MESCT, had taken over the last couple of years with respect to policy making for higher education. They indicated most of the decisions were based on the national agenda of the GoM, and PARPA, which highlighted priority areas for higher education. For example, in line with PARPA, MESCT should establish mechanisms to
guarantee equal participation in higher education for different regions. For this reason MESCT developed a pilot programme for scholarships.

With respect to MESCT’s role in higher education, group 2 emphasised it was a coordinating organisation. This group was aware various people in the sector blamed MESCT for trying to manage the institutions or for interfering too much at an institutional level. The group argued MESCT’s principle aim was to guide a policy process in cooperation with stakeholders. A person in MESCT explained what the notion of “coordination” involved:

MESCT is a coordinating Ministry, it does not have the capacity to steer the higher education institutions [...]. Although we are not an implementing Ministry like for example MINED that developed the curricula for schools, sometimes MESCT has to interfere during the implementation phase in order to assure that there are no obstacles or problems during the implementation process. For instance, MESCT asks the higher education institutions to report to them and conducts evaluations to see if they have to take another direction or if they should continue as they are doing. This is needed to assure that the funding MESCT is receiving from the state and donors is being used according to plan so that policy goals are achieved

The members of group 2 believed that MESCT should have a leading role in the higher education sector, which included:

- Harmonising the higher education sector through defining a clear degree structure and establishing a system for quality assurance and credit accumulation and transfer
- Strengthening the neglected higher education institutions
- Avoiding the duplication of key activities due to scarce resources
- Supporting the private higher education institutions as they play a key role in the expansion and diversification of the higher education sector.
- Developing policies in close cooperation with MINED to assure that other education sectors (vocational and secondary education) are linked with the tertiary education sector.

To illustrate one of these aspects, a person from MESCT in this group said;

MESCT is helping the higher education institutions to be more effective so that they can safe money for things that are related to their primary task, namely teaching and research.

In the debate on the meaning of the term autonomy, this group pointed out what they expected from the higher education institutions. A person from MESCT defined the concept as follows:

Institutional autonomy means that the institution itself does not have to request authorisation or stamps for daily activities[...] To be eligible for
public funding MESCT requested the public higher education institutions to develop their institutional strategic plan. […] They have autonomy to develop their own strategic plan and they have autonomy because they showed they had to capacity to do so. Now they have to show that they are committed to the agreements, which they made with MESCT about spending and reporting on funding.

Some group members pointed out public institutions depended too much on government and donor funding. They believed the sustainability of the institution depended on their operating more independently from government funding, for example through developing income-generating activities. Although the group realised this would be difficult given there was little demand for their services, they expected this demand would increase in the future.

**MESCT and private higher education institutions**

Private institutions believed MESCT was not supporting them sufficiently, yet group 2 argued MESCT supported them in many ways and through all sorts of mechanisms. MESCT supported them because it believed private institutions played an important role in expansion and diversification of higher education. As a person from MESCT in this group mentioned:

At this stage it is impossible not to support the private higher education institutions. Both private and public higher education institutions are aiming for the same ultimate goals, namely to educate people, giving them more tools and skills to develop themselves and the country […]. MESCT is promoting the expansion and the strengthening of higher education. One of the ways MESCT strengthens and supports private institutions is through incentives, such as fiscal stimuli, the Quality Innovation Fund (QIF) and through scholarships that are offered to students who can go and study at the private higher education institutions as well. Furthermore MESCT encourages them in informal ways as well. They are invited to meetings and to be part of the decision-making process. We go to the opening of their buildings and graduation ceremonies to show our interest. The Ministry is here to facilitate them and to inform them.

**Structure of MESCT**

The people in this group realised that especially in the beginning, many people outside the Ministry criticised the specific structure of MESCT. They believed the main reason for this was because it was an unusual Ministry for Mozambique and people did not know what it would lead to. They also believed it was the most efficient way to coordinate the higher education sector. The Ministry stayed small, and experts and higher education representatives
or other Ministries were involved in the policy-making processes. Bringing in people from outside MESCT was important because higher education covered all policy fields. As a person from MESCT said:

We are not only a coordination body, but also a multidisciplinary institution, which means that we will need the contribution of all other sectors. They have to be more involved within the process so that they gain ownership, that is, that they are really partner and stakeholder in the policy and implementation processes [...]. People were not used to this kind of operation because the university sector is a very conservative sector.

GROUP 3
Group 3 consisted mainly of rectors from public higher education institutions and one representative of MESCT. Although there was more disagreement within group three, it was very similar to group two as both stressed the same topics as salient issues. They advocated the way in which the GoM supported higher education and believed it should have a leading role in the higher education sector (represented by MESCT). This would be more efficient than if separate institutions developed independent plans. However, some group members had doubts about the structure of MESCT and questioned whether it was indeed able to co-ordinate the sector. Finally, group 3 held strong opinions about the private higher education sector.

The establishment of MESCT
The majority of group 3 believed it necessary to establish a new MESCT that would focus on the areas of higher education, science and technology. They argued the sector was growing fast without any guidance from the GoM and resulted in a sector that could be characterised as separate in-articulated higher education institutions wasting many resources. Moreover, given that areas of science and technology were previously neglected, this group believed MESCT should give science and technology extra attention. As a rector argues:

The extra attention from the GoM to higher education is important because it plays an important role in innovation, an important factor that can contribute to the decrease of poverty. In addition there is a shortage of highly qualified people with a university degree for which the labour market is asking.

One person was concerned with the establishment of a separate Ministry for Higher Education, Science and Technology. He would have preferred the GoM establish a separate unit for this within the existing MINED. He felt the sector
would not be sufficiently articulated with other education sectors if it was coordinated by a separate Ministry.

**The structure and modes of coordination of MESCT**

The majority of this group not only supported the establishment of the new MESCT but also strongly supported the structure of MESCT and disagreed with criticisms on the specific organisational structure. As one rector argued:

MESCT is new and it has a new structure and organisation to which people still have to get used. [...] MESCT has developed a new administrative system with new rules that are transparent. This did not exist in the past, because every higher education institution had its own rules.

One rector however said:

MESCT should develop the same framework and structure as the other Ministries have. I do not agree that they developed their own structure. But maybe I will change my opinion next year when I see that it is more effective and productive. Come back next year!

**Leading and coordinating role of MESCT**

In the discussion on MESCT’s role and the meaning of coordination, group 3 took the view that MESCT should among others:

- Formulate policy for future directions and introduce clear guidelines
- Motivate people who eventually have to implement higher education policies to improve the institutions
- Define a policy for funding mechanisms
- Establish a quality assurance system
- Develop higher education policies in close cooperation with other Ministries to ensure higher education is linked to the plans of these other sectors
- Increase the opportunities for disadvantaged students to go to higher education through offering scholarships and supporting distance higher education.

One group member feared MESCT would not be able to coordinate higher education institutions in an appropriate way. A rector supplied the following analysis:

MESCT should create a supportive environment, for instance creating laws that allow the higher education institutions to assess the policies themselves. The law indicates that the higher education institutions
should be involved in decision-making processes and policy development, but in practice this is not the case. It is not clear whether MESCT is listening to us. […] MESCT is not imposing policies but they are using power; “do this and do that”. […] In stead, MESCT acts like “I do not mind what you think, because I already have a clear plan in mind”. The Minister tells us what to do and we, in our turn, say yes to her requests, but in the meantime we do not follow it up for all sorts of reasons.

Private higher education institutions
Group 3 had clear ideas on how MESCT should support private institutions. It agreed private institutions should benefit through fiscal stimuli. However at the same time they strongly disagreed MESCT should allocate any further resources to the private sector as public resources were scarce. They underlined that public finance should go to the public institutions.

Moreover, some group members criticised private institutions for only focusing on profit instead of offering quality courses. For that reason some believed private institutions were a threat to the higher education sector in general. In addition rectors of public institutions blamed the private institutions for not investing in human resources and extensively “using” staff of their institution. They argued public institutions were investing a great deal in human resources, whereas private institutions were offering lucrative contracts through offering high salaries in dollars. As a consequence staff were not fully committed to the institution that invested in them and instead spent a lot of time at the private higher education institutions. As one of the rectors stated:

There are two different types of higher education institutions that have different responsibilities. Private higher education institutions are established to make profit. Public higher education institutions have a social component. They work in a very difficult environment. It would not be fair if public institutions had to compete with the private institutions that operate in an easier environment. I agree there should be some reasonable environment created for the private higher education institution as well, but not to be competitive with public institutions.

Not all group members expressed themselves as strongly against private institutions. For example, a person from MESCT argued:

The contribution of the private sector is very important. However, these higher education institutions should develop their own ideas and should not wait until the government does something for them.
GROUP 4
Group 4 consisted of people from MESCT, MINED and a rector from a private higher education institution. This group distinguished itself from the other groups by stressing the importance of the business sector, the private sector and research for the higher education sector. This group believed MESCT should support institutions in developing links to the business sector. They emphasised one of the important reasons for establishing MESCT was not only to support and guide expansion and diversification of the institutions, but also to put the science and technology on the government’s agenda. According to this group higher education, science and technology had a priority role in poverty reduction that functioned as a catalyst for development.

Leading role of MESCT
This group believed MESCT should have, amongst others, the following roles and responsibilities:

• Approve or disapprove proposals for the establishment of higher education institutions
• Develop mechanisms to define minimum programme criteria and assure higher education institutions deliver quality
• Mobilise resources, for example through developing the sectors funding formula and negotiating with donors
• Ensure equity and increase access to higher education in disadvantaged regions and for disadvantaged but talented students, for example through a scholarship programme,
• Develop policies to assure higher education actually contributes to poverty reduction, for example through focussing on areas of technological innovation.
• support the private institutions since they are partners in expanding and diversifying higher education. A lot of students study at private institutions not because they are looking for better quality, but because the public university has no place for them.
• co-operate with the business sector for research purposes and to assure that higher education institutions are producing the right manpower.
• Develop policies in cooperation with MINED in order to tune the two sectors.

One person of MESCT underlined that:

Our policy is part of the strategic plan for the overall education sector. In fact, the strategic plan of MINED on education was based on our strategic plan, because we had our plan already in 2000 and MINED developed theirs only a year ago. They used ours in order to make the link with the higher education
People in the group realised that many higher education institutions were afraid of losing autonomy. For this reason a person from MESCT explained what autonomy and accountability consisted of:

The new regulations give clarity around autonomy. If you introduce autonomy, you need to have regulations, otherwise it becomes anarchy. In fact a reform is taking place and people are not used to work with regulations, because in the past there were no regulations. Previously there was a law, but there was no regulation to control and therefore the law was never used. [...] Both MESCT and the higher education institutions have their own mandate. If the money falls under the mandate of MESCT, then this Ministry is accountable and can decide, after consultation with the higher education institutions what to do.

Despite MESCT’s leading role in the higher education sector, the group argued that the Ministry was not able to solve problems that did not fall under their mandate. For example, many actors mentioned that moonlighting (people combining more jobs) was a serious problem that should be solved by MESCT. Group 4 argued that it was impossible for MESCT to solve the problem with respect to moonlighting. They argued that this problem was partly related to the fact that the salaries in the public higher education institutions were lower than in the privates. It was a general public issue that was not specifically related to the higher education sector. It was impossible for MESCT to increase the salaries because this did not fall under its mandate. One person from MESCT argued that the higher education institutions should try to solve the problems themselves and MESCT in its turn could facilitate them in implementing their strategy.

**Structure of MESCT**

The group underlined why they organised MESCT according to a specific structure. They believed that their organisational structure included all relevant actors in higher education in the policy process. The group was aware that they were criticised by various stakeholders for asking too much time from people that were working outside the Ministry. The response of this group to these criticisms was that if the higher education institutions wanted to participate in the policy process, then they had to spend time on meetings and reading policy proposals so that they had a chance to comment.

One person from MINED acknowledged that there were some problems with the way MESCT co-ordinated meetings:

 [...] If the Ministry would define policies and strategies without consulting the different stakeholders, tomorrow the Ministry will be accused that it is facilitating a policy in a closed building in total isolation. [...] But the question is how we can find ways to institutionalise
these mechanisms. MESCT calls for meetings on an ad-hoc basis, every
day or every week. It is better to set up formal mechanisms.

8.3.1.3.1 Analysis and summary Q-sort methodology

Analysis of the four groups revealed that all respondents agreed with each
other on the policy core aspect. In 2003 all groups supported the idea that the
GoM, represented by MESCT, would have the coordinating role in the higher
education sector. The groups put forward various reasons in favour of MESCT
undertaking a supervising role. For example, they indicated the new MESCT
should be in charge of formulating and regulating policy. Moreover, the actors
believed it was more efficient if one body took care of and worked out the
various initiatives than if separate institutions developed their own strategy or
infrastructure to work out their plans. To be more precise, the Q-sort
methodology identified a list of higher education policy issues on which all
respondents agreed, these were:

- MESCT should coordinate the higher education sector and include the
  higher education institutions in the policy making process
- MESCT should set the general guidelines. Higher education institutions
  have their own mandate and all aspects that fall under it are to be managed
  by the institution in question and MESCT cannot interfere
- MESCT should be responsible for the establishment of mechanisms that
  assure programme and higher education institution quality
- MESCT should co-operate with the other Ministries when developing higher
  education policies
- MESCT should not steer the higher education institutions
- MESCT should provide extra support for disadvantaged students and
  regions that do not yet have a higher education institution
- MESCT can not solve moonlighting problems on its own
- Private higher education institutions should get support from the GoM

The reason behind identifying four groups was due to the small differences
between them. Each group emphasised certain aspects of the policy process
they considered important and came up with arguments why these issues were
important for both them and the higher education sector as a whole. The Q-sort
methodology showed all groups internally generally agreed on specific policy
issues that each group identified. In conclusion, to deal with the many
challenges and problems in the sector, the actors agreed a national supervising
body should coordinate and articulate the various higher education institutions
and create an environment to expand and diversify this sector. The issues each
group identified were either related to a secondary aspect (group 1 and group
4) or corresponded with the policy core belief.

Group 1 could be distinguished from the others because it was more
concerned with the well-being of private higher education institutions. This
group would like MESCT to support these institutions it is currently doing.
The second group was concerned with the responsibilities and tasks of MESCT and indicated what institutions could expect from the new Ministry, but also what the Ministry could expect in return. They argued that the programme of MESCT was based on the government’s election programme.

The ideas of group 3 were similar with group 2. Although they were less interested in the unique structure of MESCT and there was less coherence about the efficacy of MESCT’s organisational structure, the group identified the same policy issues. This group referred to basic ideas and plans that formed the guidelines along which both MESCT and institutions were considered to develop and operate.

Finally group 4 pointed out the important role the business sector and private institutions played in the sectors development. They also suggested science and technology deserved extra attention from the GoM, since it was an indispensable factor in innovation and development.

