Analysing Password Protocol Security Against Off-line Dictionary Attacks

Share/Save/Bookmark

Corin, Ricardo and Doumen, Jeroen and Etalle, Sandro (2004) Analysing Password Protocol Security Against Off-line Dictionary Attacks. In: Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Security Issues with Petri Nets and other Computational Models (WISP 2004). Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science, 121 (4). Elsevier, pp. 47-63.

[img]
Preview
PDF
223Kb
Abstract:We study the security of password protocols against off-line dictionary attacks. In addition to the standard adversary abilities, we also consider further cryptographic advantages given to the adversary when considering the password protocol being instantiated with particular encryption schemes. We work with the applied pi-calculus of Abadi and Fournet, in which the (new) adversary abilities are modelled as equations between terms. As case studies, we analyse the Encrypted Password Transmission (EPT) protocol of Halevi and Krawczyk, and the wellknown Encrypted Key (EKE) of Bellovin and Merritt. In the latter, we find an attack that arises when considering the ability of distinguishing ciphertexts from random noise. We propose a modification to EKE that prevents this attack.
Item Type:Book Section
Copyright:© 1997 Elsevier
Faculty:
Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science (EEMCS)
Research Group:
Link to this item:http://purl.utwente.nl/publications/48642
Official URL:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.entcs.2004.10.007
Export this item as:BibTeX
EndNote
HTML Citation
Reference Manager

 

Repository Staff Only: item control page

Metis ID: 220302