Policymaking, Comitology and the Balance of power in the European Union

Steunenberg, Bernard and Koboldt, Christian and Schmidtchen, Dieter (1996) Policymaking, Comitology and the Balance of power in the European Union. International Review of Law and Economics, 16 (3). pp. 329-344. ISSN 0144-8188

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Abstract:	Using simple game theory, this paper analyzes the working properties of the different procedures laid down in the comitology decision, i.e., the European Council's decision on procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission. Furthermore, it addresses the question of how the balance of power is determined by this decision.
Item Type:	Article
Copyright:	© 1996 Elsevier Science
Research Group:	Finance and Accounting (F&A)
Link to this item:	http://purl.utwente.nl/publications/1789
Official URL:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0144-8188(96)00026-9
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