In summary, the Q-sort methodology identified four groups that emphasised different policy issues, but to a large extent agreed on the core of higher education policies. Shortly after MESCT was established, the key policy issue of dispute became the proposed coordination mechanism that demarcated the new division of decision-making power and authority. Yet in 2003 it seemed the key actors interviewed again agreed on the same policy core beliefs. This implied rectors were moving more in the direction of MESCT. The higher education actors agreed in 2003 that MESCT should intervene by coordinating and harmonising the higher education system and develop guidelines and incentives for the higher education institutions. Higher education institutions in turn were autonomous which also implied that they were accountable to the GoM and society as a whole.

The policy core belief around which the four groups co-aligned also related to the policy core beliefs in the previous years, that is the division of tasks and authority between the actors in higher education system. The higher education system therefore once again consisted of one policy core. No new policy core issues influenced policy developments.

The secondary aspects mentioned by the groups referred to the support of the GoM to the private institutions and the role of the business sector in higher education.
8.3.2 The use of resources

This study identified three key resources, authority, finance and information. Coalitions pursue their objectives over time through securing these resources. The ability to move government programmes in a certain direction is to a large extent dependent on the resources they possess (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). We will describe the developments in the resources actors possess and how that affected the dependency relations of actors between 1993-2003.

8.3.2.1 Actors’ resources from 1993-1999

Until 1999 the higher education institutions acted to a large extent independently from the government. Rectors from public universities directly negotiated with the MPF concerning the funding of future plans without further interference of MINED. Funding was not based on performance, but
was defined by the actual level of expenditures per category in the preceding budget period and covered staff costs, educational inputs and many non-educational expenditures (staff housing, student bursaries, food etc). Though financially dependent on the MPF, public institutions acted independently from MINED.

Legally, higher education institutions fell under MINED, yet in practice its role was limited. Each university developed its own policy for aspects such as quality assurance and access requirements.

The exchange of institutional data or information between institutions and MINED was limited, given there was little national higher education policy development.

With respect to the three resources finance, legal and information, the higher education institutions were relatively independent from the GoM.

8.3.2.2 Actors’ resources from 2000-2002

MESCT used various instruments to support and realise its policy objectives. From the beginning it used financial resources to gain support from higher education actors. The areas of PEES I were to a large extent funded through the World Bank credit. Through the World Bank’s HEP I project MESCT could offer public institutions an extensive part of the budget from the World Bank’s credit. Institutions therefore had good reason to cooperate with MESCT. Given that the it managed and redistributed this budget, public institutions had to comply with guidelines set by MESCT and were therefore dependent on it. They could only receive and spend this budget according to agreed plans with MESCT that were based on the PEES. The implementation of the HEP 1 started mid 2002, therefore its financial consequences were not yet tangible.

Besides funding from the HEP 1 project, higher education institutions received money from the MPF. As during the period prior to 2000, the rectors of the public institutions negotiated directly with the Ministry of Planning and Finance. However, the difference to the previous period was that MESCT was present during these negotiations. The higher education institutions had to send their budget proposal to MESCT who gave its opinion during the meetings with MPF and the institutions. MPF had the final decision in actual funding.

With respect to legal interdependency, the institutions were to a large extent still independent from the Ministry during the first years of MESCT since it had to develop new policies and regulations from scratch. Law nr.5/03 on higher education was approved at the end of 2002 which meant between 2000-2002 the sector operated under Law nr.1/1993 on higher education (which did not mention MESCT). On the one hand the institutions in practice could not disregard MESCT as Law nr.14/2000 broadly defined the mandate of the
Ministry, but on the other hand, MESCT could not begin implementing certain policies until Law nr.5/03 on higher education was approved.

As to the resource “information” MESCT and the actors were symbiotically dependent on each other. MESCT developed a wide range of informal mechanisms to exchange information. Through organising workshops, national seminars and meetings, actors discussed higher education issues. Yet actors were not formally obliged to come to the meetings. Staff from institutions, for example, did not always attend the meetings MESCT organised specifically for them. Despite some resistance from individuals from the higher education institutions, it can be concluded that actors, such as people from MINED, labour market and provinces, were interested in exchanging information. On the one hand MESCT needed input from actors to identify shortcomings and problems in order to develop policies. On the other hand, actors wanted to know how the Ministry could help them in realising their goals or improving certain aspects in the higher education sector.

In conclusion, from a financial point of view, public institutions gradually became more dependent on MESCT due to the implementation of the HEP 1 mid 2002. As Law nr.5/03 on higher education was not yet approved, legally MESCT could not start implementing certain policies as indicated in the strategic plan. With respect to information, actors were symbiotically dependent on each other. Although during the period from 2000-2002, actors gradually became more dependent on MESCT in comparison to the previous situation when they were still relatively independent.

8.3.2.3 Actors’ resources in 2003

During the period 2000-2002, rectors gradually became more dependent on MESCT and this development continued in 2003. The implementation of HEP 1 was completed. UEM indicated that in 2003 the World Bank credit was its second main income. The first source of income being from the MPF. A person from the department of finance and planning in UEM estimated that in 2003 almost 20% of its financial sources came from the HEP 1 project and expected this percentage to increase in 2004. The department of finance and planning in UP indicated that from 2002 the HEP 1 was the most important source of income. Given that UEM and UP are the two largest public institutions of the three eligible for the budget, it can generally be concluded that public institutions became more dependent on MESCT.

Once Law nr.5/03 on higher education was approved in November 2002, MESCT had the mandate to define the sectors’ funding formula. MESCT had a powerful tool in the funding formula as it would set the (broad) guidelines that indicated which strategic areas should be supported. Although the MPF still held the final decision over how much the institutions received in total, Law nr.5/03 stipulated MPF was bound by the funding policy as defined by MESCT.
Figure 12 shows the changes in university funding after the approval of Law nr.5/03 on higher education.

**Figure 12:** Changes in university funding after the approval of Law nr.5/03 on higher education.
As Figure 12 shows higher education institutions received their funding in different ways. The main change prior to 2003 was that public institutions negotiated directly with the MPF for funding. After approval of Law nr.5/03 on higher education, MESCT also participated in the negotiations. In addition, MPF was bound by the funding formula defined by MESCT. Moreover, MESCT mobilised financial resources for all the higher education institutions. The lion’s share went to UEM as they accommodated most students. Private higher education institutions were eligible for a loan from the Quality Innovation Fund (QIF).

Once Law nr.5/03 on higher education was approved, MESCT could commence implementing policies and develop other policies included in the Strategic Plan. For example, the new law on higher education stated MESCT had the mandate to develop a system for quality assurance and accreditation.

Information generation and exchange did not differ greatly from the period 2000-2002. MESCT kept inviting new actors to contribute to the discussion on certain policy issues, such as the development of the quality assurance system. MESCT expanded the higher education system and used the new actors as information sources. In order to develop higher education policies MESCT was dependent on the actors’ input. They in turn, were eager to get information from MESCT on issues including future policy directions or how to apply for certain funds (QIF or scholarships).

In comparison with the period 2000-2002, institutions in 2003 became legally and financially more dependent on MESCT. With regards to the resource information, the nature of the relationship between MESCT and other higher education system actors remained the same as during the period 2000-2002.

### 8.3.3 Interaction between actors and policy change

In order to analyse higher education policy developments in Mozambique we concentrate on the common action of actors who tried to influence these policy developments. The common action concept refers to different types of strategies through which advocacy coalitions attempt to make government institutions behave in accordance with their policy cores, for example: influencing legislatures to alter budgets and legal authority of administrative agencies, affecting public opinion or altering the perceptions of policy-relevant actors by producing knowledge through research (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Zafonte & Sabatier, 1998). In the following section we analyse the nature of interaction between actors in Mozambican higher education and to what type of policy change that has lead.
8.3.3.1 Interaction from 1993-1999

The major policy change that took place in 1993 coincided with the emergence of the new higher education system. Law nr.1/93 on higher education established institutional autonomy and made allowance for private higher education institutions. The changes in Law nr.1/93 had major consequences because with the introduction of university autonomy, government’s influence significantly decreased in that they would no longer control the institutions. Moreover, rectors were given a position on the CNES, from which can be deduced that the government believed the rectors role should increase through advising the Council of Ministers on higher education matters. This policy change came about due to the adoption of a new national political ideology whereby government abandoned the strict socialist programme and shifted to a new liberal constitution which included democracy and free market principles.

After 1993 all higher education actors, which were few and consisted of rectors and government representatives, undertook various common activities to pursue the GoM to establish a new national coordination unit to guide the development of the Mozambican higher education system. It was thus one coalition, which we labelled as the systemic coalition, that sought to convince the government of the need for this national co-ordination unit. A number of studies and consultations were undertaken, such as the national consultation concerning higher education in 1996; the national meeting held in Manica that produced recommendations in support of the reform process in higher education; and the baseline study conducted in 1999 commissioned by MINED to analyse higher education in Mozambique. In an attempt to gain more legitimacy for their policy goals, actors used the recommendations of experts such as external consultants and the recommendation of the World Conference on Higher education organised by UNESCO in 1998.

The coalition’s action and strategies to push government into creating a new national co-ordination unit responsible for the sector can be characterised as weak coordination. Weak co-ordination does not require any elaborate decision-making or monitoring processes. Law nr.14/2000, which defined the establishment of MESCT, did not include any concrete decisions on how the establishment of MESCT would affect institutions in terms of, for example, division of authority. Generally, all actors supported the broadly formulated role of MESCT. The co-ordination activities between the actors in the systemic coalition were developed without obligations and no sanctions were imposed.

Due to the actors’ strategies, the new elected GoM decided to put higher education at the top of the agenda and establish MESCT, which in turn was given the task to develop a system-wide policy to overcome the problems identified in higher education. This policy change can be classified as a major one, because it coincided with the policy core topic “(re)distribution of authority”. This topic is included in Sabatier’s and Jenkins-Smith “list of topics” that refer to major policy change (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, 133). Figure 13 illustrates how the higher education system consisted of one coalition, which
pushed for a system-wide policy under the guidance of a national coordination unit. Actors were independent from each other and engaged in weak coordination in order to realise their common policy goal. Their efforts lead to the establishment of MESCT.

**Figure 13: Interaction from 1993-1999**

### Higher Education System

#### Systemic Coalition

**A. core belief:** system-wide oriented higher education policy under the guidance of national coordination unit  
**B. resource:** independent

Weak coordination

**Policy change:** new MESCT

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8.3.3.2 *Interaction from 2000-2002*

During the period 2000-2002 a second coalition emerged in the higher education system. From 1993-1999, rectors participated in the systemic coalition to push for the establishment of a government unit in charge of developing a system-wide policy. Once MESCT was established, between 2000-2002 the rectors separated from the systemic coalition and regrouped in the autonomy coalition where they sought to push for more decision-making power and autonomy. Other actors, - MESCT, business sector individuals and representatives from MINED (who were not always active in coalitions) -, had shared the same policy core and “stayed” in the systemic coalition. The two coalitions disagreed...
on various proposed aspects of Law nr.5/03 on higher education. In particular there was a dispute about the proposed co-ordination mechanisms that defined division of authority and responsibilities between actors. Organised opposition appeared during the formation of Law nr.5/03 on higher education. The autonomy coalition objected to the Ministries’ proposal. It took various plenary sessions in Parliament, informal and formal negotiations and lobbying by both the autonomy coalition and the systemic coalition to convince Parliament of its ideas. The autonomy coalition tried to lobby against decreasing power of rectors and the growing authority of MESCT. The systemic coalition emphasised that MESCT should get more decision making power over system wide regulations. After several rounds of negotiation MESCT (key actor in the systemic coalition) agreed on certain adaptations in its proposal.

The two coalitions tried to influence Parliament on the policy defining coordination mechanisms, through weak conflict. Weak conflict occurs when organisational actors monitor each other’s political behaviour and then alter their actions to prevent the pursuit of goals by the other party. The autonomy coalition tried to block the systemic coalition in giving more power to MESCT at the cost of the rectors. In the conflict weak strategies where used (i.e. negotiating, lobbying and Parliament interference).

At the end of 2002, Parliament approved Law nr.5/03 that, amongst others, defined the new tasks and authority of the actors.

The nature of the policy change is difficult to discern from an ACF point of view. Major policy change occurs if there is a change that applies to the system as a whole, which happens if the policy core alters. Minor policy changes affect certain aspects in the policy system. This happens if there is a change in the secondary aspects. The policy core belief of the systemic coalition had not changed. In fact the systemic coalition started with the implementation of the system-wide policy, which relates to secondary aspects. Yet the policy change affected the majority in the higher education system, for example all higher education institutions, MESCT and also the business community, because the latter participated in the National Council on Higher Education, Science and Technology (CNESCT) that advised the Council of Ministers on higher education, science and technology matters. Moreover, the policy change coincided with the policy core topic “distribution of power between actors” which relates to major policy change. In short, the policy change in 2002 should be interpreted as a change ranking somewhere between minor and major change.

Along with developing the new law on higher education the Ministry initiated the development of new policies (e.g. the higher education distance learning policy). MESCT sought to create commitment and gain support from actors in the sector to generate new policies. To do this, MESCT co-operated with actors that included, amongst others, higher education institutions, Ministries, province representatives, business sector, donors and consultants. For example, MESCT appointed commissions representatives that consisted of key people in
the higher education sector outside the Ministry to develop policies, consult and generate debates. In this way MESCT mobilised new and existing actors and involved them in the policy making process in order to obtain their support. Through organising meetings, debates, workshops and seminars, MESCT both consulted and informed actors on how they believed the goals could best be realised. This type of interaction can be characterised as weak coordination. These interactions, initiated by MESCT, for the period 2000-2002 had not led to any “concrete” policy changes.

In addition to initiating new policies, MESCT started with the implementation of some aspects of the PEES such as human resource development and the expansion of public institutions’ programmes. These implementation activities in ACF terms are classified as minor policy changes. A major part of them was realised through the World Bank’s HEP 1 project.

Initially there was resistance during the operationalisation process of the PEES. For example, some rector’s believed they did not have the full autonomy to decide for themselves how to realise objectives as defined in the PEES. Yet they did not form a coalition. This was probably because the operationalisation of the PEES was different for every public higher education institution. The institutions formed separate agreements with MESCT that were specific to their needs.

In conclusion as shown in Figure 14, the policy change in 2002 was a result of two competing coalitions, the systemic coalition and the autonomy coalition, having different perceptions on the division of authority between the actors. The autonomy coalition pushed for more power for the rectors, whereas the systemic coalition believed MESCT should have the final decision-making power in system-wide policy. Through weak conflict the coalitions sought to prevent the other from realising its goals. Eventually the dominant systemic coalition, after making some compromises with the autonomy coalition, was able to force its beliefs in higher education policy.

