Timed Model Checking of Security Protocols

Corin, R. and Etalle, S. and Hartel, P.H. and Mader, A. (2004) Timed Model Checking of Security Protocols. In: 2nd ACM Workshop on Formal Methods in Security Engineering, FMSE 2004, October 25-29, 2004, Washington, DC, USA.

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Abstract:	We propose a method for engineering security protocols that are aware of timing aspects. We study a simplified version of the well-known Needham Schroeder protocol and the complete Yahalom protocol. Timing information allows the study of different attack scenarios. We illustrate the attacks by model checking the protocol using Uppaal. We also present new challenges and threats that arise when considering time.
Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item
Copyright:	© 2004 ACM
Faculty:	Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science (EEMCS)
Research Group:	Distributed and Embedded Systems (DIES) Robotics and Mechatronics (CE)
Link to this item:	http://purl.utwente.nl/publications/48643
Official URL:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1029133.1029137
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