The new law had a system-wide impact and included, amongst others, new regulations regarding the division of decision-making power between MESCT and the higher education institutions over areas such as quality assurance, finance policy and the definition of the degree structure. Moreover, Law n.5/03 included the definition of different types of higher education institutions offering a variety of degrees and sharing a common academic credit system. The adoption of this law was a case in which secondary aspects had an impact on the whole system, and therefore the policy change ranks somewhere between minor and major.
8.3.3.3  Interaction in 2003

In 2003 MESCT continued actively expanding the systemic coalition. Due to its strategic actions, that is mobilising resources for actors to realise their goals and through extensive consultations and dialogues for awareness raising, MESCT was able to reach a consensus and gain support for a number of policy initiatives, such as the development of a policy for quality assurance and credit transfer. The new actors that entered the higher education system had similar policy core beliefs to the systemic coalition. Due to MESCT’s actions, the core beliefs of the majority of rectors gradually changed and seemed to correspond increasingly with the policy core beliefs of the systemic coalition. In 2003 resistance towards the new MESCT had decreased. The systemic coalition grew as new actors coalesced with the core policy beliefs developed by MESCT. MESCT thus succeeded in establishing one large coalition in which the rectors also participated. In 2003 the weak interaction between actors did not result in any major or system-wide policy changes.

With respect to minor policy changes, the actors involved in the HEP 1 project continued to implement various aspects in the PEES. Private higher
education institutions gradually became involved in the HEP 1 project as they applied for funding from the QIF.

Figure 15 illustrates that key actors, including rectors, joined the systemic coalition so that once again the higher education system consisted of one coalition. MESCT, in cooperation with subsystem actors such as rectors and commissions, initiated the development of new policies through weak coordination for CAT and QA. In 2003 no specific or concrete major policy changes took place.

The system-wide policy changes adopted in previous years affected the higher education institutions. MESCT had mobilised resources to make further progress with the implementation of PEES. To sum up there were a number of changes at institutional level: a number of institutions carried out a curriculum reform; public institutions implemented human resource development to upgrade their staff and some institutions commenced on institutional reforms. These changes are, in ACF terms, minor changes that relate to certain aspects of higher education policy.

*Figure 15: Interaction between in 2003*
8.3.4 Overview of policy changes

Figure 16 gives an overview of the Mozambican higher education policy changes between 1993-2003.

**Figure 16: Major and minor policy changes in Mozambican higher education between 1993-2003**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major policy change: Establishment of MESCT</td>
<td>Major policy change: Law nr.05/-3 on HE defines the new division of authority between higher education actors</td>
<td>Major policy change: None yet Initiatives for QA and CAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor policy change: none</td>
<td>Minor policy change: Curriculum change QIF Scholarship fund Human resource development</td>
<td>Minor policy change: Curriculum change QIF Scholarship fund Human resource development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1993 a major policy change took place in the newly emerged higher education system. Law nr.1/93 established institution autonomy and allowed for private institutions. The changes in Law nr.1/93 had system-wide consequences, that is consequences for both the GoM and the institutions. Now that universities were autonomous, government influence was considerably reduced in that they could no longer prescribe what would happen in the higher education institutions. Moreover, Law nr.1/93 stipulated defined that rectors were given a position in the CNES. This was a sign the government believed the rectors’ role should increase through advising the Council of Ministers on higher education matters. The policy change came about due to the adoption of a new ideology at national level whereby government abandoned the strict socialist programme and shifted to a new liberal constitution which included democracy and free market principles.

Seven years later, in response to the many problems emerging in higher education, the newly elected GoM introduced the second major policy change; the establishment of the new MESCT mandated to develop system-wide policy change to overcome identified problems in the sector. Between 2000 and 2002 a key policy change took place and a number of minor policies were introduced. Two coalitions, the dominant systemic coalition that
consisted of people from MESCT, MINED and the business sector and the autonomy coalition consisting of rectors had conflicting ideas on the policy core belief topic, “distribution of authority between actors”. The final policy change in 2002 was dubious as secondary aspects impacted on the whole system and coincided with the policy core belief “distribution of authority”, which refers to major policy changes. Therefore the policy change ranks somewhere between minor and major change.

In addition to initiating new policies, MESCT began implementing some aspects of the PEES such as human resource development and curriculum reform in public institutions, the introduction of scholarship funds and the establishment of polytechnics. Many of these activities and policies were realised through the HEP 1. The policy changes related to aspects of the PEES and applied to a limited number of system actors. They can be identified as secondary aspects.

In 2003, at the end of the period covered by this research, no major policy change took place. The system again consisted of one policy core. The rectors’ policy core belief once more shifted in the direction of the policy core of the systemic coalition by supporting more system-wide policies under the guidance of MESCT. In the meantime MESCT continued, in cooperation with the individual actors in the higher education system, with further implementation of the HEP 1 project which related to minor policy changes.
9 Summary, conclusion and reflection

9.1 Summary

This chapter analyses whether the logic of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), as developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, and specified in the theoretical part of this study, stands up to empirical testing. ACF is a theoretical framework that seeks to explain policy processes and change. In short, this framework argues that acting on the basis of beliefs, actors form coalitions and press to have their beliefs realised in public policy. Policy change happens due to a shift in the dominant coalition and through the process whereby coalitions create new understandings of reality that affect their ideas on policy goals.

For the empirical case we examined the development of the Mozambican higher education system that has emerged against the background of a turbulent policy environment. We are interested to what extent ACF, a theoretical framework developed and tested in industrialised and relatively stable environments, may apply to such a turbulent context. Mozambique can be characterised as a turbulent country given that over the last four decades state models have changed three times. Only since the early nineties have democratic principles, such as free elections, freedom of speech and an independent legal system, been introduced. The country is rebuilding itself after almost 30 years of war and is developing salient organisations to make democracy work, including independent law officers, parliament and an independent press. Furthermore, the country is characterised by extreme poverty.

The first part of this chapter summarises the outcomes of our empirical analysis of Mozambican higher education policy change from 1993-2003 in the light of the expectations formulated in Chapter 4. We examine how far the outcomes correspond to these expectations. As Chapter 4 pointed out, for the purpose of this research we concentrated on three specific aspects of ACF: 1) fragmented beliefs in nascent subsystems, 2) major policy change in a turbulent context and 3) the role of beliefs, resources and common action in policy change. In our empirical analysis we identified three periods: 1993-1999, 2000-2002 and 2003. In the last part of this chapter we focus on the wider implications of the results for ACF.
9.1.1 Higher education policy developments between 1993-1999

As a consequence of the political shifts in the early 1990s whereby the Mozambican government shifted from communism to liberalism, in 1993 a new law for higher education was adopted. Law no.1/93 defined new aspects: the autonomy of higher education institutions, the establishment of the National Council of Higher Education (CNES) consisting of all rectors to advise the Council of Minister on higher education matters, and the possibility to establish private higher education institutions. During the first years of the nascent higher education system, little happened with regard to higher education policy. Few activities took place to alter higher education policy. From 1996 onwards, the actors in the higher education system became more active, through addressing the problems they perceived in higher education. In fact, it was the rectors, positioned in the CNES to advise the Council of Ministers, who initiated activities to influence the government’s higher education policy. They mobilised support for more system-wide policies in higher education, guided by a national coordination unit with the purpose of ensuring that higher education met the needs of society. Some actors disagreed over the status of the new coordination unit to be established. Some believed the national coordination unit should take the form of a new Ministry. Others believed the new unit should come under the existing Ministry of Education (MINED).

In respect of resources, higher education institutions were relatively independent from the Government of Mozambique (GoM). Certainly, they were financially dependent on the GoM. Yet, rectors from public universities directly negotiated, without further interference of MINED, with the Ministry of Planning and Finance (MPF) for the funding of future plans. Funding was not based on performance, but on the actual level of expenditures in the preceding budget period. Legally, higher education institution fell under MINED. In practice, its role was limited. Each university developed its own policy in such domains as quality assurance and requirements for access.

To realise their common policy goal, rectors and representatives of the GoM came together around a coalition, which we labelled the “systemic coalition”. They developed a weak form of coordination. A number of studies on the Mozambican higher education sector were commissioned and meetings were held, which supported the need for a national coordination unit to deal with the problems identified in higher education: shortage of student places, low graduation rates, high drop out rates, decreasing quality, and inadequate financial resources. On the basis of these recommendations, the newly elected government in 1999 decided to establish a national coordination unit in the form of the Ministry for Higher Education, Science and Technology (MESCT) which came into existence in 2000.

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28 A subsystem in ACF terminology corresponds in the domain of higher education studies to a system. We will use the term higher education system when referring to the set of actors who seek to influence higher education policy.
9.1.2 Higher education policy developments between 2000-2002

Between 2000 and 2002, once MESCT began to take shape and developed new regulations and policies, different perceptions appeared amongst actors vis-à-vis the new coordination mechanisms MESCT proposed for the higher education system. The majority of the rectors, especially those from the older established universities, believed that their power had decreased significantly. Thus, once the broadly formulated policy defining the role of the new Ministry became more concrete, some rectors had a tendency to reduce their support for the system-wide policy approach and sought more freedom and power for themselves. MESCT, on the other hand, believed that to develop the national higher education system, it should wield a leading and coordinating function and play a decisive role in higher education policies.

Financially, the public higher education institutions²⁹ became more dependent on MESCT, largely through operation of the World Bank’s Higher Education Project (HEP I). Thanks to the HEP I project MESCT could mobilise resources for the higher education institutions. Since MESCT was responsible for this allocation, it managed and redistributed these funds. Public higher education institutions were obliged to comply with the guidelines MESCT set. The higher education institutions were therefore dependent on MESCT. HEP I started during the second half of 2002 by implementing those policies defined in the Higher Education Strategic Plan (PEES) at the institutional level. From a financial point of view, by comparison with the period 1993-1999, the public higher education institutions were more dependent on MESCT. From a strictly legal point of view, since Law nr.05/03 on higher education had yet not received parliamentary approval, the rectors remained relatively independent from MESCT.

The disagreement on the new coordination mechanisms resulted in weak conflict between the actors, which consequently led to a new coalition emerging. Rectors left the ‘systemic coalition’ and coalesced in a coalition, which we labelled the ‘autonomy coalition’. It pushed for more autonomy for the institutions. Through negotiation and lobbying, both coalitions sought to influence the policy outcomes and especially the new coordination mechanisms.

9.1.3 Higher education policy developments in 2003

In 2003 policy core beliefs amongst the autonomy coalition, i.e. the rectors, gradually changed and moved increasingly towards the policy core beliefs held by the systemic coalition. The actions of MESCT, such as the mobilisation of

²⁹ University of Eduardo Mondlane (UEM), Pedagogical University (UP) and the Higher Education Institute for International Relations (ISRI)
resources for the institutions, had affected the institutions in a positive way. MESCT was seen less as a threat and more as a support. In addition, new actors entering the higher education system entertained policy core beliefs similar to those of the systemic coalition. Through debate and interaction with all actors, MESCT had developed a policy core belief generally supported by all key actors.

With regard to dependency, the higher education institutions became more dependent on MESCT. As the HEP I became fully operant and Law nr.5/03 on higher education had been approved by Parliament, public higher education institutions became financially even more dependent on MESCT. The private higher education institutions also fell under the nr. 5/03 law on higher education.

Through weak coordination, MESCT steadily forged one large systemic coalition which supported, at least in 2003, a number of policy initiatives, for instance for quality assurance and credit transfer. Resistance by the autonomy coalition to the systemic coalition weakened and no new policy core beliefs emerged.

### 9.2 Testing the expectations

**Expectation 1**

In nascent subsystems that emerge out of new issues or a new conceptualisation, policy beliefs are fragmented.

ACF has generally been applied to stable subsystems long in place, in which positions are clear and stable. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith identify this type of subsystems as mature subsystems. One of the purposes of this study was to apply ACF to a nascent subsystem and to analyse the consequences for policy processes. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith distinguish two types of nascent subsystems; 1) a subsystem as a spin-off of an existing one, for instance when a group of actors became dissatisfied with the neglect of particular problems by an existing subsystem or 2) a subsystem that arises out of new issues or a new conceptualisation. The subsystem’s origins have consequences for actors’ beliefs and coalitions. In the first case, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith expect clearly differentiated coalitions (mirroring pre-existing groups) at the birth of a subsystem. Yet, in instances cases where subsystems emerge from a new issue or a new conceptualisation, they expect actors’ policy core beliefs to be fragmented (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999, p. 137). Fragmented beliefs imply that 1) policy cores are vaguely formulated; 2) actors espouse different policy cores; and 3) actors’ policy core beliefs change rapidly. Hence actors change coalition in relatively short periods.
The Government of Mozambique shifted in the early 1990s from Marxist-Leninism principles to Liberalism. The new political ideology had consequences for higher education as well. First, steering mechanisms in the higher education system changed. Government control diminished. Higher education institutions obtained academic autonomy and could decide themselves what to teach. The role of rectors in influencing higher education policy increased as part of the CNES advising the Council of Ministers on higher education matters. Second, private institutions were authorised. Given the re-conceptualisation that took place around these issues, the status of the higher education system can be classified as a subsystem shaped by new issues and new conceptualisation.

In the second half of the 1990s, the preoccupation of rectors focused on the problems in higher education’s inability to meet the demands of society: employers were dissatisfied with graduates’ knowledge and skills; graduates numbers were insufficient to fulfil labour market requirements; student enrolment was unequally distributed across different regions of the country; higher education institutions could not accommodate the sudden increase in demand of higher education, quality of education and infrastructure were considered to be too low. Some actors feared on explosion of private higher education institutions offering courses that lacked quality. Responding to this, rectors sought to mobilise support for a national coordination unit to develop a system-wide policy for higher education. The policy core that stood for “system-wide policy under the guidance of a national coordination unit” dominated the higher education system throughout the second half of the 1990’s. Ironically, once this coordination unit was established in the form of MESCT, the rectors themselves changed position. They left the systemic coalition between 2000-2002 and gathered in the autonomy coalition that pressed for more freedom, power and autonomy for the rectors. A year later however, they rejoined the systemic coalition. Rectors had reconciled themselves with the fact that Parliament had approved Law no.5/03. In addition, they had experienced the positive effects of MESCT, which actively supported the interests of higher education in general and had mobilised resources for the institutions. Other actors, MINED, government representatives of provinces, donors, and the business community, during 1993 and 2003 endorsed the same policy core belief. They supported the introduction of system-wide policies under the guidance of a national coordination unit. MESCT existed only from 2000 onwards. In the three years that we studied its position and policy beliefs, it held the same policy core belief, i.e. the development of system-wide policies under the guidance of MESCT.

In sum, the empirical findings show that from 1996 actors actively attempted to influence the higher education policy. Generally all actors held the same policy core belief during 1996-2003. Only the rectors changed position for a short period of time between 2000-2002.

The empirical reality thus contradicts ACF prediction about fragmented beliefs in nascent subsystems that emerge out of new issues or a new
conceptualisation. Is this aspect of ACF falsified? Strictly from an epistemological point, the expectation is not sustained. Yet, care is needed in drawing conclusions because, first, they apply to a context which may have had an impact on the degree of fragmentation and, second, because the research period covers only ten years.

As far the first point is concerned, the Mozambican case is unusual because the number of policy actors in the nascent higher education system was small. All policy issues focused solely on higher education because all actors related to this sector. All actors had the same understanding of the specific policy issue. There was only one policy core belief in the system. Although the rectors changed position for a short period, generally everyone agreed with the need for system-wide policy under a new national coordination unit, set apart from MINED. However, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith assume that every subsystem contains a large number of actors. They state “whatever the origins, subsystems normally contain a large and diverse set of actors” (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993, 25). ACF generally applies to complex subsystems covering a number of different sectors and policy issues. In the Tahoe study, for instance, environment issues, economic development, water quality and urbanisation shaped the policy process (Sabatier & Brasher, 1993). In the cases they studied, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith did not envisage nascent subsystems where practically everything needs to be developed from scratch; government institutions (at different levels), higher education institutions, a business sector. In such types of nascent subsystems, and certainly in the Mozambican case, the number of actors is small.

Because policies to all intents and purposes had to be developed from scratch, actors were primarily concerned with setting the basic structure for higher education - policies, regulations and institutions relevant for the system to work. They were mainly involved in one core issue that needed to be clearly resolved: the division of authority between higher education institutions and the GoM. This issue dominated the higher education system during the first ten years. Most of actors’ effort and time were geared towards this. Once the division of authority between actors was defined in 2003, other major policy issues arose in the higher education system.

This brings us to the second point why caution is needed when drawing firm conclusions from this study. The duration of our period of study was relatively short. Once the higher education law nr.5/03 was enacted, MESCT started developing new policies, e.g. quality assurance, credit transfer and entrance to higher education. It is not excluded that these proposals for policies become issues of dispute around which actors drew up further coalitions. Already, the last two years have seen questions raised whether students from the North should have different criteria for access. Access policy could generate a conflict on the North-South issue, which in ACF terms relates to the core belief “whose welfare counts”? This issue could very likely become a core issue around which actors from the systemic coalition, or even from other organisations or subsystems, come together. As the higher education system is
confronted with more policy issues, as more people enter the higher education system, further policy cores could emerge and mesh and subsequently fragment actors' core beliefs still further.

The Mozambican higher education system represents an extreme example of instability. Therefore, this research does not allow us to draw firm conclusions about the nature of policy beliefs in nascent systems. Yet, empirical findings do raise questions about the uniformity of nascent systems. First, one can question whether an average uniform period exists during which subsystems are nascent. Or is this dependent on the context in which it develops? In Mozambican instance, after ten years the higher education system was still nascent. It is difficult to predict when it is mature. Maybe this takes another ten years and that actors’ core beliefs become fragmented later. Second, between 1993-2003, actors in Mozambican higher education faced very specific problems, problems absent in systems to which ACF is applied. In Mozambique, actors focused on the establishment of a higher education system; everything had to be developed anew. In industrialised countries, institutions, organisations and policies already exist. Policy discussions focus on different issues. The dynamics around policy processes are more complex. In those systems, the policy process is the result of initiatives by many actors at different levels within government and outside government. They cover different policy sectors and meshed issues. In Mozambique, between 1993-2003, the scope was narrow. It concerned only higher education and the number of actors was small. Only one core topic dominated the higher education system: the division of authority between higher education institutions and the Ministry.

**Expectation 2**
The type of interaction between actors is dependent on the interaction between the nature of policy beliefs that actors hold and the nature of interdependency of actors.

One of the less robust aspects of ACF in its original form was the little attention given to the notion of common action and resources. This research aimed to illuminate this aspect further, drawing on the insights of Fenger and Klok. Fenger and Klok contribute to ACF by exploring how resource factors influenced interaction between actors seeking to advance policy changes (Fenger & Klok, 2001). They built on Zafonte’s and Sabatier’s (1998) work, which, on the basis of characteristics of interdependency and beliefs, defined expectations of common action between subsystem actors. Zafonte and Sabatier distinguish two types of interdependency (high and low) and two types of beliefs (congruent and divergent). Fenger and Klok argue that if actors are dependent on each other (high interdependency), two types of interdependency can be characterised, these are symbiotic and competitive interdependency. Symbiotic dependency anticipates a situation where one actor’s action contributes to another’s actions or goals achievement. In this situation, actors
are inclined to co-operate. Competitive interdependency, however, refers to the situation where the action of one interferes with another actor’s ability to take action or attain this goal ability. These actors are driven apart because of conflict over the resources (Fenger & Klok, 2001, p. 162). Fenger and Klok lay out three types of interdependency (symbiotic, independent and competitive) together with three types of beliefs (congruent, independent and divergent). They expand Zafonte and Sabatier’s model. Fenger and Kloks’ model includes the expectations of Zafonte and Sabatier and elaborate upon them (Fenger & Klok, 2001).

Table 12 summarises schematically the nature of policy beliefs, interdependency and the outcomes of the type of interaction between actors in the higher education system during the three phases 1993-1999, 2000-2002 and 2003. To ascertain whether the empirical findings correspond to the expectations, row three and row four must be compared.

Table 12: summary of the nature of actors’ beliefs, interdependency and interaction for the three different periods, 1993-1999, 2000-2002 and 2003

<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Policy core belief:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Policy core belief:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Policy core belief:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>congruent</td>
<td>divergent</td>
<td>congruent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nature of dependency:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Nature of dependency:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Nature of dependency:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>independent</td>
<td>Relatively independent (financially more dependent than in previous years, legally still independent)</td>
<td>Dependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Common action:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Common action:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Common action:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak coordination</td>
<td>Weak conflict</td>
<td>Weak coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expected common action:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Expected common action:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Expected common action:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak coordination</td>
<td>Weak conflict</td>
<td>Coalition with severe collective action problems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There are two striking elements in the table. First, in 2003, the empirical outcome does not correspond with the expectations adumbrated by Fenger and Klok and Zafonte and Sabatier. Second, it is remarkable that actors were so independent of each other (or independent to so large an extent) between 1993-2002.

The outcomes during the years 1993-1999 (congruent beliefs and independence result in weak coordination) and during 2000-2002 (divergent beliefs and independence result in weak conflict) could have been explained by Zafonte and Sabatier as well. Accordingly, Zafonte and Sabatier’s expectations are born out thus verified for the period 1993-1999. In 2003 when rectors depended on MESCT for resources, a case of competitive interdependency emerged which Zafonte and Sabatier did not refer to. If their expectations were applied to the situation in 2003, Zafonte and Sabatier could argue that actors were dependent on each other, and given that beliefs were congruent, they could anticipate strong coordination. Their expectation concerning coalition behaviour would not therefore match our empirical findings, which point out that in 2003 actors engaged in weak coordination.

Fenger and Klok, in their turn did distinguish between the types of dependency. On their criteria, they would expect a coalition with severe problems of collective action. These occur when 1) coalitions, engaged in common action (weak or strong), but fall apart once actors perceive that common action to influence policy does not successfully lead to common policy goals and 2) occur when actors hold congruent core beliefs but compete for the same resources\textsuperscript{30}. Fenger and Klok’s expectations are not born out by the empirical finding either, because in 2003 the coalition did not fall apart. However, they are closer to the empirical findings than Zafonte and Sabatier. According to Fenger and Klok, before coalitions fall apart, their preceding common action corresponds either to weak coordination or strong coordination. When actors hold congruent beliefs but compete for resources Fenger and Klok entertain the possibility of both weak coordination and strong coordination (which at a later stage dissolves) and Zafonte and Sabatier predict strong coordination. Fenger and Klok’s predictions, although it should be admitted that their prediction (weak or stronger) is rather safe, appear more likely to be in line with the empirical findings.

The second aspect to be observed is that during the first nine years of the higher education system, actors were relatively independent from each other. Public sectors in industrialised countries are to a large extent dependent on government. In Mozambique however, the public higher education institutions were largely independent from government. Public institutions were financially

\textsuperscript{30} Fenger and Klok’s aim was not only to predict different forms of coalition behaviour. They also stressed that coalition behaviour occurs under different circumstances. They therefore gave different labels to similar outcomes of interaction.
dependent on the GoM, but having autonomy, they could negotiate their funding directly with the Ministry of Planning and Finance. Rectors and Ministers, were both appointed by the President, which gave the former a powerful position and high status. However, ACF is generally applied to subsystems where actors are dependent on each other and strong forms of interaction are generally developed. During the first ten years of the Mozambican higher education system, policy change was affected by weak forms of interaction.

On the basis of these empirical findings for the greater part of the period studied, that is from 1993-2002, the expectations are verified. The nature of interdependency, which is influenced by the type of resources actors hold, is indeed relevant for the type of interaction between actors. As for the period 2003, the expectations of neither Zafonte and Sabatier nor Fenger and Klok are sustained. The expectations of Fenger and Klok are closer to our empirical findings than Zafonte and Sabatier. Although the expectations of Fenger and Klok do not match the empirical findings, rejecting their predictions requires caution. One year is too short to reach firm conclusions. Maybe from 2004 onwards, as actors, who spent efforts and time on weak coordination, notice that their activities have not lead to the desired policy outcomes, decide to withdraw and the coalition falls apart. Before that happens, the actors must engage in weak or strong coordination, which indeed happened in 2003.

**Expectation 3a**
Major policy change happens infrequently, that is only after a decade or more.

**Expectation 3b**
If major change occurs, it is due to changes external to the subsystem.

As expectation 3a and 3b are closely related, the testing of these expectations is worked out in one and the same section.

From the analysis of higher education changes in Sub Saharan Africa, to which Mozambique is no exception, it could be argued that policy changes took place frequently after decolonisation. ACF distinguishes between major policy changes that take place infrequently and minor policy change that take place frequently. It is worthwhile seeing if this hypothesis that links type of policy with frequency of change also holds in turbulent setting of Mozambique.

ACF provides a theoretical construct that distinguishes major policy change from minor policy change. In this theoretical framework belief systems are synonymous with perceptions of policy, as in the case of policy goals and government programmes and perceptions about how to reach objectives (policy instruments and causal relations) or perception as to the magnitude of the
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problem. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith hold that major policy change refers to change in the policy core, and minor policy change refers to secondary aspects. A major policy change occurs, for instance, when the government would decide to abolish freedom of religious education and only allow public education. This policy issue is related to the basic core value that people can be raised and educated according to their religion. A minor policy change refers, for instance, to the authorisation of private higher education institutions, which can relate to policy questions concerning secondary aspects such as how to expand higher education without further burden on public funding. Core beliefs concerning policies, relating to basic values and fundamental normative precepts, generally change slowly because they tend to be fixed in people’s mind. One does not simply put these core beliefs aside. To change people’s core belief external shocks or forces from outside the policy subsystem are needed. External factors, for example socio-economic conditions and impacts from other subsystems, are assumed to be relatively stable. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith assert that these shocks occur infrequently. Since policy cores impinge on practically all actors and regulations in the subsystem, attempts at major change is generally complex and protracted.

Secondary beliefs on the other hand, relate to instrumental decisions of weight in specific aspects of the problem, do change more rapidly. Actors tend to compromise on this aspect of policy as long as the core of the belief stays intact. Moreover, policy learning often involves frequently changing thoughts on secondary aspects. Finally, in contrast to policy core beliefs, secondary learning concerns only aspects of the subsystem. Attempts at minor changes are less complex because it concerns actors and regulations. Secondary aspects change as a result of interaction in the subsystem, through negotiation, compromises or policy learning.

Until the early 1990s, higher education policy solely reflected the government’s will. The perceptions and beliefs of other actors were neglected. Though open dispute about policy beliefs is a key element in ACF, this was not possible. In the early 1990s, the government abandoned the strict socialist doctrine and embraced a new liberal constitution. For higher education it implied adopting a new law for higher education, Law nr.1/93. The act had major consequences: with the introduction of autonomy of universities, government oversight and control were reduced considerably. All rectors were appointed to the CNES, which showed the government believed that the role of rectors in advising the Council of Ministers on higher education matters should carry weight. This major policy change was the result of the GoM embracing a new political ideology in the early 1990s. In ACF terms the policy change was caused due to changes in (stable) factors outside the subsystem.

No major policy changes took place during the following seven years. With establishment of MESCT in 2000 the second major policy change took place. A major policy change because it related to the “(re)distribution of authority”. This type of change is taken up in Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s “list of topics” under the rubric of major policy change (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p. 133).
It was driven by forces external to the subsystem. In ACF terms it was due to changes in the dynamic factors, i.e. change in government. The new elected GoM, under the pressure from rectors, put higher education on top of its agenda. The GoM responded to the problems identified in higher education. It believed higher education could play a key role in the reducing of poverty.

Two years later, in 2002, a further switch in policy took place, and was closely related to the major policy change in 2000. The systemic coalition, which was dominant, gave further meaning to system-wide policy and developed new coordination mechanisms amongst key actors. The policy goal, coincided with the policy core topic “distribution of authority between actors”. The rectors, disagreeing on the proposed coordination mechanisms, left the systemic coalition and formed a separate coalition, the autonomy coalition. Whilst the autonomy coalition agreed on the principles for the need for system-wide policy, they believed this to be the detriment of the autonomy of higher education institutions. The autonomy coalition therefore pushed for more power for rectors. Law nr.5/03 on higher education defined the new coordination mechanisms and affected the whole higher education system. Not a greatly difficult task since the actors in this system were few. The policy change of 2002 was a dubious case whereby secondary aspects coincided with policy core belief topics and had impact on the whole system. The latter policy change was caused by interaction between the two coalitions and not by external factors outside the higher education system.

Between 1993-2003, three specific policy changes took place. Those of 1993 and 2000 qualify as major policy change. The policy of 2002 was ambiguous, the change laying across major and minor policy change. The first major change in 1993 was driven by changes in fundamental norms about social and political constructs. The second policy change of 2000 was urged on by external factors, a new elected government following the wish of rectors and representatives of the former government to establish a national coordination unit to steer higher education. The reform of 2002 was the product of interaction between actors in the higher education system. The assertion that major change happens infrequently is not substantiated by the empirical findings of Mozambique. Major policy change took place more frequently than ACF expected. However, major policy change occurs in response to changes external to the subsystem, for the period 1993-2000, is verified. The later policy change, which we indicated was dubious, derived from interaction between actors.

The expectation that major policy changes happen infrequently is not confirmed. Mozambique proves yet again to be a case that includes characteristics, which in industrialised countries are seldom present or absent. Expectations about the infrequency of major policy change cannot be falsified solely on the basis of this study. The first policy change was a consequence of changes in the political construct, which Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith assume occurs seldom. Given that they have not analysed cases where policy change is
the result of changes in political constructs, ACF does not specify further the implications for the variables included in the model.

The Mozambican case demonstrated that a change in the political constellation at national level had huge consequence for the higher education system precisely because basic laws and regulations had to be laid down. All initiatives were to bring change about in Mozambique. Actors’ priority in higher education was to build a higher education system, developing basic regulations, policies and other political institutions the higher education system demanded. Beliefs required amplification, shaping the role of government and rectors in higher education transformed. The policy core of the systemic coalition, which dominated for ten years, specifically aimed to change in higher education across the whole system.

A central characteristic for a new subsystem that develops almost out of the blue is that all political institutions have to be developed from a similar condition. Mozambican actors with decision-making power were few, the number of embedded regulations and institutions limited. Grin and Hoppe (1997), John (2003) Kübler (2003) point out that institutions, such as intermediate organisations, voting systems, the division of powers, the salience of the higher courts are of consequences. They can promote and block reforms. They affect the speed of policy change. In the Mozambican higher education system the dominant systemic coalition promoted and advanced policy change. This dominant coalition experienced little resistance due to the non-existence of other actors and institutions that could block change. Moreover, no other actors with authority, power, or a complex decision-making procedure were present to slow down the processes for major policy change.

9.2.1 Summary of the findings

In sum, this research reminds us we have to be very careful in drawing firm conclusions. First, the period when we studied higher education in Mozambique was relatively short; second, it bears upon a context on which more research is required. Yet, it can be concluded that ACF is built on basic assumptions, which generally apply to stable industrialised countries but not to countries with a high degree of civil and political turbulence. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith assume that, no matter under what conditions a nascent subsystem emerges, the subsystem involves of a large number of actors. Second, they assume that subsystems consist of more than one policy core. Actors will always have enduring conflicting perceptions about policy issues and topics. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith assume further that environmental factors outside the subsystem are relatively stable and consequently major policy change is infrequent. This study shows that these assumptions need to be questioned. They do not pertain only to the Mozambican case. Before definitive conclusion can be drawn on those aspects of ACF studied, more research is
needed of cases where systems are established de novo and operate in a turbulent environment.

9.3 Reflection

In a setting were actors press for radical policy change and have practically to develop key political institutions and regulations from the baseline, ACF provided a useful theoretical framework.

ACF takes the subsystem as the unit of analysis. By focussing on the subsystem Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith point out it is not only the so-called “iron triangle”, administrative agencies, legislative committees and interest groups at a single level of government that draw up and implement policy. Rather, policy is the result of interaction of actors from different organisations in society - actors from government, bureaucracy, donors, interests groups who seek to influence public decisions in a policy area. In Mozambique, although the system was small, it was essential to focus on all actors, also outside the government, who pushed for policy change. In the Mozambican case, rectors, not part of the so-called iron triangle, played a key role in the policy processes throughout decade. Gradually, especially after MESCT was established in 2000, more people entered the higher education system, not as part of the government, but representing key organisations engaged in higher education.

Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith aggregate the range of actors in the system into a smaller sub-category, namely an advocacy coalition. Their point of departure in developing this aggregate, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith assume that the subsystem always consists of a considerable range of actors. They believe it necessary to disaggregate this into smaller and theoretically useful subsets. In the Mozambican case, the subsystem did not consist of a considerable range of actors. Yet, the principle role of coalitions in policy processes remains essential, and especially practical in the hectic arena where actors seek to develop many and diverse sets of policies and regulations and initiate a large number of activities at the same time. ACF is a helpful theoretical tool that distinguishes core policy issues from secondary aspects. Within this framework, actors in the subsystem form coalitions by coalescing around core issues of the policy. Subsequently, coalition actors develop common strategies around these core beliefs to insert them into the government’s agenda. This distinction allowed us first to select on which activities and exchanges to concentrate. Second, it permits identification of activities closely interrelated and viewed as a set of actions that reinforce each other in realising specific core goals and finally activities to be analysed separately relating to secondary aspects of a policy. By concentrating on the coalitions through which actors act on the basis of their beliefs, a researcher can make sense of the enormous amount of activities taking place.
All activities, policy initiatives, and discussions were categorised and with the core aspects as first focus. Discussions and policy documents revealed that the core issue in the higher education system focused on the division of authority between the higher education institutions and the GoM. Who participated in the discussion on this specific core issue was analysed and those actors who developed common activities to drive the policy in a particular direction. As actions are based on beliefs, we could get clear insights in individuals’ position, their motivations, and reasoning why policy should proceed in a certain direction. The focus on beliefs provided rich material and fascinating insights into the policy processes. Attention was paid to the secondary aspects. Distinguishing core aspects from secondary aspects is that these latter activities can be analysed separately, as was the case with the HEP 1 project of the World Bank. Occasionally, the distinction between core or secondary aspects of a policy was not always evident and clear. For instance, when MESCT put forward proposals for the new coordination mechanisms, the policy change could relate both to the policy core and to the secondary aspects.

Finally, ACF shows that subsystems function in a wider context of stable factors (fundamental socio-cultural values and basic constitutional structures), external system events (changes in socio-economic conditions and changes in systemic governing coalitions) and resources. This context is essential. It can affect actors’ beliefs and also constrain their actions. Thus for instance the incoming government in 1999 decided to establish a new Ministry focusing specifically on higher education, including science and technology. The insights of Fenger and Klok substantiate the conclusion that actors’ resources are likely to determine the ability to move governmental programmes in a certain direction. Thus the HEP 1 project helped MESCT rally support from key actors to realise policy goals.

ACF identifies key variables in the policy processes. Research has a theoretical tool and a practical purchase to analyse and explain policy changes. Key to ACF is that policy change occurs when beliefs change and actors’ perceptions of policies who come together to influence the government programme. In this respect, ACF applies also to the turbulent context of Mozambique. Even so, some aspects of the theoretical framework did not match with the empirical findings: actors beliefs did not fragment in the new higher education system that emerged out of new issues or a new conceptualisation; throughout the ten years actors engaged in weak forms of interaction and major policies occurred more often than expected.

That these aspects of ACF were not born out by the empirical findings stemmed from the circumstance characteristics of the Mozambican higher education system and its context. As can be derived from Chapter 2, many countries in Sub Saharan Africa and other developing countries outside Africa have similar characteristics. ACF is generally applied to subsystems, nascent and mature, with established fundamental structures and key political institutions and regulations. Contrary to this, the present research studied the dynamics of a
nascent subsystem in a turbulent country. It showed that the dynamics around policy processes can differ in countries in which fundamental structural elements are laid down (basic laws and regulations on decision making power, new institutions to implement and control the law) compared to countries where all efforts are directed at establishing these structural elements. Arguably, the notion of new subsystems emergence merits further refinement. Subsystems can also emerge after radical changes in the political constellation; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith refer to these changes as changes in the “stable factors outside the subsystem”. Changes in stable factors (new perceptions and political and social constructs) affect all subsystems. They may thoroughly overhaul the system by redirecting the role of a sector or sweep away imminent principles of governance.

Fenger and Klok’s predictions of the type of common action that flowed from actors’ beliefs and resources were supported, although not fully, by the empirical findings. Whether resources were the key factor in determining the outcome of coalition behaviour, may be questioned. In systems constituted ab initio, other factors may also have shaped coalition behaviour. If all actors aim for change, agreeing to establish system-wide policy for higher education and if the system consists of few institutions to block change, weak coordination will be enough to realise goals.

One may question whether the frequency of major policy changes, which Sabatier and Jenkins predict to happen after a decade or more, is valid for new or emerging systems in turbulent contexts. Arguably, change will happen more frequently for the reasons just mentioned, namely the absence or low number of political institutions and the fact that actors’ attention concentrates primarily on realising the establishment of institutions and policies. The assumption that major change requires forces outside the subsystem can be questioned in subsystems starting afresh. This research did verify Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s prediction that major changes happen due to changes external to the subsystem. In 2002, however, a policy change took place that lay between minor and major policy change. The policy affected the whole higher education system. As the actors’ priority was to establish new policies and institutions to make the system work, many changes in regulations and policies that are to follow will relate to the core aspect “distribution of authority” and will affect the whole higher education system. It is likely for this to happen in absence of external forces.

The research conducted here suggests that ACF needs to be refined further. The theoretical framework makes certain assumptions, e.g. large numbers of actors in subsystems, policy cores consisting of intertwined issues, a stable environment, all of which are generally taken for granted in industrialised countries, but do not apply to turbulent countries such as Mozambique. A good case can be made for more research on nascent subsystems, established following political ideological changes at national level under volatile
conditions. Such research should address questions concerning the duration of these nascent subsystems and factors that influence (block or speed up) processes of maturation. The forms of interaction between actors should be scrutinised, and attention paid to the role of institutions (their absence or sparseness) on policy change. Finally how the characteristics of such subsystems influence the frequency of major policy change, merits closer attention.

Given the importance of the knowledge society, many governments in non-industrialised countries are (re)considering the role of higher education and envisage system-wide changes in higher education. This is, first and foremost, relevant for the younger generations in these countries. For higher education research the changes offer above all empirical materials to test ACF further.
Epilogue

In February 2005 the newly elected GoM changed the organisational structure of the Government. Some Ministries were dissolved and new ones established. MESCT was one of the Ministries dissolved. Higher education became part of the Ministry of Education and Culture\(^\text{31}\) (MEC) and a new Ministry for Science and Technology (MST) was established. As indicated by some of the staff from the former MESCT, this decision came out of the blue. According to Brito et al (2005) the decision is probably related to the following factors:

- Changes in political priorities as a result of the election of a new president: the current government is more concerned with the middle tier of the education system and in particular places priority on technical and vocational training as a means to enhance students’ chances on the labour market, while at the same time reducing the pressure on general secondary schools. Tertiary (university) education in this perspective plays a subordinate role;
- The relatively small size of the higher education sector; primary schools alone cater for over three million learners compared to the 20,000+ students in higher education;
- The relatively small amount of direct government interventions: as higher education institutions are autonomous or private, the government’s administrative effort is extremely small compared to the other sectors which are directly managed by MEC;
- The desire for autonomy of higher education institutions: most likely certain institutions were not at ease with the way in which the Ministry was steering the sector and feared the loss of autonomy in an integrated higher education system under MESCT (Brito et al, 2005, p. 13).

Whatever the reason was to split the Ministry, these developments once again show that higher education is developing in an instable environment. Of course it is too early to assess the consequences of this latest change for the higher education policy. However, the new developments raise a couple of questions with respect to the consequences for further policy development. For instance how will this affect the nascent subsystem maturing processes? What are the consequences of this for coalition formation in the higher education system? The actors in the higher education system changed. In the new situation the MEC is the actor that formally guides the higher education institutions whereas in the previous situation MESCT had this task. It will be interesting to see how this affects the relation between the GoM (through the MEC) and the rector and consequently the policy processes. In the new situation the higher

\(^{31}\) The Ministry of Culture was also dissolved and is now accommodated by the Ministry of Education
education institutions reside under a Minister who most likely will spend most of the time on the other education sectors given their large size. During the days of MESCT they fell under a specialised Ministry where the Minister devoted 100% of her time to higher education, science and technology. It is likely that in such a situation there is more interaction between the Minister and the institutions. Characteristic for the Minister of ESCT was that a lot of effort was made to inform or be informed by all actors in the system. In this way the Minister could mobilise resources for these institutions to realise its goals. On the other hand the Minister could also block certain developments if particular activities of universities were not in line with the PEES or against the law on higher education. In the new situation, one can question who will promote higher education institutions’ interests? Will rectors have more room for manoeuvre to realise goals according to their own vision? Will rectors become more powerful in the new higher education system?

We concluded that the Mozambican higher education system was, in ACF terms, after ten years still nascent. Due to the recent developments, some aspects of the policy will be delayed because the MEC is in the process of organisational restructuring. If the MEC intends to or is able to build on the policies initiated by MESCT it is likely that this system matures further. Yet, if MEC decides to again change key aspects in the coordination mechanisms defined in Law nr.03/05 on higher education, or if rectors are able to do so, the nascent higher education system will stand still for extra years.

Although much is unclear for the moment, one thing is for certain; during the days of MESCT higher education went through an exciting period...
Nederlandse samenvatting

Inleiding

Universiteiten in Afrika, zoals in vele ontwikkelingslanden elders in de wereld, hebben het westers model van een academische organisatie overgenomen. De koloniale mogendheden beschouwden deze instellingen als een verlengstuk van het hoger onderwijs systeem in het moederland. Na de onafhankelijkheid stond onderwijs, inclusief hoger onderwijs, hoog op de agenda van regeringen omdat werd verondersteld dat (hoger) onderwijs zou bijdragen aan natievorming en de ontwikkeling van het land. Aangenomen werd dat hoger onderwijs hoog gekwalificeerde mensen zou leveren die het kader zouden vormen dat was weggevallen sinds de kolonisten waren vertrokken. Tevens werden universiteiten gezien als een symbool van prestige. Met name in de jaren ’60 en ’70 staken regeringen en donor organisaties zoals de Wereld Bank, regionale ontwikkelingsbanken en bilaterale hulp organisaties, veel geld in het hoger onderwijs ten einde het land snel op te bouwen.

Door de snelle groei in het hoger onderwijs gedurende de jaren ’70, leken de ontwikkelingen in deze sector in eerste instantie succesvol. Echter in de loop der jaren kwam er steeds meer kritiek, omdat werd gemeend dat hoger onderwijs onvoldoende had bijgedragen aan de ontwikkeling van het land. Ondanks de vele investeringen in het hoger onderwijs, verslechterde de situaties in veel Afrikaanse landen. Mede door de economische achteruitgang in de jaren ’80 voelden vele regeringen in Sub Sahara Afrika zich genoodzaakt de bijdrage aan het hoger onderwijs te verminderen. Daarnaast veranderde ook de visie van vele donor organisaties zoals bijvoorbeeld de Wereld Bank. Zij meenden dat de “rate of return” van basis onderwijs vele malen hoger was dan hoger onderwijs. Om deze reden besloten zij hun financiële steun aan het hoger onderwijs te reduceren. In de tussentijd steeg echter de vraag naar hoger onderwijs en groeide de instroom. De toenemende instroom in het hoger onderwijs enerzijds en de dalende financiering anderzijds leidde tot onvoldoende capaciteit in de universiteiten. Dit had negatieve gevolgen voor de kwaliteit van onderzoek en onderwijs.

De instanties die voorheen hun financiële bijdragen aan hoger onderwijs hadden verminderd, toonden een decennium later, in de jaren ’90, weer belangstelling voor de sector. Hun opvattingen waren weer veranderd en zij meenden nu dat hoger onderwijs essentieel was voor het leveren van hoog gekwalificeerde arbeidskrachten. Veel regeringen en donoren in Sub Sahara Afrika vergrootten daarom hun investeringen in deze sector. Tegelijkertijd voerden zij in samenwerking met universiteiten “systeem veranderingen” in ten aanzien van financiering en sturing van het hoger onderwijs (Sawyerr, 2002).
Opvallend aan bovenstaande ontwikkelingen is dat het beleid ten aanzien van de sector frequent veranderde en dat ook de context turbulent was. Dit onderzoek richt zich op veranderingen van het hoger onderwijs beleid in Mozambique. Mozambique is een interessante case vanwege haar roerige geschiedenis in de afgelopen 40 jaar die tevens voor grote veranderingen in het hoger onderwijs heeft gezorgd. Het hoger onderwijs is sinds de oprichting van de eerste universiteit in 1962, in grote mate beïnvloed door de verschillende ideologieën die regeringen er op na hielden. Het eerste “hoger onderwijs systeem” (1962-1974), dat slechts bestond uit één universiteit, was gevormd door de ideologie van de Portugese kolonisten. In de praktijk betekende dit dat het slechts toegankelijk was voor rijke Portugese. Na de onafhankelijkheid volgde de nieuwe regering van Mozambique een Marxistisch-Leninistische ideologie. Van 1974 tot het begin van de jaren ‘90, had Mozambique drie publieke universiteiten die centraal werden aangestuurd. Dit betekende dat alles centraal werd voorgeschreven; curriculum, personeel, studenten en de infrastructuur. In de jaren ‘90 veranderde de Mozambikaanse regering weer van ideologie. Het strikt socialistische regime werd van de hand gedaan waarvoor liberalisme in de plaats kwam dat was gebaseerd op democratie en vrije markt werking. In lijn met de nieuwe politieke ideologie werd het hoger onderwijs vrijwel volledig hervormd.

Onderzoeksdoelen en vragen

Bovenstaande ontwikkelingen vormen het uitgangspunt van dit proefschrift. Het heeft twee doelvlindenden. Het eerste doel is om een gedetailleerde analyse te geven van de ontwikkelingen van het Mozambikaanse hoger onderwijs in de periode 1993-2003. We beschrijven de ontwikkelingen van een hoger onderwijs systeem dat praktisch geheel vanaf de grond moest worden opgebouwd in een turbulent context. Het tweede doel is om aan de hand van dit empirisch materiaal een bijdrage te leveren aan theorievorming over beleidsontwikkelingen en -veranderingen. Aan de hand van het door Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith ontwikkelde theoretische raamwerk, the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), dat als doel heeft beleidsprocessen en veranderingen te verklaren, worden de veranderingen van het Mozambikaanse hoger onderwijsbeleid geïnterpreteerd. Kort gezegd stelt ACF dat actoren, op grond van hun opvatting, coalities vormen en strategieën ontwikkelen ten einde deze opvattingen te realiseren in beleid. Dit onderzoek stelt de vraag aan de orde of dit theoretisch raamwerk, dat ontwikkeld is in westere geïndustrialiseerde samenlevingen, zoals vrijwel alle andere theoretische raamwerken, ook van toepassing is op de turbulent context waarin het Mozambikaanse hoger onderwijs zich ontwikkelt. Enerzijds is de context turbulent omdat het land te maken heeft met een jonge en zwakke democratie die zich nog verder moet ontwikkelen. Anderzijds tracht de Mozambikaanse regering het hoger onderwijs drastisch te hervormen.
Gegeven de bovengenoemde onderzoeksdoelen staan de volgende onderzoeksfragen in dit proefschrift centraal:

Hoe heeft het Mozambikaanse hoger onderwijs beleid zich ontwikkeld over de periode 1993-2003? Hoe kunnen de processen en uitkomsten verklaard worden?

Aan de hand van deze hoofdvraag zijn de volgende subvragen geformuleerd:

- Waarom werd een verandering in het hoger onderwijs beleid geïnitieerd en wat waren de verdere ontwikkelingen?
- Wie initieerde dit beleid? Hoe reageerden actoren op het nieuwe hoger onderwijs beleid?
- Hoe kunnen de beleidsprocessen, ten aanzien van het Mozambicaans hoger onderwijs geconceptualiseerd en verklaard worden vanuit het perspectief van ACF?
- In welke mate wordt op grond van de empirie de theoretische verklaring zoals weergeven door ACF, ondersteund of weerlegd?

Theorie

ACF stelt zich als doel beleidsprocessen en beleidsverandering te verklaren. Het theoretisch raamwerk kent een aantal fundamentele concepten, te weten: beleidssubsysteem, beleidscoalities, opvattingen (beleidsvisies), hulpbronnen en "de omgeving van het beleidssubsysteem" (Sabatier en Jenkins-Smith, 1993).

Beleidssubsysteem

Het beleidssubsysteem bestaat uit alle actoren die een rol spelen bij de besluitvorming, uitvoering en evaluatie van een beleid. Deze groep moet breed worden opgevat; hieronder vallen onder meer politici, ambtenaren, belangengroepen, wetenschappers, adviesorganen, denktanks en journalisten. Deze actoren kunnen afkomstig zijn uit verschillende beleidsterreinen. Sabatier en Jenkins-Smith veronderstellen dat elk subsysteem bestaat uit een groot aantal actoren van zowel publieke- als private instellingen.

Een beleidsprobleem is niet noodzakelijk beperkt tot 1 beleidsterrein, maar kan verschillende terreinen overlappen. Actoren vanuit verschillende beleidsterreinen zullen vanuit hun achtergrond en belangen proberen het beleid te beïnvloeden. Bij een plan voor verandering van een rivierdelta bijvoorbeeld, kunnen o.a. betrokken zijn: milieubeweging, belangenvereniging voor toerisme, vertegenwoordigers van rivierentransport, het bedrijfsleven, regionale-,
provinciale- en landelijke bestuurders, visserij, en de vereniging voor watersporters (p. 24).

Nieuwe subsysteem kunnen op verschillende manieren ontstaan: 1) als “spin-off” van een bestaand subsysteem, bijvoorbeeld wanneer een groep actoren meent dat bepaalde deelproblemen niet voldoende aandacht krijgen binnen een bestaand subsysteem, of 2) wanneer nieuwe beleidsonderwerpen van belang worden of bestaande beleidsonderwerpen herzien en opnieuw geconceptualiseerd worden. De oorsprong van het ontstaan van een subsysteem heeft consequenties voor de opvattingen van actoren en coalities. In het eerste geval verwachten Sabatier en Jenkins-Smith duidelijk te onderscheiden coalities met heldere opvattingen die lang stand houden (afspiegeling van reeds bestaande groepen). Echter, wanneer een subsysteem ontstaat doordat nieuwe beleidsonderwerpen van belang worden of doordat bestaande beleidsonderwerpen opnieuw worden geconceptualiseerd, dan hebben coalities volgens de theorie gefragmenteerde opvattingen die vaag zijn en snel kunnen veranderen. In deze situaties veranderen actoren ook dikwijls van coalitie (p. 26).

Beleidcoalities

Binnen een subsysteem vormen actoren beleidsoalities. De leden van de coalitie delen dezelfde opvattingen over het beleid en trachten door middel van gecoördineerd handelen overheidsbeleid te beïnvloeden. De strategieën die zij hierbij ontwikkelen richten zich bijvoorbeeld op het trachten te veranderen van percepties van politieke sleutelfiguren of de samenleving, door informatie en kennis te verschaffen of door de wetgevende macht er toe te zetten bepaalde regelgeving of budgetten te veranderen.

Twee typen coalities kunnen worden onderscheiden: dominante- en minderheidsoalities. De dominant coalitie bepaalt in grote mate het regeringsprogramma (p. 35).

Opvattingen (beleidsovisies)

Één van de kernpunten binnen ACF is de opvattingen van actoren ten aanzien van beleid. Beleidskeuzes en acties om beleid te beïnvloeden zijn gebaseerd op opvattingen. Sabatier en Jenkins-Smith stellen dat beleidsovisies uit drie niveaus bestaan, namelijk de diepe kern, de beleidskern en secundaire aspecten. Het meest abstract is het niveau van de diepe kern. Deze bestaat uit de fundamentele normatieve en ontologische opvattingen, ook gemakshalve persoonlijke filosofie over het leven genoemd. Deze persoonlijke filosofie is van invloed op alle beleidsterreinen. Het volgende niveau is dat van de beleidskern die bestaat uit de beleidsstrategieën en voorkeuren die nodig zijn om opvattingen uit de diepe kern binnen het concrete beleidssysteem te verwezenlijken. Het zijn met name de visies uit de beleidskern die ertoe leiden dat actoren elkaar vinden in een coalitie. Ten slotte bestaan de secundaire
aspecten uit de instrumentele beslissingen die nodig zijn om de beleidskern in een specifiek subsysteem te implementeren. De leden van een coalitie zijn geneigd een compromis te sluiten wanneer zij onenigheid hebben over secundaire aspecten ten einde hun hoofddoel, de beleidskern, in stand te houden en te realiseren in beleid.

Sommige aspecten van een beleid en beleidsvisie veranderen sneller dan andere. ACF verklaart dit doordat naarmate het niveau van de beleidsvisies meer abstract wordt, de stabilité van deze visies groter zal zijn. Secundaire aspecten veranderen sneller dan de beleidskern die op haar beurt weer sneller verandert dan de diepe kern.

Sabatier en Jenkins-Smith onderscheiden kleine beleidsveranderingen van grote beleidsveranderingen. Kleine beleidsveranderingen zijn het gevolg van veranderingen in opvattingen over de secundaire aspecten. De veranderingen betreffen bepaalde aspecten van een beleid en zijn van invloed op een groep binnen een subsysteem. De veranderingen zijn veelal het gevolg van beleidsgericht leren (policy learning) wat inhoudt dat actoren door hun ervaring en kennis tot nieuwe inzichten komen, bijvoorbeeld over de oorzaak van problemen, causale verbanden of het succesvol realiseren van beleid. Veranderingen in de secundaire aspecten worden veroorzaakt door interactie tussen actoren binnen het subsysteem.

Grote beleidsverandering hebben betrekking op vrijwel alle aspecten van een beleid en alle actoren in een subsysteem. Grote beleidsveranderingen zijn volgens ACF het gevolg van krachten in de omgeving van een subsysteem. Factoren in de omgeving kunnen ertoe leiden dat de opvattingen over de beleidskern van een dominante coalitie veranderen. Tevens is het mogelijk dat deze externe factoren resulteren in de vervanging van de dominante coalitie door een minderheidscoalitie die de mogelijkheid krijgt het beleid te domineren. De weerstand tegen processen van beleidsverandering kan worden verklaard door de grote mate van stabiliteit van de beleidskern.

Volgens Sabatier en Jenkins-Smith komen veranderingen in de diepe kern zelden voor. Een verandering in de diepe kern zou veroorzaakt moeten worden door verandering in stabiele factoren in de omgeving van het subsysteem (p. 28).

De omgeving van het beleidssubsysteem

Sabatier en Jenkins-Smith maken een onderscheid tussen stabiele factoren en dynamische factoren in de omgeving. Van stabiele factoren, zoals de sociale structuur of constitutionele regels, wordt verondersteld dat zij zelden veranderen. De dynamische factoren bestaan o.a. uit sociaal- economische condities, regeringscoalities en beslissingen uit andere beleidsvelden. ACF stelt dat deze laatste factoren wel aan veranderingen onderhevig zijn maar dat de tijdspanne hiervoor aanzienlijk is, namelijk een decennium of meer.
**Hulpbronnen**

Hulpbronnen zijn van groot belang voor de coalities aangezien deze hun mogelijkheden vergroten om een beleid te beïnvloeden. De verdeling van hulpbronnen wordt bepaald door de omgeving van een subsysteem, bijvoorbeeld wanneer sprake is van een politieke machtsverschuiving waardoor nieuwe actoren de kans krijgen het beleid richting te geven. De belangrijkste hulpbronnen zijn geld en macht (p. 21).

ACF stelt kortom dat beleidsveranderingen tot stand komen op twee verschillende manieren: 1) door interactie van coalities in een subsysteem die door middel van beleidsgericht leren hun opvattingen vertalen in beleid en 2) door veranderingen in de omgeving van een subsysteem waardoor opvattingen van een domineante coalitie veranderen of een minderheidscoalitie de mogelijkheid krijgt de plaats van een dominante in te nemen.

Gezien de specifieke situatie in Mozambique zijn er twee vragen te stellen bij de toepasbaarheid van het zeer algemene ACF. Ten eerste kan men zich afvragen of ACF van toepassing is op landen die gekarakteriseerd worden door een turbulente en instabiele omgeving. Ten tweede kan de vraag worden gesteld wat de consequenties voor beleidsprocessen zijn wanneer zij zich ontwikkelen in nieuwe en jonge subsysteem. ACF is voornamelijk toegepast op stabiele subsystemen die reeds lang bestaan en waarin actoren een duidelijk positie en taak hebben. Kortom: strekt ACF zich ook uit tot dit type systemen?

**Verwachtingen**

het type gedrag van actoren bepaalt. Op basis van deze veronderstellingen stellen zij de volgende tabel op.

Table 13: Coalitie gedrag als gevolg van interdependentie en beleidsvisies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interdependentie</th>
<th>Beleidsvisies</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Symbiotisch</td>
<td>Congruent</td>
<td>Indifferent</td>
<td>Divergent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sterke coördinatie</td>
<td>Gelegenheidscoalitie</td>
<td>onstabil conflict, depolitisering, leren</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geen afhankelijkheid</td>
<td>zwakke coördinatie</td>
<td>geen coalitie</td>
<td>zwak conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitief</td>
<td>Coalities met ernstige problemen van collectieve actie</td>
<td>zwak conflict</td>
<td>sterk conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Cel 1 geeft aan als er sprake is symbiotische interdependenties en congruentie van beleidsvisies, verwacht kan worden dat actoren deel uit zullen maken van dezelfde coalitie en dat binnen die coalitie sterke coördinatie plaatsvindt. Omdat actoren symbiotische afhankelijk zijn van elkaar zijn ze door coo’rdinatie van hun activiteiten ook nog eens beter in staat hun gemeenschappelijke doeleinden te realiseren. Cel 9 duidt aan dat in een situatie van divergente beleidsvisies en competitieve interdependentie zich verschillende coalities zullen vormen die verschillende doeleinden hebben en waarbij als gevolg van de competitieve interdependentie het bereiken van een doel van de ene actor ten koste gaat van de realisatie van een doel van een andere actor (Fenger, 2001, 92).

Samenvattend, dit onderzoek richt zich op het verloop van beleidsprocessen in 1) instabiele turbulente omgeving en 2) een jong subsysteem. Om deze processen in een dergelijk specifieke context te bestuderen concentreren we ons op de rol van beleidsvisies, hulpbronnen en coalitie gedrag. Op basis hiervan zijn vervolgens de volgende verwachtingen geformuleerd.

1. Verwachting ten aanzien van opvattingen over beleidsvisies in jonge subsysteemen

In jonge subsysteemen die ontstaan wanneer nieuwe beleidsonderwerpen van belang worden of bestaande beleidsonderwerpen herzien en opnieuw geconceptualiseerd worden, zijn beleidsvisies gefragmenteerd.
2. Verwachting ten aanzien van gedrag tussen actoren in subsystemen

Het gedrag van actoren is afhankelijk van zowel het type interdependentie als het type beleidsvisie.

3. Verwachtingen ten aanzien van grote beleidsveranderingen

A. Grote beleidsveranderingen (hierbij refererend aan veranderingen in de beleidskern) vinden zelden plaats, slechts na een decennium of langer.

B. Indien grote beleidsveranderingen plaats vinden, is dit naar aanleiding van veranderingen in de omgeving van het subsysteem.

Empirische bevindingen


Beleidsontwikkelingen van het hoger onderwijs tussen 1993-1999


32 Conselho Nacional de Ensino Superior
33 Wat een subsysteem wordt genoemd in het ACF wordt in het domein van hoger onderwijs studies systeem genoemd. In de rest van deze studie wordt de term hoger onderwijs systeem gebruikt wanneer er gefereerd wordt naar actoren die het hoger onderwijs trachten te vormen.
leveren om de arbeidsmarkt te voorzien, was de instroom van studenten uit Noord en Centraal Mozambique relatief laag (60% van de studenten kwam uit het zuiden, 25% uit centraal gelegen provincies en 15% uit het Noorden), was er een hoge uitval onder studenten en verslechterden ten slotte onderzoek en onderwijs faciliteiten door o.a. financiële tekorten. Om deze problemen op een structurele wijze aan te pakken adviseerde de CNES aan het kabinet om beleid gericht op systeemverandering te ontwikkelen dat aangestuurd en gecoördineerd zou moeten worden door een nationaal overheidsorgaan. De actoren verschillen van mening over het type overheidsorgaan dat noodzakelijk was. Sommigen prefereerden een eenheid binnen het bestaande ministerie van onderwijs (MINED). 34 anderen meenden dat er een volledig nieuw ministerie moest worden opgericht dat zich zou bezighouden met hoger onderwijs, wetenschap en technologie.

Kijkend naar de hulpbronnen waren de rectoren (de machtigste actoren in de universiteiten die vrijwel alle besluiten namen voor de instellingen) relatief onafhankelijk van de regering. Uiteraard waren de publieke instellingen financieel afhankelijk van de regering. Echter, de rectoren konden zonder enig tussenkomst van het MINED over hun begroting onderhandelen met het Ministerie van Financiën en Planning (MPF) en aangeven welke richting zij op wensten te gaan. Financiering was niet gebaseerd op prestaties maar op werkelijke uitgaven. Wettelijk gezien vielen de universiteiten onder het gezag van het MINED. In de praktijk bemoeide deze zich echter nauwelijks met de universiteiten. Elke instelling ontwikkelde haar eigen beleid t.a.v. bijvoorbeeld kwaliteitszorg en toelatingseisen.

Om hun gezamenlijk beleidsdoel te realiseren verenigden rectoren, representanten van de Mozambikaanse regering en provinciale overheden zich in een coalitie die wij het label *systemic coalition* hebben gegeven. Actoren in deze coalitie ontwikkelden een zwakke vorm van coördinatie. Zij probeerden op verschillende wijzen, bijvoorbeeld d.m.v. het organiseren van workshops, seminars en het uitvoeren van studies, de problemen in het hoger onderwijs aan de orde te stellen en de regering ertoe aan te zetten een nieuwe overheidsinstantie in het leven te roepen die hoger onderwijs op nationaal niveau zou aansturen. De in 1999 nieuw gekozen regering besloot op grond van deze adviezen een nieuw ministerie voor hoger onderwijs, wetenschap en technologie (MESCT)35 in het leven te roepen. In Januari 2000 werd het nieuwe ministerie daadwerkelijk opgericht.

*Beleidsontwikkelingen van het hoger onderwijs tussen 2000-2002*
Zodra MESCT vorm kreeg en nieuwe regelgeving en beleid ontwikkelde, bleek al gauw dat actoren onderling verschillende opvattingen hadden over de nieuwe coördinatie-mechanismen die het ministerie voorstelde. Het voorstel over deze mechanismen definieerde de bevoegdheden en machtsverdeling

34 Ministerio da Educação
35 Ministério do Ensino Superior, Ciência e Tecnologia
tussen MESCT en de universiteiten. Een meerderheid van de rectoren, met name van de oudere universiteiten, meenden dat hun macht aanzienlijk werd ingeperkt. Op het moment dat het breed geformuleerde beleid over de rol van MESCT concreet werd, stoppen een aantal rectoren hun steun aan de systemic coalition ten einde meer vrijheid en macht voor zichzelf te realiseren. Daar tegenover stond dat MESCT ervan overtuigd was dat het alleen mogelijk was een effectief nationaal hoger onderwijs systeem te ontwikkelen, wanneer het ministerie de leidende en coördinerende rol zou krijgen alsmede de uiteindelijke definitieve beslissingsmacht.

Wanneer de hulpbronnen in beschouwing worden genomen, blijkt dat de universiteiten meer afhankelijk werden van MESCT. Dit was mede veroorzaakt door het zogenaamde “Higher Education Project I” (HEP I), dat was ontwikkeld door de Wereldbank in samenwerking met MESCT en de universiteiten. Door middel van dit project (70 miljoen US dollars) kon MESCT financiële middelen mobiliseren en verdelen over de universiteiten (met name de publieke instellingen). MESCT was verantwoordelijk voor dit budget. Om in aanmerking te komen voor geld uit dit project dienden de universiteiten voorstellen te ontwikkelen die in lijn waren met het Strategische Plan 2000-2010 van MESCT. Dit breed geformuleerde strategisch plan was begin 2000 ontwikkeld door MESCT en goedgekeurd door de regering. Het strategisch plan was destijds breed gesteund door de rectoren. MESCT had de uiteindelijke beslissingsmacht over de wijze waarop de universiteiten het budget konden besteden. Aangezien het om grote bedragen ging, waren de publieke universiteiten hiermee financieel meer afhankelijk geworden van de overheid, (via MESCT) dan voorheen toen het ministerie nog niet bestond en zij zelf direct het geld ontvingen van de Wereldbank of via MPF. Aangezien de wet nr 1/93 nog formeel van toepassing was omdat de nieuw wet voor het hoger onderwijs nog in ontwikkeling was, waren rectoren wettelijk gezien relatief onafhankelijk van het ministerie. Strikt gesproken had MESCT nog geen gezag over de universiteiten of formele bevoegdheden om bijvoorbeeld toe te zien op de kwaliteit van het onderwijs en onderzoek.

Door de onenigheid over de nieuw voorgestelde coördinatie-mechanismen die de bevoegdheden van MESCT en de universiteiten definieerden, ontstond een zwakke vorm van conflict tussen de rectoren en MESCT. Om deze reden “verlieten” de rectoren de systemic coalition en vormden een nieuwe coalitie die als autonomy coalition is gelabeld. Deze coalitie streefde naar meer autonomie van universiteiten. Zowel de systemic coalition, waarbinnen MESCT de belangrijkste actor was, als de autonomy coalition probeerde door middel van lobbyen parlementariërs te beïnvloeden.

**Beleidsontwikkelingen van het hoger onderwijs in 2003**

Geleidelijk aan veranderde in 2003 de beleidsvisie van de autonomy coalition en leek deze zich in de richting van de opvattingen van actoren in de systemic coalition te verschuiven. De acties van MESCT, zoals bijvoorbeeld het mobiliseren van financiële middelen voor de instellingen en het creëren van
draagvlak bij verschillende partijen in de samenleving zoals b.v. het bedrijfsleven, docenten in de universiteiten en provincies, stemden de rectoren positief over MESCT. Zij zagen MESCT niet primair meer als een bedreiging maar juist als een steun.

De universiteiten waren in 2003 ten opzichte van voorgaande jaren meer afhankelijk geworden van MESCT. HEP I project was vanaf medio 2002 volledig van de grond gekomen. De publieke universiteiten gaven aan dat de financiële middelen uit HEP I project een aanzienlijk deel van het totaal budget van de instelling betrof. De Universiteit Eduardo Mondlane (de grootste universiteit van Mozambique) gaf bijvoorbeeld aan dat in 2003 20% van haar financiële middelen uit dit project kwam. Voor de Pedagogische Universiteit was dit zelfs 60% van haar totale budget. Inmiddels had het parlement eind 2002 de nieuwe wet nr.5/03 op het hoger onderwijs, die MESCT had ingediend, goedgekeurd. Hierbij had het ministerie ook de wettelijke gezaghebbende macht gekregen en kon zij cruciale besluiten nemen t.a.v. het hoger onderwijs beleid. Alle universiteiten, ook de privé instellingen vielen onder deze wet.

Door middel van zwakke coördinatie mechanismen had MESCT in feite één grote systemic coalition ontwikkeld waarin alle actoren, waaronder ook de rectoren, in ieder geval in 2003, de nieuwe beleidsvoorstellen steunden. De weerstand van de autonomie coalitie was verzwakt en het hoger onderwijs systeem bestond nog maar uit één coalitie, namelijk de systemic coalition.

Toetsen van de verwachtingen

1. Verwachting ten aanzien van opvattingen over beleidsvisies in jonge subsystemen

Wat betreft het eerste punt moet worden vastgesteld dat Mozambique een ongebruikelijk case is omdat het aantal actoren in het jonge hoger onderwijs systeem klein is. Alle beleidsproblemen betroffen het hoger onderwijs en alle actoren waren voornamelijk werkzaam in of verbonden met dit beleidsterrein. Alle actoren hadden vrijwel dezelfde beleidsvisie t.a.v. hoger onderwijs. Hoewel de rectoren voor een korte periode van opvatting veranderden, waren alle actoren van mening dat het hoger onderwijs op een andere wijze diende te
worden aangestuurd en gecoördineerd door de nationale overheid dan
voorheen het geval was. Sabatier en Jenkins-Smith veronderstellen echter dat
elk subsysteem uit een groot aantal actoren bestaat, waarbij zij verschillende
belangen behartigen en zijn verbonden met verschillende beleidsterreinen.
Daarnaast gaan Sabatier en Jenkins-Smith ervan uit dat actoren langdurige
conflicten hebben over de beleidskern. Zij komen tot deze conclusie omdat ACF
voornamelijk is toegepast op complexe subsysteem die inderdaad
verschillende beleidsterreinen en beleidsonderwerpen beslaan. Zij hebben
daardoor niet voorzien dat er ook jonge subsysteem bestaan die nog helemaal
van de grond moeten komen en waar zowel de actoren als instituties nog
ontwikkeld en gevormd moeten worden. Dit type jonge subsysteem bevat, in
eieder geval in het geval van Mozambique, een klein aantal actoren.

Aangezien er in 1993 nauwelijks een nationaal hoger onderwijs beleid
bestond, moest het beleid nog helemaal ontwikkeld worden. Actoren waren het
er over eens dat eerst de basis structuren van het hoger onderwijs dienden te
worden ontwikkeld, zoals reglementen en beleid over de te ontwikkelen taken
en verantwoordelijkheden, om überhaupt het hoger onderwijs systeem effectief
te kunnen laten functioneren. Toen eenmaal de taken en de verdeling van
macht was gedefinieerd in de wet nr.5/03 op het hoger onderwijs, was er ruimte
om andere belangrijke beleidsonderwerpen te behandelen, zoals bijvoorbeeld
het ontwikkelen van een kwaliteitszorgsysteem.

Hiermee zijn we bij het tweede punt aangekomen, namelijk dat
voorzichtigheid is geboden om conclusies te trekken uit het empirisch materiaal
dit onderzoek omdat de onderzochte tijdsperiode relatief kort was. Het is
goed mogelijk dat nu de coördinatie mechanismen gedefinieerd zijn, er nieuwe
beleidsvoorstellen worden ontwikkeld, bijvoorbeeld voor kwaliteitszorg, credit
transfer en toelatingseisen, die onderwerpen van disputu worden waardoor er
alsnog coalities worden gevormd.

2. Verwachting ten aanzien van gedrag tussen actoren in subsysteem

Tabel 14 geeft een overzicht van veranderingen van de beleidvisies,
interdependentie en het gedrag van actoren in het hoger onderwijs systeem
**Table 14:** Samenvatting van veranderingen van de beleidsvisies, interdependentie en het gedrag van actoren in het hoger onderwijs systeem gedurende de drie fases, 1993-1999, 2000-2002 en 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Beleidsvisie:</strong></td>
<td>congruent</td>
<td>divergent</td>
<td>congruent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interdependentie:</strong></td>
<td>onafhankelijk</td>
<td>Relatief onafhankelijk (financieel meer afhankelijk dan voorheen, wettelijk nog onafhankelijk)</td>
<td>Afhankelijk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coalitie gedrag:</strong></td>
<td>Zwakke coördinatie</td>
<td>Zwak conflict</td>
<td>Zwakke coördinatie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Verwachte coalitie gedrag:</strong></td>
<td>Zwak coördinatie</td>
<td>Zwak conflict</td>
<td>Coalities met ernstige problemen van collectieve acties</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 Verwachtingen ten aanzien van grote beleidsveranderingen


ACF is niet vaak toegepast op situaties waar grote politieke omwentelingen hebben plaatsgevonden en waar een subsysteem nog moet worden opgebouwd. Op grond van één studie is het te voorbarig om conclusies te trekken. Volgens Sabatier en Jenkins-Smith komt het zelden voor dat er veranderingen optreden in de fundamentele politieke constructies. ACF specificeert om deze reden niet wat de gevolgen (kunnen) zijn voor beleidsontwikkelingen wanneer er wel veranderingen optreden in de, wat zij noemen, stabiele facetten van de samenleving.


**Reflectie**

ACF identificeert de sleutelvariabelen die van belang zijn bij beleidsveranderingen. Het belangrijkste principe van ACF is dat beleidsveranderingen tot stand komen door veranderingen in opvattingen over beleid en dat actoren op grondd van hun beleidsvisies strategieën ontwikkelen om het regeringsbeleid te beïnvloeden. Vanuit dit perspectief gezien is ACF van toepassing op de Mozambikaanse case. Echter de empirie wijst ook uit dat niet alle aspecten van het theoretisch raamwerk gelden voor het Mozambikaanse hoger onderwijs systeem; opvattingen waren niet gefragmenteerd in het jonge hoger onderwijs systeem dat ontstaan was doordat nieuwe beleidsonderwerpen van belang werden, en beleidsveranderingen volgden elkaar sneller op dan ACF voorspelt. Een belangrijke reden waarom de stellingen weerlegd worden is dat ACF van bepaalde assumpties uitgaat die wellicht in westerse geïndustrialiseerde samenleving van toepassing zijn, maar niet in contexten met een hoge mate van *civile en politieke turbulentie*. De Mozambikaanse case verschilt in grote mate van de cases die Sabatier en Jenkins-Smith beschrijven. Zij hebben ACF toegepast op stabiele subsystemen waarin actoren reeds lange tijd een duidelijke rol en verantwoordelijkheid hebben. Het Mozambikaanse subsysteem is ontstaan als gevolg van politieke omwentelingen waardoor zowel het subsysteem als actoren en instanties in het systeem nog ontwikkeld moesten worden. Dit had grote invloed op de beleidsprocessen. Het Mozambikaanse systeem kende niet zoals Sabatier en Jenkins-Smith verwachten, een groot aantal actoren die afkomstig waren uit verschillende beleidsscheidsreken en tegelijkertijd ook een gemeenschappelijk beleidskwestie belangrijk achteren. Daarnaast waren er geen instanties die het beleidsproces konden vertragen.

Kenmerkend voor het Mozambikaanse systeem is dat alle actoren erop gericht waren om de basisstructuur voor het hoger onderwijs systeem te realiseren. Binnen dit systeem was alles gericht op beleidsverandering. Ondanks dat we stelden dat hulpbronnen een belangrijke rol speelden bij coalitiegedrag kan worden afgevraagd in hoeverre deze factor van doorslaggevende betekenis is
geweest in dit beleidsproces, aangezien alle actoren waren gericht op beleidsverandering.

Alles bij elkaar genomen kan worden vastgesteld dat de specifieke situatie van Mozambique grote invloed heeft gehad op de beleidsprocessen. Omdat in dit onderzoek ACF binnen één land is getoetst met een turbulente context zijn de conclusies tentatief. Er is meer onderzoek nodig in landen met een soortgelijke context. Een relevant thema dat verder kritisch bestudeerd zou kunnen worden in zo'n context is de uniformiteit van een jong subsysteem. Dergelijk onderzoek zou de vraag kunnen beantwoorden of er zoiets bestaat als een uniform jong subsysteem of dat dit afhankelijk is van de context. Bovendien zou het nadere antwoorden kunnen opleveren over de tijdsduur van een jong subsysteem. In Mozambique was het subsysteem, volgens de definities van ACF, na tien jaar nog steeds jong. Tevens is er verder onderzoek nodig naar de factoren die beleidsprocessen versnellen of vertragen. Hierbij zou met name gekeken moeten worden naar de rol van instituties en de interactie tussen actoren.

Slotopmerking
Vandaag de dag wordt veel belang gehecht aan de kennis economie. Mede als gevolg hiervan geven vele regeringen in ontwikkelingslanden veel aandacht aan de hoger onderwijs sector. Regeringen trachten de problemen in het hoger onderwijs op te lossen door hervorming van de gehele sector. In de eerste plaats is dit relevant voor de jonge generaties in deze landen. Bovenal is het voor studies over hoger onderwijs beleid interessant, omdat het empirisch materiaal levert waarmee ACF verder kan worden getoetst.
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Appendix 1: commissions established by MESCT

Between 2000 and 2003, MESCT established temporary commissions with the following remits:

- Develop the strategic plan for science and technology, (November 2001-July 2003)
- Re-formulate Law n.1/93 on higher education (May 2001-May 2002)
- Operationalise the Strategic Plan on Higher Education (PEES) (September 2000-June 2001)
- Develop a policy on distance education (created in 2001 and still operational)
- Develop a policy for a system of credit transfer and accumulation (October 2003-June 2004)
- Develop a policy for a system to guarantee quality, accreditation and evaluation (October 2003-June 2004)

**Commission for Science and Technology**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boaventura Cuamba (coordinator)</td>
<td>UEM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almiro Lobo</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danilo Parbato</td>
<td>MESCT</td>
</tr>
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<td>Francisco Maússie</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabriela da Silva</td>
<td>Instituto Nacional de Normalização e Qaulidade</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mahomed Harune</td>
<td>Ministry for Agriculture and rural development</td>
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<td>Paula Meneses</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rodrigues Manjate</td>
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**Commission for Operationalisation of the PEES**

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<td>Zélia Menete</td>
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<td>Espírito Santo</td>
<td>ISRI</td>
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<td>Fernando Ganhão</td>
<td>UDM</td>
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<td>Paulo Assarbujo</td>
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**Group of legal advisors to MESCT**

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<tr>
<td>Oscar Monteiro</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rita Casimiro</td>
<td>MGA</td>
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<td>Paulo Assubuji</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
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<td>Mouzinho Mário</td>
<td>UEM</td>
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**Commission for Science and Technology:**

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<tr>
<td>Orlando Quilambo (coordinator till 2004)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Américo Magaia (until 2004)</td>
<td>FACIM (Feira Internacional de Maputo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ana Bela Manhiça (from 2004)</td>
<td>National Institute for Research on Veterinary</td>
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<tr>
<td>António Prista</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carla Honwana (until 2004)</td>
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<td>Feliciano Micavo</td>
<td>School of Journalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ilesh Jani</td>
<td>National Institute of Health (INS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jorge Barreto (coordinator until mid 2003)</td>
<td>National Institute of Health (INS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manuel Cureva</td>
<td>MESCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roland Brouwer (coordinator from 2004)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rufino Gujamo</td>
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**Commission for Distance Education**

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<tr>
<td>António Franque</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ana Edite Mendonça</td>
<td>UEM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benilde Vieira</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anísio Matangala</td>
<td>MINED</td>
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<sup>36</sup> members of this “commission” got paid
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<tr>
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<td>Willem Neeleman</td>
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<td>Miguel Buendia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Humberto Muquing</td>
<td>UEM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elsa Pereira</td>
<td>ISPU</td>
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<td>Félix Guzman</td>
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**Commission for a system to guarantee quality, accreditation and evaluation:**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Óscar Basílio</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>João Paulo Borges Coelho,</td>
<td>UEM</td>
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<tr>
<td>José - Magode</td>
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<td>João Massenda</td>
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<td>Franscisco Noa</td>
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<td>Danilo Parbato</td>
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<td>Norton Pinto</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luisa Santos,</td>
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<td>Lopo Vasconcelos</td>
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**Commission for a system of credit transfer and accumulation:**

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<td>UP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fernando Tsucane</td>
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### Appendix 2: list of interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>15-11-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rector</td>
<td>HEI c</td>
<td>20-11-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Rector</td>
<td>HEI d</td>
<td>21-11-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rector</td>
<td>HEI e</td>
<td>13-11-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rector</td>
<td>HEI f</td>
<td>08-07-02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rector</td>
<td>HEI g</td>
<td>03-07-02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dean</td>
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<td>16-06-02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>27-06-02</td>
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<tr>
<td>Director Planning</td>
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<td>14-06-02</td>
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<td>10-03-03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Director Planning</td>
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<td>03-03-03</td>
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<tr>
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<td>05-03-03</td>
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### Higher education institutions (HEIs)

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### Donor organisation

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<tr>
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### Iron triangle: Ministers, bureaucrats and members of Parliament

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<tr>
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## Iron triangle: Ministers, bureaucrats and members of Parliament

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## Business sector

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Appendix 3: Q-sort methodology

Table 15 gives an overview of how the 4 groups valued the statements.

Table 15: Statements and factor scores for higher education subsystem actors

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<th>Statements and factor scores for each group</th>
<th>Groups</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1  The higher education sector has a priority role in the battle against poverty and therefore deserves specific attention from the government</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2  All education sectors in the education sub-system have their own important role in society and require the same attention from government</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3  Government should play a leading role in the development, expansion and diversification of the higher education sector</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4  The private higher education sector and the business sector should increase their role in the development of the higher education system</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5  The HEIs must identify national priorities with respect to the higher education sector</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6  The strategy for the development of higher education sector cannot be separated from the overall economic and education policies of the GoM</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7  The Government is purposely not spending sufficient financial resources and attention on the higher education sector since it is easier to rule a country that is less educated than a country that is more educated</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8  The GoM should interfere more with the public sector in order to promote a social policy that supports economical disadvantaged people</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9  The higher education sector must have its own budget that is independent from budgets for other education sectors.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 The separate Ministry for higher education is to be preferred as opposed to a separate unit within MINED</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 The overall education budget should be equally</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
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</table>
## Appendix 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements and factor scores for each group</th>
<th>Groups</th>
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<tr>
<td>be divided between all the different education sectors</td>
<td>1 2 3 4</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 Government should have a leading role in steering and co-ordinating the higher education institutions</td>
<td>0 3 2 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Both public and private HEIs should benefit from the State in terms of resource allocation and fiscal stimuli</td>
<td>2 0 1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 There should be more cooperation between the business sector and the HEIs</td>
<td>0 1 1 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Public HEIs should be less dependent on the government and donors and generate more income for themselves</td>
<td>1 2 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 HEIs should be more included in the decision-making process on higher education policy</td>
<td>4 -2 2 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 It is MESCT and not MINED or the MPF that should have most decision-making power in matters with respect to higher education institutions</td>
<td>-1 1 -2 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 MESCT should develop their policies in cooperation with MINED in order to improve the links between the various education sectors</td>
<td>2 4 2 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Given that Central and Northern Mozambique are economically disadvantaged regions, priority should be given to the expansion of higher education in these regions</td>
<td>1 0 0 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Although higher education is on the agenda of the government, in practise, the government is not paying enough attention to this sector and not investing enough</td>
<td>-2 -4 -2 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 The government should guarantee equal access and participation for all citizens, including talented but disadvantaged students.</td>
<td>3 3 4 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 The government should create more incentives to promote and support the private HEIs</td>
<td>2 -1 -3 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Formally, MESCT is a co-ordinating Ministry, however, in practice they manage the HEIs</td>
<td>-4 -3 -1 -3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 It is MESCT, as opposed to the rector, who should, in cooperation with the MPF, decide on the funding of HEIs.</td>
<td>-2 1 -2 -1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Public funding should be based on the performance of a higher education institution, instead of being defined by the actual level of expenditure by category</td>
<td>4 1 -1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statements and factor scores for each group</td>
<td>Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 The level and quality of the programmes of private HEI should be the responsibility of the private HEIs since they are financing their own institution</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 It is the role of MESCT to promote private HE, given that the degrees (and values of these degrees) that these HEIs offer are hardly or less known compared to those of the public HEIs</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Donors should pool their financial support in a donor fund that is managed and redistributed by MESCT instead of supporting the HEIs directly</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Private and public HEIs should co-operate to solve problems with respect the shortage of lecturers</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 The problem with respect to moonlighting should be solved by MESCT</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Co-ordination implies that MESCT is guiding a policy process in cooperation with existing governmental officials and stakeholders</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 Under the guise of co-ordinating Ministry, MESCT is asking too much time and effort of stakeholders who already have a busy job</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 The way MESCT is structured, causes a lack of continuity in the policy-making process, given that MESCT is heavily dependent on external consultants and representatives of HEIs and governmental bodies</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 Due to the specific nature of MESCT, bureaucracy is avoided and relevant front-line and knowledgeable people are included</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 Institutional autonomy implies that the rectors should spend the money according to their own vision and priorities</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 Institutional autonomy implies that HEIs can spend their money according to a plan which MESCT and rectors of the public HEIs have negotiated and agree on</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37 With the new MESCT, the policy making process is more difficult and bureaucratic, given the introduction of many new rules.</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38 Scholarships should not only be offered to students doing a higher education course, but also for students doing medium education</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The four groups (in Q-sort methodology terms factors) indicate cluster of persons who have ranked the statements in essentially the same fashion. The programme computed an idealised Q-sort for each group.

The upper row indicates the values. The numbers in the other rows illustrate the number of the statement.

For the analysis we particularly focussed on the statements on which the groups agreed or disagreed most (-4, -3, +3, +4). These are the policy issues most salient for the groups.

The Q-sort of Group 1

```
-4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4
28  24  20  12  29  4  6  31  25
23  11  32  2  19  3 10  22  16
  27  7  35  9 30  21  18
  26  17  8  5  13
  36  34  33
  38  1  15
   14
    37
```

The Q-sort of Group 2

```
-4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4
35  33  8  27  32  17 12  21  3
20  16  30  13  36  25  5 15 18
  23  7  26  4 24  6 31
  29  11  19  34  1
  22  2  9
  10  38  14
   37
    28
```
The Q-sort of Group 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>-4</th>
<th>-3</th>
<th>-2</th>
<th>-1</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>23</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
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<td>13</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tbody>
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The Q-sort of Group 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>31</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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</table>

Seventeen correspondents were correlated, creating a 17 by 17 matrix. The matrix was factor analysed using the principle component method, which were then rotated according to the varimax rotation.
Table 16: Factor loadings of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.0119</td>
<td>0.0755</td>
<td>0.1050</td>
<td>0.8709X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2345</td>
<td>0.0767</td>
<td>0.5456X</td>
<td>0.4922X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.6567X</td>
<td>0.0232</td>
<td>-0.0561</td>
<td>0.4180X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>-0.1548</td>
<td>0.8125X</td>
<td>0.1628</td>
<td>0.0297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.1458</td>
<td>0.1225</td>
<td>0.7766X</td>
<td>0.1533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.4445X</td>
<td>0.1014</td>
<td>0.7289X</td>
<td>0.0843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.7583X</td>
<td>0.0917</td>
<td>0.2862</td>
<td>0.1689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.4740X</td>
<td>0.1684</td>
<td>0.1628</td>
<td>0.5038X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.7556X</td>
<td>0.0592</td>
<td>0.0518</td>
<td>0.0254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.2486</td>
<td>0.4878X</td>
<td>0.3614</td>
<td>0.5824X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>-0.0775</td>
<td>0.2306</td>
<td>0.7491X</td>
<td>0.0824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.3471</td>
<td>0.2373</td>
<td>0.1031</td>
<td>0.5475X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.6438X</td>
<td>0.2653</td>
<td>0.4302X</td>
<td>0.2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.0730</td>
<td>0.7790X</td>
<td>0.2816</td>
<td>0.1678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.3849</td>
<td>0.3141</td>
<td>0.3001</td>
<td>0.4260X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.4154X</td>
<td>0.5996X</td>
<td>0.2396</td>
<td>0.2582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.3638</td>
<td>0.6504X</td>
<td>-0.0729</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% expl.Var. | 19 | 16 | 16 | 15

X indicates that the respondents have similar beliefs as the idealised belief of the group (factor loading higher than 0.42).

Table 17: Correlations between the 4 groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>0.4293</td>
<td>0.5909</td>
<td>0.6061</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.4890</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.6061</td>
<td>0.4890</td>
<td>0.5198</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>